G.R. No. L-3529 - Talento vs. Makiki

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-3529)

Factual Background

Petitioners alleged that, during the war, Eigero Makiki, accompanied by his wife and Antonio Navoa, went to petitioners’ residence and made them execute the March 30, 1943 deed through intimidation. They claimed that their consent was extracted by fear of possible consequences if they refused. They further alleged that the price of the homestead was P3,000, paid partly in Japanese notes and partly in Philippine National Bank notes.

In the trial proceedings, Eigero Makiki did not appear, and because his whereabouts were unknown, he was declared in default. Benita Escartin, as co-defendant and wife of Eigero Makiki, answered the complaint. She denied the allegations, challenged petitioners’ claimed bad faith, and asserted that the action was filed merely to harass her. She sought an order that petitioners pay damages in the amount of P2,500.

After trial, the court found against petitioners’ principal factual theory. It held that the sale was not executed through the intimidation alleged in the complaint. It also ruled that, even assuming arguendo intimidation, the alleged defects were purged by acts performed by petitioners that amounted to confirmation of the transaction. Consequently, it dismissed the action with costs against petitioners.

Trial Court Disposition

The trial court’s findings rested on two key conclusions: first, that petitioners failed to prove that intimidation induced the execution of the deed of sale; and second, that petitioners’ subsequent acts operated as confirmation, thereby eliminating the basis for annulment even under petitioners’ own theory.

Appeals and the Nature of the Issues Raised

The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal in toto. In reviewing petitioners’ assignments of error, the Supreme Court noted that petitioners’ first assignment was that the Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the deed was executed as a result of intimidation, considering attendant circumstances and alleged unequal conditions of the parties. The respondents argued that the contention raised issues of fact and should not be re-examined at that stage.

The Supreme Court agreed with respondents. It held that matters relating to threat or intimidation are questions that largely depend on credibility of witnesses and the assessment of their consistency in light of surrounding circumstances. It then treated the Court of Appeals’ evidentiary evaluation as conclusive, stating that it made a careful and conscientious study of the record and had not overlooked substantial facts. The Court of Appeals’ finding—namely that petitioners failed to establish a cause of action meeting the legal threshold of “irresistible force” or “a reasonable and well-grounded fear of suffering an imminent and serious injury” to themselves and their family—was thus treated as binding.

Petitioners’ New Assignments and Procedural Objection

Other assignments of error raised questions of law. Petitioners argued that the deed should be declared null and void because it was executed between Filipinos and Japanese during wartime, allegedly making it a contract entered into between enemies. They also contended that even if the sale were valid, it was subject to adjustment and settlement after the war according to a constitution adopted by the Japanese-sponsored Philippine Republic during occupation, and they alleged that they offered such settlement but the Court of Appeals did not entertain it. Finally, they asserted that the sale was unconstitutional under the framework reflected in Krivenko.

Before addressing those substantive contentions, the Supreme Court addressed a significant procedural point. The petitioners’ action in the court of origin had been exclusively predicated on the claim that consent was obtained by intimidation committed by Eigero Makiki. No other question of fact or law had been raised to dispute the transaction’s validity in the trial court. Yet on appeal petitioners raised new questions. The Court of Appeals remarked that such new issues could not be raised for the first time on appeal, citing section 19, Rule 48, of the Rules of Court.

Petitioners assigned as error the appellate court’s adherence to this rule, claiming that constitutional and legal questions need not be pleaded in the complaint if they are purely questions of law. The Supreme Court considered the procedural correctness of the Court of Appeals’ approach largely beyond dispute, referencing established doctrine that appellate courts generally do not consider matters not raised in the court below, except for questions relating to jurisdiction over the subject matter and other specifically recognized exceptions. It also noted the general requirement that constitutional questions must ordinarily be raised in the court below before they may be raised on appeal.

The Supreme Court’s Substantive Treatment of the Constitutional Theories

Although the Supreme Court stated that the procedural objection could hardly be disputed, it proceeded to answer, albeit briefly, the constitutional and war-related arguments pressed by petitioners.

First, it held that the constitution adopted by the Japanese-sponsored Philippine Republic could not be invoked for petitioners’ benefit because the disputed sale occurred on March 30, 1943, while that constitution was adopted and put into operation only on September 4, 1943. The transaction therefore could not be governed by provisions not yet in force at the time of execution.

Second, it ruled that petitioners could not invoke the provisions of the present Philippine Constitution to sustain their view of unconstitutionality during the enemy occupation, because the Supreme Court had already held in Trinidad Gonzaga de Cabauatan, et al., vs. Uy Hoo, et al. (cited as 88 Phil. 103) that the present Constitution was not in force during the enemy occupation.

Third, the Supreme Court addressed petitioners’ argument even if the sale were assumed null and void. It held that petitioners were still prevented from maintaining their action because of their presumptive knowledge of the transaction’s invalidity, applying the doctrine of pari delicto as articulated in Trinidad Gonzaga de Cabauatan, et al., vs. Uy Hoo, et al., G. R. No. L-2207.

In that doctrinal discussion, the Court reiterated that even if plaintiffs could invoke the constitution or the doctrine in Krivenko to set aside an otherwise questionable sale, they could not do so when their purpose was to recover property they had voluntarily parted with, given their guilty knowledge that what they were doing violated the Constitution. The Court invoked the principle expressed in the maxims “Ex dolo malo non oritur actio” and “In pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis,” and it quoted the proposition that a party to an illegal contract cannot ask the court to enforce illegal objectives and that the law leaves parties where it finds them.

With this conclusion, the Supreme Court found it unnecessary to discuss the remaining points raised by petitioners in their brief.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision with costs against petitioners.

Separate Opinions

Reyes, J. concurred in the majority result except as to the portion holding that petitioners w

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-3529)

Parties and Procedural Posture

Spouses Apolinar Talento and Marciana Limuco Talento filed a petition for review assailing a Court of Appeals decision.
The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial court’s ruling that the disputed deed of sale was valid and binding between the parties.
The Court of Appeals also held that, even if the sale were invalid, the action could not prosper under the doctrine of pari delicto.
Efigero Makiki did not appear in the trial court, so the trial court declared him in default.
Benita Escartin, co-defendant and wife of Eigero Makiki, appeared and contested the complaint and sought damages of P2,500.
The case reached the Supreme Court on the petitioners’ assignments of error.

Key Factual Allegations

Petitioners claimed they executed a deed of sale dated March 30, 1943 for a homestead in Abucay, Bataan.
Petitioners alleged that Eigero Makiki, a Japanese civilian, visited them with his wife and a person named Antonio Navoa.
Petitioners asserted that Makiki obtained their execution of the deed through intimidation.
Petitioners stated they signed the deed out of fear of consequences if they refused the bidding of Makiki.
Petitioners alleged the price was P3,000, paid partly in Japanese notes and partly in Philippine National Bank notes.
Respondents disputed the intimidation narrative and alleged that petitioners acted in bad faith and intended to harass them.

Issues on Appeal

The first issue involved whether the deed of sale was executed through intimidation that rendered petitioners’ consent legally defective.
A second set of issues involved whether the contract was null and void on different legal theories raised on appeal.
Petitioners argued the deed should be declared void because it was executed between Filipinos and Japanese in time of war as an alleged contract between enemies.
Petitioners further argued that even if the sale were valid, it should be subject to adjustment and settlement after the termination of the war under a Constitution adopted during the Japanese occupation.
Petitioners also contended that the sale violated the present Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in the Krivenko case.
The Supreme Court also addressed a procedural issue on whether petitioners could raise new questions for the first time on appeal.

Procedural Objections on New Issues

The Supreme Court noted that the action in the trial court was exclusively predicated on the claim that the deed was invalid due to intimidation by Eigero Makiki.
The Supreme Court observed that no other question of fact or law was raised in the court of origin to dispute the validity of the transaction.
On appeal, petitioners raised new issues not presented below, and the Court of Appeals ruled that such issues could not be raised for the first time.
The Court of Appeals cited Section 19, Rule 48 of the Rules of Court as authority.
Petitioners argued that because the new matters were merely questions of law, they did not need to be pleaded in the complaint.
The Supreme Court stated the correctness of the Court of Appeals ruling could hardly be disputed.
The Supreme Court reiterated the general rule that appellate courts will not consider issues not raised in the lower court, except jurisdiction over the subject-matter and instances where the jurisdiction depends upon a question of fact.
The Supreme Court also recognized the general rule t