Title
Teehankee, Jr. vs. Madayag
Case
G.R. No. 103102
Decision Date
Mar 6, 1992
Claudio Teehankee, Jr. charged with frustrated murder; amended to consummated murder after victim's death. SC upheld amendment as formal, no new preliminary investigation needed, and validated counsel de oficio appointment. Trial court's scheduling discretion affirmed.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 103102)

Applicable Law and Authorities

  • Constitutional basis: 1987 Philippine Constitution (as the operative charter for this decision).
  • Rules on Criminal Procedure: Section 14, Rule 110, 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure (governing amendment and substitution of informations/complaints); Rule 119, Section 11 (referenced for substitution procedures).
  • Controlling jurisprudence and authorities cited in the decision: Melo v. People; Almeda v. Villaluz; Guinto v. Veluz; Vega v. Panis; People v. Montenegro; People v. Magpale; and treatise authority (42 C.J.S., Indictment and Information).
  • Legal tests articulated in the authorities: distinction between amendment and substitution; when an amendment is of form versus substance; the “identity of offenses” test (whether the evidence sufficient for one offense is sufficient for the other); the practical test whether any defense or evidence available under the original information remains equally available after amendment.

Facts and Nature of the Amendment

  • Original information charged frustrated murder: allegation that petitioner shot the victim in the head with intent to kill, and medical assistance prevented death.
  • After the victim’s death, the amended information charged consummated murder, adding the allegation that the wounds inflicted directly caused the victim’s death.
  • Petitioner objected that the amendment was substantial because it changed the nature of the offense (from frustrated to consummated murder) and therefore required a new preliminary investigation and could not be admitted after trial had begun.

Legal Distinction: Amendment Versus Substitution

  • Section 14, Rule 110 provides (a) amendment rules and (b) rules for substitution where a mistake in charging the proper offense is discovered.
  • Key differences explained by the Court:
    1. Amendment may be formal or substantial; substitution necessarily involves a substantial change.
    2. An amendment before plea may be made without leave; substitution requires dismissal of the original and filing of a new information with leave.
    3. Substitution generally entails a new preliminary investigation and new plea; amendments of form do not.
    4. An amended information must allege the same offense or one that necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the original; substitution is used when the new information charges a distinct offense.

Application of the Identity-of-Offenses Test to the Case

  • The Court concluded that frustrated murder is a stage in the execution of murder and is necessarily included in the consummated offense.
  • Both frustrated murder and murder require identical essential allegations in this context: intent to kill and qualifying circumstances (e.g., treachery, evident premeditation).
  • Because the same material allegations were essential to both informations—and because the prosecution’s theory (that the accused committed a felonious act with intent to kill) remained unchanged—the amended information did not charge a different offense but only advanced the stage of execution from frustration to consummation.

Form Versus Substance: Why the Amendment Was Permissible

  • The Court treated the addition of the victim’s death as an amendment of form (or, at most, a non-prejudicial substantive amendment) rather than a substitution of a different offense.
  • The relevant test applied: whether defenses available under the original information remain equally available after amendment, and whether evidence the accused might have is equally applicable.
  • Because defenses and evidence applicable to frustrated murder would equally apply to murder in this case, the amendment did not prejudice petitioner’s rights and thus was properly allowed under Section 14, Rule 110.
  • The Court cited authorities holding that amendments affecting penalty range, not altering the prosecution’s theory, or not causing surprise are formal and permissible even during trial.

Preliminary Investigation Requirement and Due Process

  • The Court held that a new preliminary investigation was unnecessary where the amended charge is essentially related to the original charge and an inquiry into one would elicit substantially the same facts as an inquiry into the other.
  • The filing of the amended information without a new preliminary investigation did not constitute a violation of petitioner’s constitutional protections against hasty or oppressive prosecutions, nor did it infringe the accused’s right to prepare his defense, since the prosecution’s theory remained the same and the accused could not credibly claim surprise.

Appointment of Counsel de Oficio

  • The trial court appointed a counsel de oficio after petitioner’s retained counsel refused to participate, asserting a legal issue.
  • The Supreme Court found the appointment proper: the issue raised by petitioner’s counsel was determined to be legally baseless, and counsel’s refusal to participate was viewed as contributing to delay in disposition.
  • Where a counsel of record declines to engage in proceedings and that

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