G.R. No. 85044 - Tamargo vs. Court of Appeals

Case Summary (G.R. No. 85044)

Adoption petition timeline and procedural posture

Prior to the shooting, on 10 December 1981, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura filed a petition to adopt Adelberto (Special Proceedings No. 0373‑T). That petition was granted by decree on 18 November 1982 — after the shooting. The Bundoc spouses argued in their Answer to the civil suit that the Rapisura spouses were indispensable parties because, they contended, the decree of adoption vested parental authority in the adopters as of the date the adoption petition was filed. The trial court dismissed petitioners’ complaint on 3 December 1987, finding the natural parents were not indispensable parties. Petitioners received the decision on 7 December 1987, filed a motion for reconsideration on 14 December 1987 and a supplemental motion on 15 January 1988; both motions were denied on 18 April 1988 for failure to comply with procedural notice requirements under the Rules of Court. Petitioners filed a notice of appeal on 28 April 1988; the trial court dismissed it on 6 June 1988 as filed beyond the 15‑day reglementary period. The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners’ petition for mandamus and certiorari on the ground of lost right to appeal. The Supreme Court granted the present Petition for Review, addressed both procedural and substantive issues, and reinstated the complaint.

Issues presented

Legal questions framed by the Court

(1) Whether the Supreme Court may entertain the Petition for Review notwithstanding petitioners’ apparent loss of the right to appeal due to procedural defects and untimeliness; and (2) whether, as a matter of substantive law, adoption effects can be given retroactive effect such that adopting parents become the indispensable parties to a damages action for torts committed by the adopted child while the child was still actually living in the custody of the natural parents.

Procedural-rule application and equitable relaxation

Court’s treatment of motions, notice, and appeal timeliness

The trial court had treated petitioners’ motions for reconsideration as pro forma because they failed to comply with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 and Section 13 of Rule 41 (i.e., did not contain notice of time and place of hearing), and therefore ruled those motions did not interrupt the reglementary period for appeal. The Supreme Court acknowledged the rules requiring service of notice on opposing counsel and time/place of hearing as mandatory, citing prior decisions (Pojas v. Hon. Gozo‑Dalole; Fecundo v. Berjamen; Filipinas Fabricators and Sales, Inc. v. Magsino). However, invoking the Court’s power to relax technical rules to prevent manifest injustice and encourage disposition of appeals on the merits, the Court elected to treat the motion(s) as having interrupted the appeal period and to deem the notice of appeal seasonably filed. The Court relied on precedent (Gregorio v. Court of Appeals) emphasizing that rigid enforcement of technical rules should not defeat substantial justice.

Substantive law: basis of parental liability

Civil Code and vicarious liability principles applied

The Court reviewed the substantive law governing liability for quasi‑delict (Article 2176, Civil Code) and parental liability for damages caused by minors living with their parents (Article 2180, Civil Code). Parental liability is characterized as a species of vicarious or imputed liability grounded in parental authority and the duties to instruct, control and discipline the child; a presumption of parental dereliction arises when an unemancipated child living with parents commits a tort. That presumption is rebuttable by proof that the parents exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. The Court reiterated the legislative policy and rationale for limiting extra‑contractual liability and for imputing responsibility where there is a relationship of control or dependency, citing Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co.

Application to facts: custody and timing of parental authority

Why natural parents were held indispensable parties

Applying the foregoing principles, the Court found that parental liability under the Civil Code and related statutes depends on actual custody and control at the time the tortious act was committed. At the time of the shooting, Adelberto was physically living with his natural parents, the Bundocs; parental authority and the consequent presumption of responsibility therefore attached to them. The Bundoc spouses’ contention that parental authority had already shifted to the Rapisura spouses upon filing of the adoption petition was rejected by the Court.

Statutory provisions on adoption and their interpretation

Child and Youth Welfare Code and Family Code provisions analyzed

The Bundoc spouses relied on Article 36 of Presidential Decree No. 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code), which states that a decree of adoption “shall be effective as of the date the original petition was filed.” They also invoked Article 39 of the Code, which provides that adoption dissolves parental authority vested in the natural parents. The Court, however, emphasized that Article 58 of PD 603 and Article 221 of the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209, 1987) both anchor parental liability on the child being in the actual custody of the parents sought to be held liable. The Court construed Article 36 narrowly: although the decree of adoption is stated to be effective from the date of filing for certain purposes, the Court refused to give retroactive effect to vest parental authority and impute liability to adopting parents for torts committed at a time when they had no actual physical custody or control.

Trial custody doctrine and its significance

Article 35 and the necessity of actual custody to vest authority

The Court relied on Article 35 of PD 603 regarding trial custody: the adopting parents are given a supervised trial custody period of at least six months, and “During the period of trial custody, parental authority shall be vested in the adopting parents.” The Court underscored that this provisional vesting of parental authority presupposes actual custody by the adopting parents. Where, as here, the adopting parents (the Rapisuras) had no physical custody of the child at the time of the tort (they were reportedly in the United States), no presumption of parental dereliction could attach to them; therefore, imposit

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 85044)

Facts of the Case

On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a 10‑year‑old minor, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle, causing injuries that resulted in Jennifer's death.
A civil complaint for damages was filed in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur, docketed as Civil Case No. 3457‑V, by petitioner Macario Tamargo (Jennifer's adopting parent) and petitioners Celso and Aurelia Tamargo (Jennifer’s natural parents), against respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc (Adelberto’s natural parents with whom he was living at the time of the incident).
A criminal information for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was filed as Criminal Case No. 1722‑V against Adelberto Bundoc; Adelberto was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability on the ground he had acted without discernment.
Prior to the shooting, on 10 December 1981, spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto in Special Proceedings No. 0373‑T before the then Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur; the petition was granted on 18 November 1982 (after the shooting).
At the time of the shooting Adelberto was actually living with his natural parents, the Bundoc spouses, not with the Rapisura spouses.

Procedural History in the Trial Court

The trial court dismissed petitioners’ complaint on 3 December 1987, ruling that the natural parents of Adelberto (the Bundoc spouses) were not indispensable parties to the action.
Petitioners received a copy of the trial court’s Decision on 7 December 1987 and filed a motion for reconsideration on 14 December 1987 and a supplemental motion for reconsideration on 15 January 1988.
The motions for reconsideration were denied by the trial court in an Order dated 18 April 1988 on the ground that the motions failed to comply with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court (notice of the motion and statement of time and place of hearing).
Petitioners filed a notice of appeal on 28 April 1988; the trial court dismissed the notice of appeal in an Order dated 6 June 1988, ruling that the notice had been filed beyond the 15‑day reglementary period (ending 22 December 1987).
Petitioners petitioned the Court of Appeals for mandamus and certiorari questioning the trial court’s Decision dated 3 December 1987 and the Orders dated 18 April 1988 and 6 June 1988; the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, ruling that petitioners had lost their right to appeal.
Petitioners filed the present Petition for Review with this Court.

Issues Presented to the Supreme Court

Whether petitioners, notwithstanding having allegedly lost their right to appeal, may still file the instant Petition for Review and whether the Court may take cognizance of the case even though petitioners’ appeal had been filed out of time.
Whether the effects of adoption, insofar as parental authority is concerned, may be given retroactive effect so as to make the adopting parents indispensable parties in a damage action filed against their adopted child for acts committed while the child was actually in the custody of the biological parents.

Court’s Consideration on Appeal Timeliness and Procedural Technicalities

The trial court considered petitioners’ motion (and supplemental motion) for reconsideration pro forma and ruled they did not interrupt or suspend the reglementary period to appeal because they failed to comply with requirements of Section 13, Rule 41 and Section 4, Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court (notice of the motion stating time and place of hearing).
The Court recalled established doctrine that what is mandatory is the service of the motion on opposing counsel indicating time and place of hearing, citing precedents (Pojas v. Hon. Gozo‑Dalole; Fecundo v. Berjamen; Filipinas Fabricators and Sales, Inc. v. Magsino).
Invoking the Court’s right to suspend application of technical rules to prevent manifest injustice, and in the interest of substantial justice, the Court elected to treat the notice of appeal as having been seasonably filed and the motions for reconsideration as having interrupted the reglementary period for appeal.
The Court cited Gregorio v. Court of Appeals to support the policy that dismissal of appeal on purely technical grounds is frowned upon and that rules of procedure should not be rigidly applied to defeat substantial justice.

Legal Basis of Civil Liability for Torts and Parental (Vicarious) Liability

The Court recognized