G.R. No. L-19550 - Stonehill vs. Diokno

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-19550)

Factual Background

Between March 3 and March 9, 1962, judges issued a total of forty-two search warrants upon applications filed by the respondents-prosecutors. The warrants were directed to peace officers to search the persons named and premises consisting of corporate offices, warehouses and residences. They authorized seizure of extensive categories of materials, described generally as "books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers)." The criminality alleged in the applications was broadly stated as violations of Central Bank laws, tariff and customs laws, the Internal Revenue Code and the Revised Penal Code rather than the commission of any specific statutory offense.

Petition and Relief Sought

On March 20, 1962, petitioners filed an original action in the Supreme Court assailing the warrants as unconstitutional and contrary to the Rules of Court. They alleged, inter alia, lack of particularity in the warrants, seizure of cash not described in the warrants, that the warrants were instruments for fishing for evidence to be used in deportation proceedings, and that seized property was not delivered to the issuing courts. Petitioners prayed for a writ of preliminary injunction restraining respondents from using the seized effects or any copies in deportation cases, for eventual quashing of the warrants, and for return of the seized items pursuant to Rule 67, Sec. 3.

Respondents' Answer

Respondents-prosecutors answered that the warrants were valid and issued in accordance with law, that any defects were cured by petitioners' consent, and that the seized items were admissible in evidence notwithstanding alleged illegality in the searches.

Preliminary Injunction and June 29 Resolution

The Court granted the writ of preliminary injunction on March 22, 1962. By resolution dated June 29, 1962, the Court partially lifted that injunction with respect to papers and things seized from corporate offices and other enumerated nonresidential premises — twenty-nine such places were listed — but retained the injunction insofar as papers, documents and things seized from the petitioners’ residences were concerned. The three residences expressly preserved under the injunction were 13 Narra Road, Forbes Park, Makati; 15 Narra Road, Forbes Park, Makati; and 8 Urdaneta Avenue, Urdaneta Village, Makati.

Standing as to Corporate Premises

The Court concluded that petitioners lacked a cause of action to challenge seizures made in the corporate offices. It reasoned that corporations named in the warrants possessed personalities separate and distinct from petitioners, and that the right to object to an unlawful seizure belonged to the owner of the property seized. The Court invoked authority holding that objections to unlawful searches and seizures are personal to those whose rights were invaded and that corporate officers may not, in their individual capacity, assert the corporation's right to suppress corporate papers seized from corporate premises.

Residence Seizures — Legal Questions Presented

As to the category of items seized from the petitioners’ residences, the Court framed two questions: whether the contested search warrants and the searches and seizures under them were valid; and, if not, whether the items seized could nevertheless be received in evidence against petitioners. Petitioners contended that the warrants were general warrants and therefore void.

Constitutional Requirements: Probable Cause and Particularity

The Court examined the constitutional mandate that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by a judge after examination under oath or affirmation, and that warrants must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The Court found that the applications for the warrants did not allege any specific offense or particular acts by the petitioners. They stated only that the parties had violated multiple statutory schemes in general terms. The Court held that such abstract averments negated any meaningful determination of probable cause and converted the instruments into general warrants proscribed by the constitutional provision.

Particularity of Things to Be Seized

The Court found further defect in the description of the items to be seized. The warrants authorized taking all records and papers “showing all business transactions,” without limiting the search to documents connected to a specific offense. The Court regarded such broad categories as contrary to the constitutional command of particular description and as tending to resurrect the very evil the provision seeks to prevent.

Abandonment of the Moncado Non-Exclusionary Rule and Adoption of the Exclusionary Rule

Confronting the question whether unlawfully obtained evidence should nevertheless be admissible, the Court unanimously abandoned the holding in Moncado vs. People, 80 Phil. 1, which had adhered to a non-exclusionary approach. The Court adopted the exclusionary rule and relied upon developments in American jurisprudence culminating in Mapp v. Ohio, and on prior federal decisions such as Weeks and Gouled, to hold that evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is inadmissible. The Court reasoned that exclusion is the only practical and effective means to enforce the constitutional privilege, because alternative remedies — damages, criminal prosecution of officials, or administrative discipline — do not reliably deter or remedy systemic abuses, particularly where searches are committed by agents of the party in power.

Court’s Disposition and Orders

Applying these principles, the Court held that the warrants authorizing searches of the three residences identified in the June 29 resolution were null and void and that the searches and seizures conducted thereunder were illegal. The prior writ of preliminary injunction was made permanent with respect to the items seized in those residences. The Court granted the writs prayed for insofar as they related to papers, documents and other effects seized in those residences, denied the petition and the writs insofar as they related to the items seized in the twenty-nine nonresidential places enumerated in the June 29 resolution, and denied the motion for reconsideration and amendment. The Court made no special pronouncement as to costs.

Motion for Reconsideration and Petitioners' Additional Contentions

Petitioners had moved to expand the scope of the injunction and to characterize additional rooms and premises as residences and to assert that some items seized from corporate offices were personal and under their exclusive control. The Court observed that these contentions were raised in the motion for reconsideration rather than in the original petition, that some supporting affidavits contained inconsistent allegations, and that the record did not satisfactorily establish the factual predicates relied upon by petitioners. The Court therefore declined to rule on those matters and left them open for determination in appropriate future proceedings.

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Castro, J.

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-19550)

Parties and Procedural Posture

Petitioners were Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brooks, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck who filed an original action in the Supreme Court for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction.
Respondents included Hon. Jose W. Diokno in his capacity as Secretary of Justice, Jose Lukban as Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation, Special Prosecutors Pedro D. Cenzon, Efren I. Plana and Manuel Villareal, Jr., Assistant Fiscal Manases G. Reyes, and several judges named in the petitions.
The petition challenged forty-two search warrants issued against petitioners and certain corporations between March 3 and March 9, 1962, and sought the return and suppression of documents, papers and other effects seized under those warrants.
Petitioners obtained a writ of preliminary injunction from the Supreme Court on March 22, 1962, which was partially lifted by the Court's resolution of June 29, 1962, as to certain corporate premises but maintained as to papers seized from the petitioners' residences.
Petitioners subsequently moved for reconsideration and amendment of the June 29, 1962 resolution, and the Supreme Court rendered its final decision resolving the legality of the warrants, the admissibility of seized evidence, and the scope of standing to contest the seizures.

Key Factual Allegations

Respondent-prosecutors procured a total of forty-two search warrants directed to peace officers to search the persons and premises of the petitioners and several corporations and to seize books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, typewriters and other documents or papers showing all business transactions.
The warrants' applications described the offenses in broad terms as violations of Central Bank laws, Tariff and Customs laws, the Internal Revenue Code and the Revised Penal Code without alleging specific statutory provisions or particular acts.
Petitioners alleged that the warrants did not particularly describe the items to be seized, that cash not mentioned in the warrants was seized, that the warrants were used to fish for evidence for deportation cases, that searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner, and that seized items were not returned to issuing courts.
The seized effects fell into two groups: those taken from the offices and premises of corporations and those taken from the petitioners' residences.

Issues Presented

Whether the contested search warrants complied with the constitutional requirement that warrants issue only upon probable cause and that they particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Whether documents and other effects seized under the contested warrants are admissible in evidence despite alleged unconstitutionality of the searches and seizures.
Whether petitioners had legal standing to challenge seizures of corporate records and other items seized from corporate offices and premises.

Contentions

Petitioners contended that the warrants were general warrants lacking particularity and probable cause, that seizures included items not described in the warrants, that the searches were fishing expeditions for deportation proceedings, and that seized items should be returned and suppressed.
Respondent-prosecutors contended that the warrants were valid, that any defects were cured by petitioners' consent, and that the seized items were admissible in evidence even if the searches were irregular.

Statutory Framework

The Court relied upon the constitutional provision then cited in the petition as Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III, which protects persons, houses, papers and effects from unreasonable searches and seizures and requires that warrants issue only upon probable cause and particularly describe the place and the persons or things to be seized.
The Court noted the former Rules of Court provision reading that "a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause" and the subsequent amendment embodied in the Revised Rules of Court in Sec. 3, Rule 126, that