Case Summary (G.R. No. 161434)
The petitions in G.R. Nos. 161434 and 161634 (Tecson et al. and Velez) must be dismissed as premature and for lack of jurisdiction. Article VII, Section 4(7) of the 1987 Constitution makes this Court the sole judge “of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President” only after proclamation of a winner, i.e. in post-election quo warranto or election-protest proceedings, not pre-election challenges to a candidate’s certificate of candidacy.
G.R. No. 161824 (Fornier) challenges the COMELEC En Banc’s dismissal of his petition to cancel Fernando Poe Jr.’s certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of B.P. Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code). Section 78 authorizes any person to file a verified petition to deny due course to, or cancel, a certificate of candidacy on the sole ground that any material representation therein is false. The COMELEC has such jurisdiction under Article IX-C, Sections 2(1) & (3) of the Constitution (“exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections” and “decide . . . all questions affecting elections”). Decisions of the COMELEC on these petitions may be reviewed by this Court on certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65.
The COMELEC First Division and En Banc dismissed Fornier’s petition on two principal grounds:
- They considered only whether FPJ “deliberately” or “knowingly” misrepresented his citizenship in his certificate, finding no proof of intent to deceive.
- They engaged in a tentative merits ruling that FPJ is a natural-born Filipino by blood (jus sanguinis) from his father, Allan F. Poe, overlooking that Fornier’s evidence was not substantial and that crucial facts were unproved.
The COMELEC’s dismissal was a gross abuse of discretion because:
• The COMELEC failed to comply with the Constitution (Art. VIII, Sec. 14) and its own Rules of Procedure (Rule 18, Secs. 1–2) requiring any decision to “express . . . clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.” Both questioned resolutions simply recited general findings that the evidence was “not substantial” without identifying the specific evidence accepted or rejected or the findings on the key factual issues (the citizenship of FPJ’s ancestors, the validity of exhibits, FPJ’s legitimacy and paternity).
• They erred in reading Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC (1995) to import an intent-to-deceive requirement into Section 78. Nothing in Section 78 requires proof of intent; it demands only that the “material representation” (here, “I am a natural-born Filipino citizen”) be “false.” Citizenship is an objective fact, not a candidate’s belief.
• The COMELEC’s merits determinations wrongly assumed without proof that FPJ’s grandfather, Lorenzo Pou, became a Filipino citizen under the Treaty of Paris and the Organic Acts by being a resident on April 11, 1899; that FPJ’s father, Allan F. Poe, was a Filipino citizen at FPJ’s birth; and that FPJ, born out of wedlock, nevertheless inherited Filipino citizenship from his father.
On the undisputed evidence:
• FPJ was born 20 August 1939; his parents married 16 September 1940. He was thus illegitimate at birth and prima facie followed the citizenship of his only legally known parent, his mother, who was an American.
• No authentic record proves that FPJ’s grandfather was in the Philippines on 11 April 1899 and opted to remain under the Treaty of Paris.
• No authentic record or admission shows that, at his birth, FPJ’s father was a Filipino or ever validly acknowledged FPJ as his son
Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 161434)
I. Procedural Background
- Three consolidated petitions raise the question of respondent Fernando Poe Jr.’s citizenship and eligibility for the Presidency.
- G.R. No. 161434 (Tecson, et al.) and G.R. No. 161634 (Velez) arrived by direct petition to the Supreme Court under Article VII, Section 4(7) of the 1987 Constitution.
- G.R. No. 161824 (Fornier) came by petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing two COMELEC Resolutions (January 23 and February 6, 2004) that dismissed a Petition for Disqualification (COMELEC SPA 04-003).
- All three challenge respondent Poe’s claim, in his Certificate of Candidacy, that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
II. Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
- The Constitution vests exclusive, original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, sitting en banc, over post-election “contests” as to “election, returns and qualifications” of the President or Vice-President (Art. VII, Sec. 4(7)).
- “Contests” under that provision are understood to be adversarial, post-proclamation proceedings (election protests or quo warranto), not pre-election challenges to eligibility.
- Petitions by Tecson et al. and Velez are premature: they invoke a remedy that becomes available only after proclamation of the winner.
- Under Article IX-A, Section 7, and Rule 64/65, the Supreme Court may review COMELEC decisions on certiorari on grounds of grave abuse of discretion.
- G.R. Nos. 161434 and 161634 must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction; G.R. No. 161824 properly invokes the Court’s certiorari power.
III. COMELEC Jurisdiction over Certificates of Candidacy
- The COMELEC’s constitutional powers (Art. IX-C, Secs. 2(1), 2(3)) authorize it to “enforce and administer all laws … relative to the conduct of an election,” including denial or cancellation of certificates of candidacy for false material representations (Omnibus Election Code Sec. 78).
- Under COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Rule 23, petitions to deny or cancel a Certificate of Candidacy for material falsehood must be filed and decided before election day.
- COMELEC First Division and En Banc both recognized authority under Sec. 78 to resolve the Petition for Disqualification against respondent Poe.
IV. Standard for Cancellation of a Certificate of Candidacy
- Section 78 requires only tha