Title
Tadeo vs. Visperas
Case
G.R. No. L-20891
Decision Date
May 23, 1968
Tadeo charged with estafa for fraudulent land sale; motions denied, crime not prescribed, due process upheld by Supreme Court.
right to confront witnesses
preliminary examination
crime of estafa
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 140895)

Factual Background and Criminal Allegations

The facts were treated as undisputed. In the Justice of the Peace Court, the criminal complaint alleged that Tadeo, with deceit and intent to defraud, caused Maicon and Acosta to sign a document that he represented as a deed of partition. The complainants later discovered that the instrument was actually a sale of their land to Tadeo’s brother-in-law for P400.00. The complaint further alleged that Tadeo and Bongato then sold the same property to Nicolas Perez for P700.00, resulting in fraudulent deprivation of the land and damage to the complainants.

In relation to damages, the complaint alleged damages “in the sum of P2,000.00 the actual current value (market) of the property at the time of the sale, plus moral damages and exemplary damages in the amount of P5,000.00 x x x,” issues later used by Tadeo in challenging the sufficiency of the proceedings and the alleged basis for the penalty.

Preliminary Investigation: First Stage, Warrant, and Arrest

After conducting the first stage of preliminary investigation, respondent Justice of the Peace found probable cause that Tadeo had committed the crime charged. Accordingly, the Justice of the Peace issued a warrant for Tadeo’s arrest. Tadeo was arrested but was released after posting the required bond.

The record then moved to the second stage of the preliminary investigation.

Second Stage: Request for Reinvestigation and Denial of the Motion

When the second stage was set, Tadeo did not proceed by presenting evidence. Instead, he moved for reinvestigation, arguing that the complaint was “inherently defective.” He asserted that the criminal complaint improperly alleged moral and exemplary damages of P5,000.00, whereas, under law, the determination of the penalty for estafa is said to be based only on the actual damage suffered by the offended party. He also contended that the land involved had only one-half hectare and was later sold for P700.00.

Respondent Justice of the Peace denied the motion for reinvestigation.

Attempt to File a Motion to Quash and Subsequent Certiorari Petition

On the day the second stage was again set, Tadeo verbally prayed that he be granted ten days to file a motion to quash. Counsel for Tadeo and the Justice of the Peace discussed the grounds. The Justice of the Peace treated the request as a dilatory tactic and denied the motion to file a motion to quash.

After that denial, Tadeo manifested that he would introduce evidence at the next hearing, scheduled for September 7 and 12, 1962. However, before those hearings, he filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, alleging grave abuse of discretion in denying both the motion for reinvestigation and his request to file a motion to quash.

On October 16, 1962, the Court of First Instance dismissed the certiorari petition and ordered the Justice of the Peace to continue with the criminal proceedings. Tadeo then filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals, but the appeal was forwarded to the Supreme Court because only questions of law were involved.

The Parties’ Contentions in the Supreme Court

Tadeo argued that respondent Justice of the Peace committed grave abuse of discretion in denying both motions. His contentions were anchored on three linked propositions: first, that the penalty for estafa is based only on the value of the fraud and does not include damages the offended party may have suffered; second, that the value of the land alleged to have been fraudulently deprived was at most P400.00 or P700.00, and not the exaggerated figure of P2,000.00 used in the complaint, considering the complaint’s theory on “actual current value (market)” plus moral and exemplary damages; and third, that using P400.00 or P700.00 as the basis for the penalty, the criminal action had already prescribed, because the alleged crime was committed on March 27, 1948, while the complaint was filed only on April 30, 1957.

Tadeo further asserted that the denials violated his right to due process, because he was supposedly denied an opportunity to be heard and to present all defenses.

Respondent’s position, as sustained by the Court of First Instance and ultimately affirmed by the Supreme Court, was that the Justice of the Peace did not commit grave abuse, and that Tadeo’s requests functioned as delays rather than legitimate procedural entitlements.

Legal Framework on Preliminary Investigation and Rights During Its Stages

The Court held that Tadeo’s request for reinvestigation was, in substance, a request to reopen the preliminary examination that already constituted the first stage of preliminary investigation. The Court explained that during that first stage, the Justice of the Peace had already ascertained that a crime had been committed and that there was probable cause that the accused committed it, which then justified issuance of the warrant.

The Court reiterated a settled rule that it was not a matter of right for the accused to require confrontation of witnesses during the preliminary examination prior to the issuance of the arrest warrant. Citing doctrinal support, the Court stated that the accused could not demand that the complainant and witnesses repeat in his presence what they had said during the preliminary examination before the order of arrest. It was characterized as discretionary for the Justice of the Peace to allow cross-examination in that stage under Section 6 of Rule 108 of the old Rules of Court.

The Court further emphasized that after arrest—where the accused had posted bond—the case proceeded to the second stage under Section 11 of Rule 108 of the old Rules of Court, during which the accused was afforded the opportunity to present evidence. The Court noted that if, during the second stage, the accused could show that the offense had already prescribed, the Justice of the Peace could dismiss the complaint, and the Court stressed that this did not even require a motion to quash; it was enough for the accused to bring the matter to the Justice of the Peace’s attention by evidence.

The Court’s Treatment of Due Process and Alleged Grave Abuse

Applying the above framework, the Court found no merit in Tadeo’s claim that denial of reinvestigation and the request to file a motion to quash deprived him of due process. The Court reasoned that Tadeo’s purpose in asking for reinvestigation was apparent: he sought to recall the complainants and witnesses so he could cross-examine them, presumably to establish the actual value of the property involved as a basis for the defense of prescription.

The Court held that the law did not give the accused the right to obtain witness confrontation during the first stage prior to issuance of the warrant. It also found that the accused was later given the opportunity during the second stage to present evidence, including evidence relevant to prescription. What the record showed, according to the Court, was not a legitimate attempt to use that opportunity but instead a strategy that caused delay.

Accordingly, the Court agreed with the Court of First Instance that Tadeo should have proceeded with the second stage, where he could demonstrate the falsity of the charge or the defense of prescription by presenting evidence in his behalf. The Court concluded that the conduct reflected only delay.

Prescription Analysis Based on the Value of the Property and the Applicable Penalty

Even assuming Tadeo’s preferred valuation of the property—at most P700.00 or even P400.00—the Court still rejected the argument that the case had prescribed.

The Court invoked Paragraph 3, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, and held that the penalty for estafa under that paragraph, even if the property value was only P400.00, was arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period. It then applied Article 90, which provided that crimes punishable by a correctional penalty prescribe in ten years, with an exception for crimes punishable by arresto mayor, which prescribe in five years.

The Court reasoned that when the penalty fixed by law is a compound one, the higher penalty controls for purposes of prescription. In this case, the higher penalty was correccional, so the prescriptive period was ten years.

The Court then measured the time from the alleged date of the offense—March 27, 1948—to the filing of the criminal complaint—April 3

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