G.R. No. 222870 - Tagastason vs. People

Case Summary (G.R. No. 222870)

Filing of the Complaint, Preliminary Investigation Events, and Issuance of Warrants

In March 2012, Susano Bacala and Emalyn Bacala, with their witnesses, filed Complaint-Affidavits for Murder and Frustrated Murder against the accused, including Jessie Tagastason, Rogelio Tagastason, Jr., Marlon Tagastason, Jerson Tagastason, Elias Tagastason, Annie Bacala-Tagastason, Gil Ugacho, and Merlyn Bacala-Ugacho. The accused, through counsel, filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File their Counter-Affidavits. The City Prosecutor partially granted the request by extending the deadline until 4 April 2012 rather than the 10 April 2012 prayed for.

On 4 April 2012, the City Prosecutor issued an Omnibus Motion finding probable cause for Murder and Frustrated Murder and, on the same date, filed the Informations. On 10 April 2012, the cases were raffled to the sala of Judge Maclang, who was also the judge handling other cases involving the parties. On that same date, Judge Maclang issued the warrants of arrest against the accused. Petitioners later learned of the partial grant of the extension, the filing of the omnibus motion and Informations, and the issuance of the warrants only on 10 April 2012.

Motions Filed by the Accused and the Trial Court’s Responses

Upon learning of these events, the accused filed: (1) a Petition for Review before the DOJ; (2) an Administrative Complaint against the City Prosecutor; and (3) a Motion for Inhibition and Holding in Abeyance the Issuance of Warrants of Arrest before Judge Maclang. Judge Maclang denied the motion to hold in abeyance the issuance of warrants but set the motion for inhibition for hearing. Petitioners later filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial. During the pendency of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals, invoking extreme urgency due to the alleged deprivation of liberty.

Court of Appeals’ Findings in the 22 January 2015 Decision

In its 22 January 2015 Decision, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners’ petition. It observed that the City Prosecutor issued an Order dated 23 March 2012 giving the accused until 4 April 2012 to file counter-affidavits. It also noted that the mailing envelope was stamped “registered 4/4/12,” which corresponded to the deadline for filing the counter-affidavits. The Court of Appeals further noted that the Informations were filed on 4 April 2012 at 12:00 noon, before the deadline end-of-office-hours on the same date.

Despite these observations, the Court of Appeals held that there was no denial of due process. It reasoned that lawyers should not presume that their motions for extension would be granted as a matter of course. It also held that the grant or denial of the motion for reconsideration lay within the City Prosecutor’s sound discretion, and that petitioners’ counsel should have followed-up their motion.

On the allegation of lack of preliminary investigation and due process, the Court of Appeals held that the accused could still file a motion for reconsideration or an appeal. It noted, in fact, that petitioners filed an appeal before the DOJ Secretary. It rejected petitioners’ claim that Judge Maclang was prohibited from issuing warrants on the day the cases were raffled to him. The Court of Appeals explained that the resolution of the City Prosecutor pertains only to the accused’s positive identification as the perpetrators of the crime, and that such resolution did not bar the judge from issuing warrants upon the filing of Informations.

Finally, as to the motion for inhibition, the Court of Appeals said the issue had been set for hearing and had not yet been resolved when petitioners filed their petition for certiorari and prohibition. It further ruled that petitioners asked the Court of Appeals to rule on a matter anchored on Judge Maclang’s sound discretion, without awaiting the resolution of the inhibition motion. The Court of Appeals also found that petitioners alleged partiality against Judge Maclang but did not present evidence to support the allegation.

Court of Appeals’ 6 November 2015 Resolution

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 6 November 2015 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion.

Supreme Court Issues

The Supreme Court framed the issues as follows: first, whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in sustaining the warrants of arrest issued by Judge Maclang; and second, whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in ruling that petitioners were not deprived of due process.

Ruling: Petitioners’ Petition Was Denied

The Supreme Court held that the petition had no merit and denied it. It addressed petitioners’ challenge to the issuance of warrants of arrest. It emphasized that issuance of a warrant of arrest lies within the discretion of the issuing judge upon determination of the existence of probable cause.

Legal Basis: Distinction Between Executive and Judicial Determination of Probable Cause

The Court relied on Mendoza v. People, which, in turn, distinguished two kinds of determination of probable cause—executive and judicial. Executive determination of probable cause is made during preliminary investigation and is a function properly pertaining to the public prosecutor, who has quasi-judicial authority to determine whether probable cause exists and whether a case should be filed. The Court stressed that the trial court does not and cannot be compelled to pass upon whether the prosecutor correctly ascertained probable cause.

Judicial determination of probable cause is made by the judge to determine whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. The judge must satisfy himself that, based on the evidence submitted, it is necessary to place the accused under custody to prevent frustration of the ends of justice. If no probable cause is found, the judge cannot be forced to issue the warrant. The Court reiterated the clear difference: executive determination concerns the adequacy of evidence to support the filing of the Information, while judicial determination concerns the necessity of issuing the warrant.

The Supreme Court further stressed that the judge’s function to issue a warrant of arrest upon determination of probable cause is exclusive and cannot be deferred pending resolution of a petition for review by the Secretary of Justice, because such review is executive in nature. It held that deferring implementation of the warrant would encroach upon the judge’s exclusive prerogative. It also accepted the argument of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) that an appeal before the DOJ Secretary does not automatically hold in abeyance the proceedings before the trial court, citing Department Circular No. 70 dated 3 July 2000 and the 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal, particularly Section 5 on the contents of a petition and the requirement to accompany a motion to defer proceedings in court, noting that in the case no motion to defer proceedings had been filed in the trial court.

Due Process Arguments: Prematurity and Extension-of-Time Considerations

On the due process claim, the Supreme Court noted that petitioners’ petition for review was still pending before the DOJ Secretary. It held that it was therefore premature for the Court to preempt the DOJ Secretary on the issue.

The Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that, while petitioners filed a motion for extension to file counter-affidavits, they should not assume that their motion would be granted. The 2008 Revised Manual for Prosecutors was cited for the rule that extensions to submit counter-affidavits should not exceed ten days. Petitioners had asked for an extension of fifteen days, while the City Prosecutor granted only an extension of ten days. The Court thus treated petitioners’ due process theory anchored on the filing and timing of counter-affidavit

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 222870)

The case involved a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals rulings dated 22 January 2015 and 6 November 2015 in CA-G.R. SP No. 04924-MIN.
The petition sought to reverse the denial by the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City, Branch 3, through the assailed Order, of petitioners’ Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of Warrants of Arrest.
The petitioners challenged both (a) the validity of the warrants of arrest issued by Judge Maclang, and (b) the alleged violation of due process connected to the filing of the Informations.
The Court DENIED the petition for lack of merit.

Parties and Procedural Posture

The petitioners were Jessie Tagastason, Rogelio Tagastason, Jr., Annie Bacala-Tagastason, and Jerson Tagastason.
The respondents were People of the Philippines, Office of the Special Prosecutor of Butuan City, Susano Bacala, and Belinda Bacala.
The petitioners assailed the Court of Appeals denial of their petition for certiorari and prohibition that questioned the trial court’s handling of the warrants of arrest and the related claim of due process denial.
The Court of Appeals treated the petition as one attacking the Order of the RTC denying the motion to hold warrants of arrest in abeyance.
The Supreme Court reviewed the Court of Appeals decision and resolution through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, as indicated in the source.

Key Factual Allegations

In March 2012, Susano Bacala and Emalyn Bacala, together with their witnesses, filed a Complaint-Affidavit for Murder and Frustrated Murder against multiple accused, including the petitioners.
The accused, through counsel, filed a Motion for Extension of Time to file their counter-affidavits in the preliminary investigation stage.
The City Prosecutor partially granted the motion by granting an extension until 4 April 2012 even though the accused had prayed for an extension until 10 April 2012.
On 4 April 2012, the City Prosecutor issued an Omnibus Motion finding probable cause for Murder and Frustrated Murder, and the City Prosecutor filed the Informations on the same date.
On 10 April 2012, the cases were raffled to the sala of Executive Judge Francisco F. Maclang, who also handled other cases involving the parties.
On 10 April 2012, Judge Maclang issued the Warrants of Arrest against the accused.
The accused learned of the partial grant of the extension, the Omnibus Motion, the filing of the Informations, and the issuance of the warrants of arrest only on 10 April 2012.
After learning of these events, the accused filed multiple remedies: (1) a petition for review before the DOJ, (2) an administrative complaint against the City Prosecutor, and (3) a Motion for Inhibition and Holding in Abeyance the issuance of the warrants of arrest before the trial court.
The trial court denied the motion to hold in abeyance but set the Motion for Inhibition for hearing.
The accused filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial of the motion to hold in abeyance.
While the motion for reconsideration was pending, the accused filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals, invoking extreme urgency due to alleged deprivation of liberty.
The petitioners later filed a motion for reconsideration before the Court of Appeals, which the appellate court denied.

Court of Appeals Findings

The Court of Appeals noted that a City Prosecutor order dated 23 March 2012 gave the accused until 4 April 2012 to file counter-affidavits.
The Court of Appeals observed that the mailing envelope of that order bore a stamp reading “registered 4/4/12,” corresponding to the deadline for filing counter-affidavits.
The Court of Appeals further noted that the Informations were filed on 4 April 2012 at 12:00 noon, which it treated as within the deadline at the end of office hours on the even date.
The Court of Appeals held that petitioners were not deprived of due process because lawyers should not assume that their motion for extension would be granted as a matter of course.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the grant or denial of petitioners’ motion for reconsideration rested in the sound discretion of the City Prosecutor.
The Court of Appeals treated the claim that there was no preliminary investigation as unavailing because the accused could still file a motion for reconsideration or an appeal, and it noted that the accused actually filed an appeal before the DOJ Secretary.
The Court of Appeals ruled that Judge Maclang had no prohibition against issuing warrants of arrest on the day the cases were raffled to the court.
The appellate court stated that the City Prosecutor’s resolution pertained to the positive identification of the accused as the perpetrators of the crime.
The Court of Appeals held that the Motion for Inhibition had been set for hearing and had not yet been resolved when the petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed.
The appellate court concluded that petitioners asked the Court of Appeals to rule on a motion anchored on the judge’s discretion, despite the lack of resolution by the trial judge.
The Court of Appeals stated that petitioners alleged partiality ag