G.R. No. L-27191 - Tanega vs. Masakayan

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-27191)

Factual Background

The petitioner was originally convicted of slander by the City Court of Quezon City and, on appeal, was found guilty by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch V. The final sentence imposed was twenty days of arresto menor, indemnity to the offended party Pilar B. Julio in the sum of P100.00 with corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, and costs. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, and the petitioner’s petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court was denied. The trial court directed that execution of sentence be set for January 27, 1965; at petitioner’s request execution was deferred to February 12, 1965 at 8:30 a.m. Petitioner failed to appear on the latter date. The respondent judge caused a warrant of arrest to issue on February 15, 1965 and an alias warrant on March 23, 1965; petitioner was never arrested or placed in confinement. On December 10, 1966 petitioner moved to quash the warrants on the ground that the penalty had prescribed. On December 19, 1966 the respondent judge denied the plea of prescription and ordered the issuance of another alias warrant.

Procedural History

Criminal Case Q-3955 was the title in the Court of First Instance: People of the Philippines, plaintiff, vs. Adelaida Tanega, accused. The Court of First Instance convicted and sentenced the petitioner; the Court of Appeals affirmed in C.A.-G.R. No. 0147-CR on May 20, 1964. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in G.R. No. L-23429 on October 22, 1964. Following the failure of the petitioner to surrender for execution of sentence, the trial court issued warrants of arrest and later denied the motion to quash. The petitioner filed the present original petition for certiorari and prohibition in the Supreme Court challenging the denial of her plea of prescription.

Issue Presented

The narrow legal question was whether the period of prescription of the penalty imposed by final sentence began to run so as to bar execution where the convict was never placed in confinement and could not have escaped from serving the sentence.

Statutory Framework

The Court examined Article 92 and Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code, the first classifying penalties as light and prescribing that light penalties "imposed by final sentence" prescribe in one year, and the second providing that the period of prescription "shall commence to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence." The Court further relied on Article 157, which defines evasion of service of sentence as an escape while "sufriendo privacion de libertad por sentencia firme" and prescribes punishment for that offense; Article 158 was also noted as an instance where escape during confinement triggers special consequences. The Court emphasized the precise language of Article 157 and the controlling Spanish text as to the requirement that the offender be undergoing deprivation of liberty.

Parties’ Contentions

The petitioner contended that the light penalty had prescribed under Article 92 and Article 93 because the period for prescription had run during the interval between issuance of warrants and the motion to quash. The respondent judge maintained that the penalty had not prescribed, that "the penalty imposed upon the accused has to be served," and accordingly rejected the plea of prescription and ordered further enforcement measures.

Court’s Legal Analysis

The Court construed the phrase "when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence" in Article 93 in light of Article 157. It identified the essential elements of evasion of service of sentence: (1) the offender must be a convict by final judgment; (2) he must be serving a sentence that consists in deprivation of liberty; and (3) he must escape during the term of his imprisonment. The Court reasoned that evasion denotes escape and that escape presupposes that the sentence is being served. The Court examined the historical origin of Articles 92 and 93 in Article 134 of the Penal Code of Spain of 1870 and observed the omission in the present Article 93 of the Spanish clause concerning notification of the sentence, leaving only the concept of quebrantamiento or evasion. The Court further cited authorities, including Viada and prior decisions such as People vs. Abilong and Alvarez vs. Director of Prisons, to support the proposition that when the penalty consists of deprivation of liberty the prescription of the penalty can begin to run only upon escape from confinement. The Court rejected a

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-27191)

Parties and Posture

Adelaida Tanega filed an original petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court.
Hon. Honorato B. Masakayan acted in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch V and was named as a respondent.
The Chief of Police of Quezon City was also named as a respondent in the petition.
The petition challenged the issuance and maintenance of arrest warrants issued by the respondent judge and ordered further enforcement.
The case reached the Court after conviction for slander by the City Court of Quezon City, affirmation by the Court of First Instance, and affirmation by the Court of Appeals.

Facts

The petitioner was convicted of slander by the City Court of Quezon City and appealed to the Court of First Instance where she was again found guilty.
The Court of First Instance sentenced petitioner to twenty days of arresto menor, to indemnify Pilar B. Julio in the sum of P100.00 with corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, and to pay costs.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction in C.A.-G.R. No. 0147-CR decided on May 20, 1964.
The Court declined certiorari review in G.R. No. L-23429 on October 22, 1964.
Execution of sentence was set by the trial court for January 27, 1965 and was deferred to February 12, 1965 at 8:30 a.m. at petitioner's request.
Petitioner failed to appear at the appointed time which prompted the respondent judge to issue a warrant of arrest on February 15, 1965 and an alias warrant on March 23, 1965.
Petitioner was never arrested at any time following issuance of the warrants.
On December 10, 1966 petitioner moved to quash the warrants on the ground that the penalty had prescribed.
The respondent judge denied the motion on December 19, 1966 and ordered issuance of another alias warrant, prompting the present petition.

Statutory Framework

Article 9, Revised Penal Code classifies arresto menor and a fine as a light penalty.
Article 92, Revised Penal Code provides that light penalties "imposed by final sentence" prescribe in one year.
Article 93, Revised Penal Code provides that the period of prescription "shall commence to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence."
Article 157, Revised Penal Code defines evasion of service of sentence as the act of a convict who "escapes during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment" and prescribes specific penalties.
Article 158, Revised Penal Code addresses evasion occurring on the occasion of disorders or calamities and prescribes an increase of penalty in specified circumstances.
The Spanish text of Article 157 contains the controlling phrase "sufriendo privacion de libertad" which emphasizes that the escape must occur while the convict is undergoing deprivation of liberty.

Issue

The principal issue was whether the prescription of the light pe