Title
Spouses Mallari vs. Prudential Bank
Case
G.R. No. 197861
Decision Date
Jun 5, 2013
Florentino Mallari defaulted on loans secured by a mortgage; SC upheld 23% interest, 12% penalty, and foreclosure, ruling terms valid and enforceable.
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 197861)

Principal loan transactions and instruments

On December 11, 1984, Florentino obtained a P300,000 loan evidenced by Promissory Note (PN) No. BD 84-055, bearing 21% per annum interest, attorney’s fees equivalent to 15% of the total amount due but not less than P200, and a 12% per annum penalty/collection charge in case of default; maturity initially January 10, 1985, renewed to February 17, 1985. Florentino executed a Deed of Assignment authorizing the bank to apply his P300,000 time deposit to the loan. On December 22, 1989, petitioners obtained a separate P1.7 million loan evidenced by PN No. BDS 606-89 due March 22, 1990, at 23% per annum interest, attorney’s fees equivalent to 15% of the total amount due but not less than P200, and 12% per annum penalty/collection charge; petitioners executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage on property under TCT No. T-215175 to secure the P1.7 million loan.

Defaults, account computations, and extrajudicial foreclosure

Petitioners defaulted. By January 31, 1992, computations showed PN No. BD 84-055 accumulated to P571,218.54 and PN No. BDS 606-89 to P2,991,294.82. The bank filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure on February 25, 1992 for satisfaction of the obligations secured by the real estate mortgage covering the P1.7 million loan; auction was set for April 23, 1992. On April 10, 1992 the bank sent statements of account indicating the P300,000 obligation had increased to P594,043.54 and the P1.7 million obligation to P3,171,836.18. After procedural litigation involving temporary restraining orders and lifts, the property was sold at sheriff’s sale; a certificate of sale was issued to the bank as highest bidder for P3,500,000 on July 7, 1993.

Petitioners’ claims in the complaint

In their April 20, 1992 complaint, petitioners sought annulment of the mortgage and related injunctive relief and damages. Their primary contentions included: (1) the P300,000 loan should have been considered paid because the P300,000 time deposit (Certificate of Time Deposit No. 284051) had been assigned to the bank; (2) the bank allegedly added the P300,000 loan to the P1.7 million loan for purposes of applying auction proceeds; and (3) the bank imposed onerous terms by unilaterally increasing charges and interest beyond those stipulated in the contracts. Petitioners sought to enjoin the foreclosure sale.

Respondent bank’s position and defenses

The bank answered and counterclaimed, asserting the promissory notes expressly fixed interest rates used in the computation; claimed that as early as January 1986 the time deposit was applied to pay interest on the P300,000 loan and that the April 10, 1992 statement of account accounted only for interest and penalties from May 26, 1989, because proceeds had been applied to earlier periods; and maintained petitioners were aware of the bank’s terms. The bank also asserted that foreclosure sought satisfaction of the P1.7 million loan secured by the mortgage, not the separate P300,000 loan.

RTC proceedings, evidentiary posture, and trial court findings

The RTC initially denied a writ of preliminary injunction, later issued a restraining order, then lifted it, allowing foreclosure to proceed. After prolonged litigation and trial with petitioners’ witness testimony (Florentino as lone plaintiffs’ witness), the bank filed a demurrer to evidence. On November 15, 1999 the RTC granted the demurrer and dismissed the case, reasoning, inter alia, that: (a) the P300,000 time deposit had been assigned and would have covered the principal but not accumulated interest and penalties—thus the P292,600 penalty charge claimed by petitioners was unjustified; (b) the P1.7 million obligation had grown to the amounts reflected in the statements of account by application of the agreed 23% interest and 12% penalty; (c) the bank had not improperly added the P300,000 loan to the P1.7 million loan for purposes of applying auction proceeds; (d) petitioners were not entitled to the difference between the bank’s P3.5 million bid and the P1.7 million principal because accumulated interest and penalties had already increased the obligation; (e) the stipulated 23% per annum interest rate was not unconscionable—banks are commercial entities and prevailing market rates were relevant; and (f) Article 1229 of the Civil Code (concerning reduction of interest) did not apply because petitioners paid nothing on the P1.7 million loan.

Court of Appeals ruling

The CA affirmed the RTC in a June 17, 2010 decision, holding that the P300,000 time deposit covered only principal and was insufficient to satisfy accrued interest, penalties, and fees; that the bank did not improperly consolidate the two loans for application of auction proceeds; and that the contractual interest (23% p.a.) and the 12% p.a. penalty were not unconscionable. The CA adopted the RTC’s factual and legal findings in toto and denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration on July 20, 2011.

Issue on appeal to the Supreme Court

The sole issue presented to the Supreme Court was whether the agreed 23% per annum interest and the 12% per annum penalty charge on the P1.7 million loan were excessive or unconscionable under the circumstances, such that they should be reduced or declared void.

Legal principles applied: freedom of contract and limits

The Court reiterated the principle of freedom of contract under Article 1306 of the Civil Code: contracting parties may stipulate terms they deem convenient provided such stipulations are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. A valid stipulation binds the parties as the contract is the law between them. However, jurisprudence has recognized that stipulated interest rates and penalty clauses can be struck down or reduced when unconscionable or contrary to morals.

Jurisprudential benchmarks on unconscionable interest rates

The Court examined prior jurisprudence cited by petitioners:

  • Medel v. Court of Appeals: a 66% p.a. (5.5% per month) rate on P500,000 was declared excessive and void.
  • Toring v. Spouses Ganzon-Olan and Chua v. Timan: monthly rates of 3% and higher (equivalent to 36% p.a. or more) were held excessive; the Court reduced such rates to 12% p.a. (1% per month) in those contexts.
    The Court contrasted these precedents with the present case,

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