Case Summary (G.R. No. L-63915)
Central legal question presented
Whether the clause “unless it is otherwise provided” in Article 2 of the Civil Code relieves the legislature or the executive of the duty to publish laws (including presidential decrees and regulations) before they take effect, and relatedly (a) what constitutes publication, (b) where publication must occur, (c) when publication must be made, and (d) which instruments must be published.
Court’s interpretation of Article 2 — scope of “unless it is otherwise provided”
The Court held that the phrase “unless it is otherwise provided” refers solely to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself. In other words, the legislature (or law) may change the waiting period for effectivity (shorten or extend the usual fifteen days), but it may not dispense with prior publication altogether. Publication is an indispensable precondition to the effectivity of laws; the disputed clause cannot be read to permit laws to be effective upon approval without prior publication because such a reading would offend due process and the public’s right to information.
Due process, presumption of knowledge, and public information basis for publication
The Court emphasized that mandatory publication is grounded in due process and the presumption that every person knows the law — a presumption that is only legally justifiable if laws are actually published and made known. It reasoned that laws unknown to the public (whether penal or non‑penal) may prejudice persons who could not have known of restrictions or obligations; publication protects rights such as prescriptive periods and informs public scrutiny. The Court also referenced the constitutional right of the people to information on matters of public concern (citing the Bill of Rights) as reinforcing the publication requirement.
Scope of instruments required to be published
The Court adopted a broad rule: all statutes, including local application laws and private laws, as well as presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated in the exercise of legislative powers, must be published as a condition for their effectivity. Administrative rules and regulations that enforce or implement existing law must also be published. By contrast, interpretative regulations and purely internal administrative issuances — those that regulate only agency personnel or internal procedures and do not affect the public — need not be published. Similarly, letters of instruction limited to internal agency direction need not be published. Municipal ordinances, however, were noted as governed instead by the Local Government Code.
Definition and content requirements of “publication”
The Court held that publication must be “in full” to serve its purpose of informing the public of the law’s contents. Mere announcements consisting of a decree number, title, custody information (e.g., “with Secretary Tuvera”), or a cryptic supplement do not satisfy the requirement and amount to no publication at all. Substantial compliance is insufficient where the public is not given the full text necessary to learn the law’s provisions.
Required medium for publication and the Court’s duty to apply existing law
Although the Court acknowledged practical criticisms of the Official Gazette (irregular release, limited readership) and the practical superiority of newspapers of general circulation for disseminating laws, it held that the medium prescribed by Article 2 is the Official Gazette and that the Court is bound to apply the law as written. Absent legislative amendment to Article 2 authorizing alternative media, publication must be effected in the Official Gazette. The Court stated that it is not its role to rewrite statutory prescription for publication and that such policy changes belong to the legislature.
Timing of publication and effectivity
The Court declared that laws “shall immediately upon their approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette” and shall become effective only after fifteen days from such publication, unless the legislature fixes another date. Thus, publication must be made forthwith or as soon as practicable, and effectivity is counted from publication, subject to any valid statutory variation of the waiting period.
Remedies, order, and practical implications
The Court reaffirmed and clarified its prior order: all laws as defined (broadly including statutes, presidential decrees, executive orders, and certain administrative rules) must be published in
Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-63915)
Court, Citation, Date and Procedural Posture
- Decided by the Supreme Court, En Banc, reported at 230 Phil. 528; G.R. No. L-63915; decision date December 29, 1986.
- The matter arose from a petition invoking due process to demand disclosure and publication of a number of presidential decrees alleged not to have been published as required by law.
- The Court had previously decided the case on April 24, 1985, ordering respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances of general application, holding that unless so published they shall have no binding force and effect.
- Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration/clarification of that decision, posing specific questions about the scope of the April 24, 1985 decision and seeking definitions and directives about publication.
- The present resolution addresses that motion for reconsideration/clarification and sets forth a binding rule on publication under Article 2 of the Civil Code.
Parties and Positions
- Petitioners: Lorenzo M. Tanada, Abraham F. Sarmiento, Arid Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI).
- Respondents: Hon. Juan C. Tuvera (Executive Assistant to the President), Hon. Joaquin Venus (Deputy Executive Assistant to the President), Melquiades P. De La Cruz, etc., et al.
- Solicitor General (in Comment and later Rejoinder) defended the government’s position in various aspects, advancing arguments summarized below.
- Petitioners sought (in their motion) clarification on scope, nature, form, place and timing of publication; they advocated no distinction between laws of general applicability and others, complete publication, and publication forthwith in the Official Gazette.
Specific Questions Raised by Petitioners (as Presented)
- What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"?
- Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not?
- What is meant by "publication"?
- Where is the publication to be made?
- When is the publication to be made?
- Petitioners’ suggestions in resolving doubts: no distinction between laws of general applicability and those which are not; publication means complete publication; publication must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette.
Relevant Statutory Provision
- Article 2, Civil Code (as quoted in the opinion):
- "ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication."
Arguments Presented by the Solicitor General (Comment and Rejoinder)
- Initial Comment (then Solicitor General):
- Argued the motion was effectively a request for an advisory opinion and thus should be dismissed.
- Claimed the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 meant publication was not always imperative; i.e., publication requirement could be dispensed with in some instances.
- Argued publication need not be in the Official Gazette.
- Asserted the April 24, 1985 decision was not binding because only three justices had concurred.
- Subsequent Rejoinder (new Solicitor General after February Revolution):
- Submitted that issuances intended only for internal administration or for particular persons did not have to be published.
- Claimed that when publication is necessary it must be in full and in the Official Gazette.
- Maintained that the decision under reconsideration was not binding because it was not supported by eight members of the Court.
Petitioners’ Reply
- Petitioners filed a Reply refuting the Solicitor General’s arguments (as referenced in the record).
- They reiterated the need for disclosure, full publication, and clarity on the scope of publication.
Core Issue for Resolution
- The principal legal question: Whether the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code negates the publication requirement itself (i.e., allows laws to become effective without prior publication), or whether it pertains only to the date of effectivity after publication.
Court’s Holding — Publication Requirement (Primary Holding)
- The Court held that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself.
- Publication is indispensable in every case; the clause does not permit dispensing with publication altogether.
- The legislature may, however, provide a different period of effectivity (shorten, lengthen, or specify another date) following publication — e.g., the Civil Code’s effectivity one year after publication.
- Failure to publish would offend due process by denying public knowledge of laws that govern them; publication is required to justify the presumption that every person knows the law.
Court’s Reasoning — Due Process, Presumption of Knowledge, and Right to Information
- The Court emphasized due process concerns: laws unknown to those they govern produce unjust prejudice and cannot be enforced fairly.
- The presumption that every person knows the law presupposes publication for legal justification.
- Section 6 of the Bill of Rights (right of the people to information on matters of public concern) supports publication of legislative enactments.
- The term "laws" encompasses all statutes — including those of local application and private or special laws — because they affect public interest even if they apply directly only to particular persons.
- A law without any public bearing would be invalid as intrusion on privacy, class legislation, or ultra vires.