Title
St. Louis College of Tuguegarao vs. National Labor Relations Commission
Case
G.R. No. 74214
Decision Date
Aug 31, 1989
A labor dispute involving termination due to old age; SC ruled fringe benefits included in back wages, limited to three years, and awarded separation pay due to advanced age.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 74214)

Factual Background

The petitioner had employed the private respondents as members of its faculty and then sought to terminate them due to their age. The case arose when the petitioner filed its application on May 31, 1979 to terminate the private respondents’ services for old age. The labor proceedings were triggered by the private respondents’ opposition, which required referral to the Labor Arbiter.

The Labor Arbiter ruled that the dismissal should be upheld as to Simangan but not as to Avera, and it ordered the reinstatement of Avera with full backwages from the time of his dismissal until actual reinstatement. As to Simangan, the Labor Arbiter treated the cash deposit made in his name as separation pay.

Labor Arbiter and NLRC Outcomes

The private respondents and the petitioner appealed to the NLRC. The NLRC dismissed the petitioner’s appeal for being not filed under oath, but it ruled in Simangan’s favor by ordering his immediate reinstatement and awarding him backwages, instead of separation pay, in its decision dated November 26, 1982.

As to Avera, the Labor Arbiter had ordered reinstatement with full backwages, and the NLRC modified the petitioner’s position only as to Simangan by changing the basis of monetary relief.

First and Second Supreme Court Review; Loss and Reconstitution of Records

The petitioner elevated the NLRC disposition to the Supreme Court via certiorari, but the Court dismissed the petition on August 15, 1983. Entry of judgment was made on September 21, 1983.

Enforcement of the NLRC decision could not proceed because the records were destroyed in a fire that gutted the NLRC office at Intramuros, Manila, on December 13, 1984. Upon petition of the private respondents, the records were reconstituted, and based on the reconstituted record, another decision was rendered on July 18, 1984, awarding back pay of P58,050.00 to Simangan and P59,910.00 to Avera, computed from 1979 to July 1984. The decision also ordered the reinstatement of both private respondents without loss of seniority and other rights.

The petitioner again sought certiorari before the Supreme Court, and certiorari was again denied.

Private Respondents’ Complaint on Computation of Back Wages; Remand

Thereafter, the private respondents complained before the NLRC that the computation of their back wages did not conform to law because it allegedly took into account only their basic salaries, excluding other benefits and allowances. They insisted that their sick and vacation leaves should be included in the computation.

The NLRC accepted the position and remanded the matter to the Executive Labor Arbiter for recomputation of the awards.

Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration; Partial Grant

The petitioner moved for reconsideration, contending that the recomputation should exclude fringe benefits and should be limited to three years; it argued further that back wages should be reckoned by academic school years, not calendar years; and that the computation should not include the separation pay already withdrawn by the private respondents.

In a decision dated December 27, 1985, the NLRC granted the motion for reconsideration on the last two issues, but denied it on the first two. The petitioner then came to the Supreme Court on a third petition for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion by the NLRC in (1) including fringe benefits in the computation of back wages and (2) failing to limit the award to three years.

Issues Raised in the Third Petition for Certiorari

The private respondents argued that the NLRC’s earlier decisions dated November 26, 1982 and July 18, 1984 could no longer be disturbed because they had already become final and executory. The Solicitor General did not deny that the issues had been decided matters, yet it invoked equity in the implementation of the NLRC decision due to the factual setting of the case.

The Court clarified that the petition did not challenge the validity of the earlier final decisions. The controversy was directed solely to the correct interpretation of those decisions in connection with the computation of the awards.

Inclusion of Fringe Benefits in Back Wages

On the first issue, the petitioner argued that including additional vacation and sick leaves would amount to double compensation, because those allowances were allegedly already included in the back wages for the full academic year whether or not leaves were actually taken.

The Court rejected the petitioner’s position and emphasized that it was settled that the employer must pay an illegally dismissed employee the whole amount of salaries or wages, plus other benefits and bonuses and general increases, the employee would have been normally entitled to had dismissal not occurred and work had not been interrupted. Consistent with that principle, the Court held that in computing back wages and separation pay, the computation must account not only for basic salary but also for transportation and emergency allowances, and must include regular allowances that the employer had been providing.

The Court further reasoned that the NLRC’s grant of back wages for the full period without qualification and deduction necessarily took into consideration holidays, vacation leaves, and service incentive leaves, paying for all working days regardless of whether those days coincided with holidays or with leave days. Thus, the Court ruled that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in including the relevant benefits in the computation.

Three-Year Limitation Doctrine and Duration of Back Wages

On the second issue, the Court considered the petitioner’s contention that the award should be limited to three years. The Court acknowledged that the NLRC’s earlier decision directed payment of back wages for a period exceeding three years, from the time of dismissal in 1979 until the date of reinstatement, if reinstatement were feasible. However, the Court held that the period could still be reduced in the context of execution and computation, notwithstanding finality of the earlier decisions.

The Court treated the duration prescribed as open-ended and therefore subject to the three-year limitation doctrine invoked by the Solicitor General. It noted that at the time of dismissal, Avera and Simangan were already seventy-one and seventy-three, respectively, and thus were not expected to remain employed indefinitely or much longer with the petitioner. The Court concluded that it was fair to limit back pay to three years, drawing analogy to other illegally dismissed employees.

The Court then grounded its ruling on the more recently decided case of Mariners Polytechnic School v. Leogardo (G.R. No. 74271, March 31, 1989). In that case, a labor order initially directed continued entitlement to back wages up to final reinstatement, but it had later been limited by administrative modification to three years because it was “consistently with a long line of decisions.” When modification was resisted on the ground of finality, the Supreme Court held that the three-year limitation doctrine should be deemed “written into the judgment” for purposes of execution and computation, because the doctrine aimed precisely at avoiding the mischief that would arise if execution required prolonged abatement while parties litigated earning capacities for extended periods.

Applying the same logic, the Court held that disregarding the three-year limitation in the judgment sought to be executed amounted to a clerical omission, and it was not within the decision’s implementing authority

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