G.R. No. L-25847 - Sunga vs. De Guzman

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-25847)

Factual Background

It was undisputed that the spouses Juan de Guzman and Lucia Montemayor died in 1935 and 1937, respectively, and that the nine (9) children thereby succeeded by operation of law to ownership of the fishpond. Also undisputed was that the fishpond remained, according to the declaration of real estate (Exhibit B), registered in the name of the deceased father of respondents-appellees up to October 5, 1962.

On July 1, 1947, five heirs—Gervacio, Felino, Casiano, Marcelino, and Marciano, all surnamed De Guzman—executed the private deed of sale (Exhibit C) selling their respective shares to Feliciano Sibug, a widower, for P700.00. Exhibit C was neither notarized nor registered in the Register of Deeds of Pampanga. The record established that the deed was signed by only the five heirs, while the remaining four (4) heirs did not sign. The private instrument thus did not purport to transfer the shares of the nonsigning heirs.

Demands were made by respondents-appellees for the delivery of their respective shares from petitioners-appellants starting in 1955, but petitioners refused. From the execution of Exhibit C, petitioners were in physical possession of the fishpond. Consequently, an action was instituted on February 5, 1962.

The Court of Appeals, in describing the thrust of the complaint, observed that only three (3) co-heirs—Benito, Emilia, and Felisa, all surnamed De Guzman—filed the complaint, representing 3/9 of the fishpond. It rejected petitioners’ position that the entire fishpond had been sold and held the claim absurd given that only five heirs signed the private deed, while four did not.

Core Issues Raised on Appeal

Petitioners framed their appeal around four assignments of error, but the petition’s principal reliance was on the defense of prescription. Petitioners asserted that respondents’ action was already time-barred because petitioners allegedly acquired ownership through acquisitive prescription and extinctive prescription, anchored on an alleged adverse possession of the whole fishpond starting from 1948.

To support adverse possession, petitioners quoted testimony of Benito de Guzman. In direct examination, Benito stated that Potenciano Sunga came into possession in 1948, because “the share of my six brothers was sold” to Potenciano Sunga. In cross-examination, he clarified that it was in 1948 that he came to know that Sunga took possession, and he explained that he came to know the possession from his brothers who sold their shares. Benito also testified that the deed was only seen by him “it is only now that I saw this document,” and that the information he had about possession and the sale originated from what his brothers told him, with no positive indication of the precise timing and extent of his knowledge about the sale and possession.

Petitioners also challenged the judgment on the ground of non-inclusion of indispensable parties, contending that respondents’ action should have been dismissed. However, respondents argued that this issue was not raised in the Motion to Dismiss before the trial court and was not raised in the Court of Appeals, and therefore could not be considered for the first time on review.

Appellate Evaluation of Prescription and Adverse Possession

The Supreme Court treated the factual premises as binding, since petitioners did not challenge the veracity of the pertinent factual findings summarized by the Court of Appeals. Against the defense of prescription, the Court focused on whether petitioners’ possession over the entire fishpond was adverse, open, and possessed in the concept of an owner, as required for prescription to run.

The Court found it “notably significant” that respondents knew of petitioners’ possession since 1948, yet knew of the sale only when informed by their brothers who sold their shares. The Court reasoned that this indicated respondents were not definitely aware that petitioners’ possession extended over the whole fishpond, including respondents’ portion. Without such definite awareness of the extent and nature of possession, petitioners’ possession could not be said to be adverse and open in the manner needed to start prescription against co-owners.

The Court emphasized a practical distinction in evaluating adverse possession: a fishpond, unlike a tract of land, is not as physically and actually occupied in a way that makes the extent of exclusive enjoyment easily ascertainable. It held that, for a vendee who acquires only the shares of some co-owners to be considered as holding the entire fishpond adversely against nonsigning co-owners, there must be a clear basis showing that the vendee harvested all fish, leaving nothing for the nonsigning co-owners. The Court found no such positive showing in the record.

Relatedly, the Court assumed that when a person harvests from a fishpond where he is only a part-owner, his harvest is only to the extent he is rightfully entitled, absent proof to the contrary. This absence of proof undermined the claim of complete, adverse, and open possession of the whole fishpond.

Further, the Court considered the tax declaration (Exhibit B) still remained in the name of the original owners—the deceased parents of respondents. This circumstance supported a finding that petitioners’ possession was not completely adverse or open, and not truly in the concept of an owner, which are indispensable elements for prescription to acquire real property rights. In this regard, the Court cited Articles 1117 and 1118 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and relied on supporting cases including Corpuz vs. Padilla, Agolto vs. Court of Appeals, Cabrera vs. Tiano, Dinoso vs. Court of Appeals, Mendoza, et al. vs. Mella, Harden vs. Harden, and Seminary of San Carlos vs. Municipality of Cebu, as well as Negrete vs. Court of First Instance of Marinduque.

Promise to Pay, Recognition of Rights, and Interruption of Prescriptive Possession

Petitioners attempted to bolster their prescription theory by invoking that they had not given respondents their share in the harvest and had thus repudiated any trust. The Court held that this argument was not convincing. It noted that the record showed petitioners had promised Benito de Guzman to pay for his share in the land. This promise was treated as a continuing recognition of respondents’ rights in their corresponding shares of the fishpond, including those of Benito and his two sisters who were also respondents.

The Court reasoned that for failure to pay as promised to constitute repudiation of a trust or manifestation of adverse possession, there must be an unequivocal act of refusal to pay or a definite reneging from the promise. The Court found that such a repudiation did not appear. The evidence showed the promise remained subsisting and continuing because no definite date had been fixed for fulfillment.

The Court further held that the promise to pay interrupted possession as a source of prescriptive rights under Article 1125 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. It cited San Carlos vs. Municipality of Cebu and quoted the doctrine that any express or implied acknowledgment by the possessor of the dominant rights of the true owner interrupts possession held for prescriptive purposes and defeats the operation of the law granting prescriptive rights.

Petitioners invoked Article 1155 of the Civil Code, arguing that prescription of action was interrupted by filing in court, by written extrajudicial demand by creditors, and by written acknowledgment of debt by the debtor. The Court rejected the reliance as inapposite, holding that Article 1155 referred to prescription of action, which was different from interruption of possession for acquisitive prescription, as already explained in San Carlos vs. Municipality of Cebu.

Non-Joinder of Parties Raised for the First Time

Petitioners assigned error on the ground that respondents allegedly failed to include indispensable parties. Respondents countered that the matter was not raised in the Motion to Dismiss filed before the trial court and not raised in the Court of Appeals brief; hence it could not be raised for the first time at the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court sustained respondents’ contention. It held that the proposition was valid and addressed it through the procedural and substantive lens that, even in cases of representative suits, not all parties need to be joined if they share a common interest and are linked together in the suit. It also recognized that the Civil Code permits a co-owner to bring an action for ejectment, and it reaffirmed that prescription obtained by a co-proprietor or co-owner benefits the others under Article 1111 of the Civil Code.

The Court likewise stated that non-joinder of parties was not a ground to dismiss the action, referencing Section 11, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court and citing decisions including Salazar, et al. vs. Ortizano, and other cases cited in the source text.

Disposition and Rationale for Affirmance

Given the adverse assessment of petitioners’ assigned errors, the Court held that the petition was devoid of merit. It affirmed the Court of Appeals, which had affirmed the trial court’s judgment awarding respondents their three-ninths (3/9) pro-indiviso ownership rights and corresponding

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-25847)

The case involved a petition for certiorari filed by petitioners against a Court of Appeals decision that affirmed a Court of First Instance of Pampanga judgment in favor of respondents.
The trial court declared respondents the absolute owners of a three-ninths (3/9) pro-indiviso portion of a fishpond and ordered petitioners to convey the share, render an accounting of harvests from 1947 up to the present, deliver products or their value corresponding to respondents’ participation, and pay attorney’s fees of P500.00 plus costs.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the judgment appealed from, holding that petitioners’ assigned errors lacked merit.

Parties and Procedural Posture

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari challenging the Court of Appeals decision dated January 17, 1966 that affirmed the Court of First Instance ruling.
The Court of Appeals treated the trial court’s factual findings as binding, given that the pertinent facts were “unquestioned” or “veracity… not being challenged,” and it reviewed the legal issues raised on the record.
Respondents prosecuted the action to recover their shares as co-heirs and to obtain conveyance and accounting for harvests taken by petitioners.
The Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the Court of Appeals, finding no reason to adopt a different view.

Key Property and Heir Relations

The property in litigation was a fishpond of 5,590 sq. m. located in the barrio of Sebitanan, municipality of Sexmoan, province of Pampanga.
The fishpond had been owned by spouses Juan de Guzman and Lucia Montemayor, whose deaths in 1935 and 1937 caused their nine children to succeed to ownership by operation of law.
The controversy centered on respondents’ claimed inherited shares as co-owners of the whole fishpond.
Petitioners claimed that they had acquired ownership over the whole fishpond by acquisitive and extinctive prescription, treating their possession as adverse.

Private Sale Contract Details

A private contract of sale (Exhibit C) was signed by five (5) of the nine (9) legitimate heirs.
The deed of sale reflected that five heirs—Gervacio, Felino, Casiano, Marcelino, and Marciano, all surnamed De Guzman—sold their respective shares to Feliciano Sibug, a widower, for P700.00.
Exhibit C was not notarized nor registered with the Register of Deeds of Pampanga.
Respondents did not sign the private deed, and the trial court and Court of Appeals treated the sale as legally limited to what those who signed had purported to convey.
The trial court rejected petitioners’ attempt to characterize the sale as covering the entire fishpond, reasoning that only co-heirs who did not sign could not be treated as having sold their shares “by any stretch of the imagination.”

Trial Court Judgment

The trial court declared respondents absolute owners of the three-ninth (3/9) pro-indiviso portion of the fishpond.
It ordered petitioners to convey the three-ninths pro-indiviso share to respondents.
It directed petitioners to provide an accounting of the harvest from 1947 up to the present and to deliver to respondents whatever products or their corresponding value corresponded to respondents’ participation during that period.
It imposed payment of attorney’s fees in the amount of P500.00, with costs.

Appellate Facts Adopted

The Court of Appeals adopted the facts quoted from its decision, emphasizing that the existence of Exhibit C, the identity of the property, and the deaths of the parents were undisputed.
The records showed that tax declarations (Exhibit B) continued to keep the property registered in the name of the original owners up to October 5, 1962, suggesting that petitioners’ asserted adverse ownership was not reflected in official records during the relevant period.
Petitioners and their predecessor(s) had taken physical possession from the execution of Exhibit C, and petitioners refused respondents’ demands starting in 1955.
An action was instituted on February 5, 1962, after the refusals to deliver the claimed shares.

Assignments of Error Framed

Petitioners’ first assignment claimed error in disregarding Benito de Guzman’s testimony about petitioners’ possession beginning in 1948.
Petitioners’ second assignment claimed error in failing to consider the same testimony regarding respondents’ alleged knowledge of the sale to Feliciano Sibug in 1948.
Petitioners’ third assignment argued that the plaintiffs’ cause of action had already prescribed.
Petitioners’ fourth assignment argued that petitioners had acquired ownership through acquisitive and extinctive prescription.
The Supreme Court characterized petitioners’ defense as resting mainly on prescription and on alleged adverse possession dating back to 1948.

Evidence on Knowledge and Possession

Petitioners relied on testimony of Benito de Guzman stating that Potenciano Sunga “came in possession” in 1948, and that this was because “the share of my six brothers was sold” to Sunga.
In cross-examination, Benito testified that it was “in 1948” that he knew Sunga took possession, and that this knowledge came from his