G.R. No. 103102 - Teehankee, Jr. vs. Madayag

Case Summary (G.R. No. 103102)

Factual Background

Petitioner CLAUDIO J. TEEHANKEE, JR. was initially charged by information with the crime of frustrated murder for an attack on Maureen Navarro Hultman on or about July 13, 1991, in Makati. After the prosecution rested and while petitioner sought leave to file a demurrer to evidence, the victim died. Thereupon the private prosecutor moved to file and have admitted an amended information charging murder. The amended information, filed October 31, 1991, added the allegation that the victim sustained mortal wounds which directly caused her death. Petitioner opposed the amendment and refused arraignment on the ground that a new preliminary investigation was required.

Trial Court Proceedings

On November 13, 1991, the trial court admitted the amended information. At the scheduled arraignment, petitioner refused to be arraigned for lack of a preliminary investigation on the new charge. The trial court nonetheless ordered that a plea of “not guilty” be entered for petitioner and directed the prosecution to proceed with presentation of evidence. When petitioner’s retained counsel declined to participate, the trial court appointed a counsel de oficio to represent petitioner.

Procedural Posture Before This Court

Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus seeking to nullify the trial court’s order admitting the amended information, to set aside the arraignment and the involuntary entry of a plea, to annul the appointment of counsel de oficio, to prohibit preferential scheduling, and to compel a preliminary investigation on the amended charge. The case was taken up by this Court en banc, and the Solicitor General’s comment was dispensed with because the operative facts and issues were presented in the petition and annexes.

Issues Presented

Petitioner raised three principal questions: whether an amended information effecting a change from frustrated to consummated murder may be admitted without a new preliminary investigation after the prosecution rested and the accused pleaded; whether a counsel de oficio may be appointed where retained counsel refuses to participate for reasons of perceived denial of due process; and whether the trial court may give preferential scheduling to the criminal case over other pending cases.

Petitioner’s Contentions

Petitioner argued that the allegation of the victim’s death in the amended information constituted a substantial amendment because it changed the nature of the offense from frustrated to consummated murder and introduced a new material fact—causation of death—that must be separately established and therefore required a fresh preliminary investigation. Petitioner further maintained that appointment of counsel de oficio was improper while retained counsel remained of record and that the trial court erred in ordering trial and scheduling that favored the instant case over older matters.

Respondents’ Position

The trial court and the prosecution treated the amended information as an allowable amendment under Section 14, Rule 110, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. They maintained that frustrated murder is a stage in the execution of murder and that the amended information did not charge a different or distinct offense but only supplied the supervening fact of the victim’s death. Respondents defended the appointment of counsel de oficio on the ground that retained counsel’s refusal to participate was obstructive and contributed to delay, and they asserted that case scheduling falls within the trial court’s sound discretion so long as no substantial right of the accused is prejudiced.

Legal Framework

Section 14, Rule 110, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure was quoted and applied. The Court treated the first paragraph of Section 14 as governing amendment of informations before plea and during trial as to matters of form, and the second paragraph as governing substitution of informations when a mistake in charging the proper offense is discovered and a new information must be filed in accordance with Rule 119, Section 11. The Court reiterated the distinction between an amendment (which may be formal or substantial) and substitution (which necessarily involves a substantial change), and invoked precedent including Melo vs. People, 85 Phil. 766 (1950) and People vs. Magpale, 70 Phil. 176 (1940) to test identity of offenses and the necessity of preliminary inquiry.

Court’s Analysis

The Court found that frustrated murder is a stage in the execution of murder and thus is necessarily included in the offense of murder. The Court explained that identity of offenses exists where evidence sufficient to convict for one offense would be sufficient to convict for the other, or when one offense necessarily includes the other. Applying the test, the Court held that t

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 103102)

Parties and Posture

CLAUDIO J. TEEHANKEE, JR., PETITIONER filed a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus seeking relief from several orders of the trial court.
HON. JOB B. MADAYAG and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS defended the trial court's admission of an amended information and subsequent trial proceedings.
The petition directly challenged the trial court's admission of an amended information upgrading the charge from frustrated murder to murder, the entry of a plea on petitioner's behalf, the appointment of a counsel de oficio, and the trial court's scheduling practices.
The Supreme Court resolved the petition on the record without awaiting the Solicitor General's comment and denied the extraordinary writs for lack of merit.

Key Facts

CLAUDIO J. TEEHANKEE, JR. was originally charged by information dated July 19, 1991 for frustrated murder allegedly committed on July 13, 1991 by shooting Maureen Navarro Hultman in the head.
After the prosecution rested, petitioner was granted leave to file a demurrer to evidence but the demurrer was not filed when the victim subsequently died.
Private prosecutor Rogelio A. Vinluan filed an omnibus motion and an amended information dated October 31, 1991 alleging that the same act directly caused the death of Maureen Navarro Hultman, thereby charging murder.
Petitioner filed an opposition and rejoinder to the amended information, and the trial court admitted the amended information on November 13, 1991.
At the scheduled arraignment on November 26, 1991, petitioner refused to be arraigned for lack of a new preliminary investigation, and the trial court ordered a plea of "not guilty" to be entered for him.
Petitioner's retained counsel refused to participate further in the proceedings and the trial court appointed a counsel de oficio to represent petitioner while the prosecution was ordered to present its evidence.

Procedural History

Petitioner filed this special civil action in the Supreme Court to nullify the admission of the amended information, to set aside the arraignment and plea entered for him, to annul the appointment of a counsel de oficio, to prohibit alleged preferential scheduling, and to compel a new preliminary investigation.
The Supreme Court noted the operative facts and determinative issues were sufficiently presented in the petition and its annexes and proceeded to decide the case without the Solicitor General's comment.
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, dismissed the petition and denied the prayed extraordinary writs.

Issues Presented

The first issue was whether an amended information involving a substantial amendment may be admitted without a new preliminary investigation after the prosecution had rested on the original information.
The second issue was whether the appointment of a counsel de oficio was proper where the accused had counsel of choice who refused to participate because of a perceived denial of due process.
The third issue was whether a criminal case may be preferentially scheduled and "rushed" over older criminal cases in a manner prejudicial to the accused.

Statutory Framework

Section 14, Rule 110, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure governs the amendment and substitution of informations or complaints and distinguishes amendments before and after the plea.
Section 5, Rule 120, 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure and Rule 119, Section 11 are cited in relation to substitution and dismissal of original informations when a new information charging the proper offense is filed.
The rule recognizes the distinction between amendment and substitution,