Case Summary (G.R. No. 143993)
Factual Background
Carmen Lapuz Sy and Eufemio S. Eufemio were married civilly on September 21, 1934, and canonically on September 30, 1934. They lived together until 1943, when Eufemio abandoned Carmen. In March 1949, Carmen discovered Eufemio cohabiting with Go Hiok. On August 18, 1953, Carmen filed for legal separation, seeking dissolution of the conjugal partnership and deprivation of Eufemio’s share of its profits. Eufemio answered with affirmative defenses and counterclaimed for annulment ab initio due to a prior Chinese marriage to Go Hiok.
Procedural History
During trial, Carmen died in a vehicular accident on May 31, 1969. Counsel notified the court, and on June 9, 1969, Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition on the grounds that: (1) the one-year period of Article 102 had lapsed, and (2) Carmen’s death abated the cause of action. On June 26, 1969, Macario Lapuz moved to substitute as petitioner; Eufemio opposed. On July 29, 1969, the court dismissed the case for legal separation and Eufemio’s counterclaim, holding that the cause of action did not survive Carmen’s death. A motion for reconsideration was denied on September 15, 1969. Carmen’s heir filed a petition for certiorari on October 14, 1969.
Issue Presented
Does the death of the plaintiff before final decree in an action for legal separation, including one involving property rights, abate the action? If so, what is the effect on related property claims?
Personal Nature of Legal Separation Actions
The Court recognized that a petition for legal separation is purely personal. Under Article 100 of the Civil Code, only the innocent spouse may seek separation, and Article 108 allows abatement or rescission upon reconciliation. Citing the maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona, the Court held that death of a spouse obviates the need for separation and leaves no continuing cause of action. Consequently, heirs cannot substitute in a pending separation suit (Article 244, sec. 3, Code of Commerce).
Effect on Property Rights
Although legal separation has collateral effects on property (Article 106 dissolves the conjugal partnership and deprives the offending spouse of profits, inheritance rights, and testamentary benefits), these are merely consequences of a final decree. Such rights are expectancy interests vested solely in the spouses. They are not “claims not thereby extinguished” under Rule 3, sec. 17, nor are they among actions surv
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Facts
- On August 18, 1953, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against her husband, Eufemio S. Eufemio, in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila (Civil Case No. 20387).
- Petitioner alleged they were married civilly on September 21, 1934, and canonically on September 30, 1934, lived together continuously until 1943 when respondent abandoned her, had no children, and acquired properties during marriage.
- She discovered respondent cohabiting with another woman, Go Hiok (alias Ngo Hiok), in March 1949, and prayed that respondent be deprived of his share in the conjugal partnership profits.
- In his second amended answer, respondent pleaded affirmative and special defenses, raised other money-and-property claims, and counterclaimed for a declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage to petitioner on grounds of a prior Chinese marriage to Go Hiok.
Procedural History
- Trial commenced and both parties presented evidence; respondent’s surrebuttal was scheduled for June 9 and June 18, 1969.
- Petitioner died in a vehicular accident on May 31, 1969; counsel notified the court accordingly.
- On June 9, 1969, respondent moved to dismiss the petition on two grounds: (1) untimeliness under Article 102, Civil Code; and (2) abatement of action by petitioner’s death.
- On June 26, 1969, counsel for the deceased moved to substitute petitioner by her father, Macario Lapuz; respondent opposed.
- On July 29, 1969, the trial court denied substitution and granted the motion to dismiss, ruling that the cause of action did not survive petitioner’s death.
- A motion for reconsideration was denied on September 15, 1969. Petitioner, through her heir-substitute, petitioned for certiorari review before this Court on October 14, 1969. Respond