Title
Teekay Shipping Philippines, Inc. vs. Ramoga, Jr.
Case
G.R. No. 209582
Decision Date
Jan 19, 2018
Seafarer injured on duty; company physician declared him fit within 240 days, overriding personal doctor’s opinion. No permanent disability benefits granted.
seafarer
ankle injury
permanent total disability benefits

Case Summary (G.R. No. 209582)

Employment Contract and Medical Events

On February 18, 2010, respondent entered into a contract of overseas employment with Teekay Shipping Ltd., represented by its local manning agency, Teekay Shipping Philippines Inc., to work as Deck Trainee on board M/T “SEBAROK SPIRIT.” The contract’s terms were approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). After undergoing the mandatory pre-employment medical examination (PEME), respondent was declared fit for sea duty and joined the vessel on April 9, 2010.

Barely six months later, respondent slipped and twisted his left ankle while climbing the vessel’s stairs. He underwent an x-ray in Thailand at Bangkok Hospital and was diagnosed with a non-displaced fracture at the base of the second metatarsal and a mild displaced fracture at the base of the third metatarsal. Surgery for open reduction and internal fixation was recommended to prevent further displacement. Respondent was repatriated to the Philippines on October 4, 2010.

The next day, respondent was referred to Metropolitan Medical Center, where he underwent rehabilitation under Dr. Esther G. Go. On October 9, 2010, respondent was operated on by the company-designated physician, Dr. William Chuasuan, Jr., for open reduction with internal fixation using intramedullary pinning of the left third metatarsal bone. He was advised to use crutches to aid ambulation and was given medications.

On April 8, 2011, Dr. Chuasuan, Jr. issued a certification that respondent was fit to return to work. Dissatisfied, respondent consulted his own doctor, Dr. Rogelio P. Catapang, who reported that respondent continued to experience pain and discomfort in his left foot and ankle despite physiotherapy. The report stated that respondent could not ambulate for long distances, could not tolerate prolonged walking and squatting when the left foot bore weight, and had been unable to work since the injury. On that basis, respondent was declared permanently unfit in any capacity to resume sea duties.

The Complaint and Rulings of the Labor Arbiter and NLRC

Respondent filed a complaint for permanent total disability benefits, sickness allowance, medical expenses, damages, and attorney’s fees under the Revised Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-going Vessels. On September 14, 2011, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in respondent’s favor and ordered petitioners to jointly and solidarily pay US$60,000.00 (or its peso equivalent at the time of payment) as permanent total disability benefits, US$648.27 as sickness allowance, and ten percent (10%) of the total award as attorney’s fees.

On appeal, the NLRC affirmed with modification. It deleted the award of sickness allowance, holding that respondent was not entitled to that specific benefit. The NLRC thus modified the Labor Arbiter’s decision by deleting the sickness allowance of US$648.27, while leaving the remaining awards intact.

Appellate Review by the Court of Appeals

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the NLRC. It reasoned that Dr. Chuasuan, Jr.’s certification was not sufficiently categorical as a definitive declaration of fitness at the time it was issued on April 8, 2011. The Court of Appeals also held that respondent should be considered permanently disabled because he was not able to resume work for more than 120 days from his repatriation on October 4, 2010. The Court of Appeals treated his disability as both total and permanent, emphasizing that permanent disability in this context referred to inability to perform his job for more than 120 days, even without loss of use of any part of the body. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals on October 18, 2013.

Issues Raised in the Supreme Court Petition

Petitioners elevated the matter to the Supreme Court under Rule 45, asserting that the CA and the lower tribunals erred in concluding that respondent was entitled to permanent total disability benefits. Petitioners argued that respondent was unable to resume work only within the legal period because Dr. Chuasuan, Jr. declared him fit to return to work on April 8, 2011, which was 186 days from repatriation. Petitioners thus maintained that the medical declaration satisfied the statutory and contractual framework on when the company-designated physician may assess fitness.

Supreme Court Approach to Factual Review and Framework of Disability Claims

The Supreme Court recognized that Rule 45 generally limits review to questions of law because it is not a trier of facts. It also acknowledged recognized exceptions allowing factual review when, among others, the CA’s findings are grounded on misapprehension of facts, are based on absence of evidence contradicted by the record, or are contrary to the trial court’s findings. The Court proceeded to review the factual basis for determining entitlement to permanent total disability benefits.

The decision addressed the doctrinal standards governing seafarers’ disability claims, anchored on Article 198(c)(1) of the Labor Code, which deems disability lasting for more than 120 days to be total and permanent, and on the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation, Rule X, Section 2, which provides for a 120-day period of entitlement, with an extension up to 240 days only under circumstances where continued medical attendance is required, and where the System may declare total and permanent status after 120 days of continuous temporary total disability as warranted by actual impairment.

The Court further discussed harmonization of the 120-day and 240-day periods in Elburg Shipmanagement Phils. Inc., et. al. v. Quiogue, explaining that seafarers are not automatically entitled to permanent total disability benefits upon mere lapse of 120 days. The Court explained that jurisprudence distinguishes between cases where treatment is extended with justification and cases where no adequate justification exists for extending diagnosis and treatment. It reiterated the rule that the company-designated physician must perform a significant act to invoke the exceptional 240-day period and must provide sufficient justification for extension. It referenced C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. v. Taok to emphasize that applying the 240-day exceptional period unconditionally would render the 120-day rule inoperative.

The Supreme Court restated the governing guidelines from Elburg Shipmanagement and related cases, requiring that: the company-designated physician issue a final assessment within 120 days from the time the seafarer reported; failure to do so without justifiable reason renders disability permanent and total; failure within 120 days with sufficient justification extends diagnosis and treatment to 240 days, with the employer bearing the burden to prove sufficient justification; and still no assessment within 240 days results in permanent and total disability regardless of justification.

Application to the Facts: Justification for Extension and Weight of the Company-Designated Physician’s Assessment

Applying these principles, the Court noted that respondent was medically repatriated on October 4, 2010, and that it was undisputed that Dr. Chuasuan, Jr. issued a fitness-to-work declaration on April 8, 2011, or 186 days from repatriation. The Court therefore focused on whether there was sufficient justification to extend the assessment period beyond 120 days.

The Court examined the record and found a report from the company-designated physician dated January 11, 2011, advising respondent to continue rehabilitation and medications and to come back on February 1, 2011 for a repeat x-ray and re-evaluation. The Court treated this as evidence that the company-designated physician determined respondent’s condition required further medical treatment and evaluation. It thus held that it was premature for respondent to file for permanent total disability benefits on March 4, 2011, because at that time respondent was not yet entitled to such benefits within the standards governing the periods of diagnosis and treatment.

The Supreme Court further reasoned that under the framework, the company-designated physician had until June 1, 2011—the 240th day from repatriation—to issue a declaration. It also rejected the view that respondent’s own doctor’s assessment of unfitness was conclusive. The Court held that the company-designated physician’s ass

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