Title
Tan Po Chu vs. Court of Appeals
Case
G.R. No. 184348
Decision Date
Apr 4, 2016
A dispute over the reissuance of a land title arose when conflicting claims of ownership and loss were made, leading to jurisdictional and procedural challenges, ultimately resolved by the Supreme Court in favor of the petitioner.
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 184348)

Factual Background

Fiber Technology Corporation was the registered owner of a parcel of land in Marikina covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 157923. The corporation’s SEC registration was alleged revoked on September 29, 2003. On April 4, 2005, Felix T. Chingkoe executed an affidavit of loss of the owner’s duplicate of TCT No. 157923 purportedly on behalf of Fiber Technology Corporation. On June 2, 2005, Fiber Technology Corporation, allegedly represented by Rodrigo Garcia pursuant to a December 2, 2004 board resolution, filed a petition for reissuance of the owner’s duplicate based on the affidavit of loss. The petition averred that Felix and Rosita L. Chingkoe had acquired one hundred percent ownership in 2004 by virtue of an NLRC award, that Felix became corporate secretary, that the former officers denied possession of the owner’s duplicate, and that an exhaustive search failed to locate the title.

RTC Proceedings and Judgment

The petition for reissuance was docketed before the RTC, Marikina City, Branch 193, as LRC Case No. 2005-771-MK. The RTC heard the petition and on July 23, 2006 declared the owner’s duplicate of TCT No. 157923 lost and ordered its reissuance.

Court of Appeals Proceedings and Dismissal

On December 21, 2007, Tan Po Chu filed a petition for annulment of judgment with the Court of Appeals, naming herself and Fiber Technology Corporation as petitioners. She alleged that she, as responsible officer or trustee pursuant to the corporation’s dissolution after SEC revocation, possessed the original owner’s duplicate; that Felix knew of her possession; that Felix committed perjury in the affidavit of loss; and that Felix and Rosita were not one hundred percent owners and that Rodrigo Garcia and Rosita were not stockholders of record. The petition invoked precedents including New Durawood Co. v. Court of Appeals and Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals to argue that a reconstituted title is void where the original duplicate is held by another. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition outright on January 16, 2008 for procedural infirmities and lack of substantial merit, citing defects in verification and certification against forum shopping, absence of petitioner’s actual address, and failure to attach a certified true copy of the owner’s duplicate. The CA also held that the RTC had acquired jurisdiction by complying with the notice and hearing requirements under Section 109 of P.D. No. 1529. A motion for reconsideration was denied on July 16, 2008.

Issues Presented

The principal issue was whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for annulment of judgment and in holding that the RTC had jurisdiction to reissue the owner’s duplicate. A secondary issue was whether certiorari under Rule 65 was a proper remedy given the availability of an appeal under Rule 45.

Parties’ Contentions

Tan Po Chu contended that the CA erred in rejecting her allegation that the RTC lacked jurisdiction because the owner’s duplicate was not lost but in her possession and because respondents lacked authority and ownership to seek reissuance. She relied on New Durawood, Serra Serra, Strait Times v. Court of Appeals, and Demetriou v. Court of Appeals to support the proposition that a reconstituted certificate is void when the original is possessed by another. The respondents maintained that the CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion and that any error was one of law rather than jurisdiction, thus reviewable by appeal and not by certiorari.

Legal Framework on Remedies and Jurisdiction

The Court observed that Rule 47, Section 5 expressly empowers the Court of Appeals to dismiss outright an annulment petition lacking substantial merit, and that such dismissal is reviewable by appeal under Rule 45. Rule 65 certiorari is an extraordinary remedy confined to errors of jurisdiction or to grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Errors in the exercise of jurisdiction that amount to mere errors of judgment are ordinarily reviewable only by appeal. An exception permits resort to certiorari where public welfare and public policy justify such relief.

Court’s Analysis on Jurisdiction over the Res

The Court found that although Tan Po Chu invoked the wrong procedural vehicle, the potential public harm justified review on certiorari. The Court explained that the CA misconstrued the nature of Tan’s challenge by treating compliance with Section 109 of P.D. No. 1529 as dispositive. Tan did not claim noncompliance with notice and hearing; she alleged that the owner’s duplicate was not lost but was in her custody. The Court reiterated the settled rule that where the owner’s duplicate is in the possession of another person, the proceeding to reconstitute that duplicate is void because the court never acquired jurisdiction over the res. In such case the proper remedy against an uncooperative possessor is an action for bold replevin. A judgment void for lack of jurisdiction is no judgment at all and may be attacked at any time.

Assessment of the Court of Appeals’ Procedural Grounds

The Supreme Court examined the procedural defects relied upon by the Court of Appeals and found them insufficient to justify outright dismissal. The Court noted that Tan alleged the corporation’s corporate existence had ceased upon SEC revocation and that she acted as trustee in dissolution. The petition was filed in the names of both Fiber Technology Corporation and Tan Po Chu; even if the corporation lacked capacity, Tan remained a real party in interest as lawful possessor of the original owner’s duplicate and thus had standing to litigate. The verification and certification of non-forum shopping were valid as to Tan. The Court further observed that Tan supplied her actual address in her motion for reconsideration and thus substantially complied with Rule 46, Section 3. Finally, the Court noted that a petition for annulment of judgment only requires a duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof and do

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