Case Summary (G.R. No. 118644)
Procedural History and Key Dates
May 1976: respondents borrowed P2,000 from petitioners for roof repairs. June 3, 1976: a document (Deed of Absolute Sale, Exhibit "1") was executed. September 1980: respondents discovered their OCT cancelled, TCT No. S-28903 issued in favor of petitioners, and the property mortgaged to Cavite Development Bank for P40,000. February 3, 1981: respondents filed suit in the Court of First Instance (later RTC) of Pasay City to declare the deed void and inexistent. The RTC rendered judgment declaring the deed void and ordering reconveyance, attorney’s fees (P5,000), and costs. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC in CA-G.R. CV No. 06543 (decision promulgated March 11, 1988). The petitioners sought review by certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 45; the Supreme Court ultimately denied the petition and affirmed the lower courts’ rulings.
Issues Presented
The dispositive question synthesized by the courts was whether the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhibit "1") was void and inexistent for lack of consent and want of consideration. Ancillary issues raised by petitioners included prescription/statute of limitations, the evidentiary weight of public instruments and ancillary documents (e.g., a BIR certification), and whether reconveyance was an appropriate remedy.
Factual Findings Relevant to Liability
Respondents testified that they were misled to sign a document they were told (in Tagalog) merely evidenced a P2,000 debt. The document was typed in English; respondents were not fluent in English. They denied appearing before the notary and denied receiving consideration. Petitioners and their witnesses (including the notary and co-owner Juanita) offered conflicting testimony and admitted at trial that the true price allegedly paid was P7,800, while the deed recited P2,000 (and showed an earlier typed P3,000 crossed out and replaced by P2,000). Petitioners also recorded payments of taxes on the property, which they claimed indicated ownership and ratification.
Trial Court Findings and Legal Characterization of the Deed
The RTC found that respondents did not intend to sell, that their signatures were procured by fraud and misrepresentation, and that there was gross inadequacy or absence of consideration. Given respondents’ advanced age and dependence, the court applied the protective lens of Article 24 of the Civil Code. The RTC characterized the deed not as merely voidable (annullable) but as void and inexistent ab initio, because respondents had not given consent at all and no valid consideration passed.
Court of Appeals’ Rationale
The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC, emphasizing that the evidence showed the deed to be simulated and fictitious. The appellate court agreed that the respondents’ sworn statements that they signed without knowing they were executing a deed of sale meant there was no consent; absence of consent and absence of consideration rendered the deed void ab initio rather than merely voidable.
Petitioners’ Contentions on Review
Petitioners argued the deed, as a public instrument, enjoyed a presumption of regularity and veracity that can only be overcome by clear, convincing, and overwhelming evidence; they invoked the presumption of validity, asserted that prescription had run (i.e., action to annul was barred after four years), and complained that the Court of Appeals improperly relied on a purported BIR certification not formally offered in evidence. Petitioners also relied on alleged tax payments and possession acts as confirmation or ratification of their title.
Supreme Court’s Analysis of Evidence and Credibility
The Supreme Court examined the record and found significant contradictions and admissions undermining petitioners’ claims. Petitioners and witnesses admitted altering and misstating the consideration (admitting P7,800 was the true price while the deed recited P2,000 and showed a prior P3,000 inscription). The alteration and the admitted motive to “save on taxes” attacked the integrity of the public instrument and rebutted the presumption of regularity. The BIR certification, although not formally admitted, had been presented during testimony and became part of the credibility contest. The trial court’s assessment that petitioners and their witnesses were not credible was supported by the record; the Supreme Court declined to disturb those credibility findings.
Applicable Law and Controlling Doctrines
Because the decision was rendered after 1990, analysis proceeded under the 1987 Philippine Constitution together with relevant Civil Code principles. Key legal principles applied and cited in the decision include:
- Article 24, Civil Code: judicial vigilance to protect parties disadvantaged by moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, age, or other handicap.
- Article 1275 (cause/consideration): contracts without cause or consideration produce no effect.
- Distinction between void and voidable contracts: absence of consent or consideration may render a contract void ab initio rather than merely voidable.
- Article 1391 and related prescriptions: actions to annul for vitiated consent are generally subject to prescription, but an a
Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 118644)
Citation and Nature of the Case
- Reported at 355 Phil. 721, First Division, G.R. No. 83974, decided August 17, 1998; opinion authored by Justice Quisumbing with Davide, Jr. (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug and Panganiban, JJ., concurring.
- Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 06543 (Decision promulgated March 11, 1988; motion for reconsideration denied by Resolution dated June 28, 1988).
- The petition sought reversal of the appellate affirmation of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City judgment in Civil Case No. LP-8790-P, which declared a Deed of Absolute Sale void and inexistent and ordered reconveyance, attorney’s fees, and costs.
Procedural History
- Initial dispute began as an ejectment suit before the Municipal Court of Las Piñas filed by petitioners against private respondents; private respondents filed a complaint in the RTC of Pasay City to determine ownership after barangay conciliation failed.
- RTC of Pasay City rendered a judgment declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exh. "1") dated June 3, 1976 void and inexistent, ordering reconveyance of the property (TCT No. S-28903) to the plaintiffs and awarding P5,000 attorney’s fees and costs.
- Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision in toto in CA-G.R. CV No. 06543 (Decision promulgated March 11, 1988); petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied (Resolution June 28, 1988).
- Petitioners filed a Rule 45 petition to the Supreme Court; petition given due course (Resolution June 26, 1989), initially denied for non-compliance (September 20, 1989), later reinstated upon motion showing compliance (September 2, 1991).
- Supreme Court disposed of the petition by denying it and affirming the Court of Appeals’ Decision and Resolution; costs assessed against petitioners.
Parties and Relationship
- Petitioners: Spouses Narciso Rongavilla and Dolores Rongavilla.
- Respondents/private plaintiffs below: Mercedes de la Cruz and Florencia de la Cruz, aunts of Dolores Rongavilla.
- Additional co-owner mentioned: Juanita Jimenez, another niece and elder sister of Dolores, co-owner of one-half of the parcel and custodian of the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) and later TCT.
- Familial ties are emphasized: the private respondents are aunts of petitioner Dolores; parties are closely related.
Facts Established in the Record
- Subject property: parcel located in Manuyo, Las Piñas, Rizal (now Metro Manila), 131 square meters, originally covered by OCT No. 5415; after subdivision, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-28903, Registry of Deeds for the Province of Rizal.
- Ownership: private respondents owned one-half pro indiviso of the parcel; co-owner was Juanita Jimenez.
- In May 1976 private respondents borrowed P2,000 from petitioners allegedly to repair their dilapidated rooftop.
- Around June 3, 1976, petitioners (Dolores and Juanita) visited the aunts’ home with a typewritten document in English; Dolores allegedly told Mercedes in Tagalog it was a document showing the debt of P2,000, and Mercedes signed based on that representation.
- Private respondents were unschooled in English but able to read and write Tagalog; they were of advanced age (Mercedes 60; Florencia 71) and engaged in embroidery and dressmaking.
- The deed of sale (Exh. "1") dated June 3, 1976 recited a consideration of P2,000 (though earlier typed amount of P3,000 was later handwritten as P2,000); petitioners and their witnesses later testified the true consideration was P7,800.
- Petitioners caused cancellation of the OCT and issuance of TCT No. S-28903 in their favor and later mortgaged the parcel with the Cavite Development Bank for a total of P40,000.
- Private respondents discovered the cancellation and mortgage only in September 1980 when petitioners demanded that they vacate the parcel.
- Private respondents filed the sworn complaint on February 3, 1981 seeking declaration of the deed of sale as void and inexistent for being fictitious, simulated, and obtained by fraud and misrepresentation; complained of lack of consent and want of consideration, alleged no consideration received, and sought damages.
Issues Presented to the Supreme Court (as synthesized)
- Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error by upholding the RTC judgment that the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exh. "1") dated June 3, 1976 is void and inexistent.
- Subsumed within that principal question were the petitioners’ articulated grounds:
- Error in declaring the deed void and inexistent;
- Error in holding the action to declare nullity does not prescribe;
- Grave abuse of discretion in relying on a purported BIR certificate not formally offered in evidence;
- Error and abuse in ordering reconveyance of the subject parcel.
Trial Court Findings and Reasoning
- The RTC found plaintiffs (private respondents) did not intend to sell their property and were misled by Dolores and Juanita into signing a document they believed to be an acknowledgment of a P2,000 loan.
- The RTC weighed the gross inadequacy and unconscionableness of the consideration (P2,000 recited while the property was later mortgaged for P40,000) and concluded it was more reasonable the P2,000 referred to the loan.
- The RTC noted plaintiffs’ advanced age, limited assets (their only property being the lot and house), and lack of necessity to dispose of the property for a small repair loan; such a disposition would be inconsistent with normal human conduct.
- The trial court concluded the deed was simulated, fictitious, and void; it emphasized that the presumption of regularity of public documents was rebuttable by clear, strong, and convincing evidence.
Court of Appeals’ Ruling and Reasoning
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, agreeing that plaintiffs had established by more than a mere preponderance of evidence that fraud was exercised by petitioner Dolores and Juanita in obtaining signatures and that there was no consideration for the alleged sale.
- The appellate court characterized the deed not as merely voidable but as null and void ab initio