Case Summary (G.R. No. 154391-92)
Places and Procedural Posture
Properties: Two parcels in Banay-banay, Lipa City, covered by TCT Nos. T-78521 and T-103141. Procedural posture: Ejectment suit filed in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Lipa City; affirmed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC); consolidated appeals to the Court of Appeals (CA); petition for review to the Supreme Court under Rule 45. Decision date of the Supreme Court: September 30, 2004 (apply the 1987 Constitution as the operative constitution).
Applicable Law and Jurisprudence
Primary statutory provisions: Civil Code (Articles 448, 447, 546, 548, 1678, 1197, 1181, 777). Rules of Court provisions applied: Rule 70 (unlawful detainer), Rule 18 (pretrial), Section 17 of Rule 70. Relevant jurisprudential authorities and doctrines cited by the courts include Calubayan v. Pascual and cases applying Article 448 to builders in good faith and to consensual improvements (e.g., Javier v. Javier, Sarmiento v. Agana, Depra v. Dumlao).
Core Legal Issues Presented
- Whether ejectment was proper and whether the plaintiffs proved entitlement to physical possession; 2) whether petitioners’ occupancy was mere tolerance or founded on an implied/express agreement; 3) whether Article 448 or Article 1678 (or Article 447) of the Civil Code governs reimbursement for improvements; 4) procedural issues relating to appearance at the preliminary conference and applicability of pretrial substitution rules; 5) whether the CA’s monetary computation and award should be sustained; and ancillary allegations of judicial and counsel misconduct.
Relevant Facts
- Respondents owned the two titled lots; they invited petitioners (their son and daughter-in-law) to occupy the lots (petitioners moved in March 1992) and petitioners constructed structures and used the site for residence and a construction business.
- Respondents later demanded payment of rent (allegedly P500/week) and subsequently issued a demand to vacate. MTCC and RTC found petitioners’ possession was not based on a lease but on tolerance; the CA likewise found possession became unlawful upon respondents’ demand. Petitioners claimed allotment as advance inheritance and a dation in payment for materials, which lower courts rejected for lack of proof.
MTCC and RTC Findings
The MTCC found petitioners’ occupation was by mere tolerance and ordered ejectment. The RTC affirmed ejectment but allowed respondents the option to appropriate the improvements after payment of indemnity under Article 448 (in relation to Articles 546 and 548) or to require petitioners to purchase the land or pay rent depending on relative values.
Court of Appeals Ruling
The CA sustained that petitioners’ possession became illegal upon respondents’ demand and treated their status as analogous to a lessee whose term expired. On that basis, the CA applied Article 1678 (lease rules) and awarded petitioners one-half of the value of useful improvements (P 475,000), and deleted an award of attorney’s fees by the RTC. The CA’s computation was based primarily on petitioners’ uncorroborated itemization.
Supreme Court’s Assessment of Ejectment and Possession
- Unlawful detainer principle: The Court reiterated that ejectment focuses on entitlement to physical possession; possession originally lawful may become unlawful upon expiration or termination of the right to possess, and such cause of action must be filed within one year from last demand.
- Complaint sufficiency: The Supreme Court agreed the Complaint adequately alleged unlawful withholding of possession and that the MTCC did not err in finding cause for ejectment. Section 17, Rule 70 was not violated.
- Tolerance versus agreement: The Supreme Court departed from the lower courts’ characterization of the occupancy as mere tolerance. It held that respondents invited petitioners to occupy the lots to foster family solidarity and assistance, creating an implied agreement (meeting of the minds) rather than mere neighborly tolerance. Consequently, petitioners had a right to occupy, albeit a right grounded in a gratuitous familial arrangement.
Termination of Occupancy and Resolutory Condition
Because the parties did not intend a definite period for the occupancy, Article 1197 (power of courts to fix duration where a period is intended) did not apply. The Court characterized the arrangement as founded on parental love and family solidarity and therefore subject to a resolutory condition: the occupancy lasted only so long as the mutual purpose and affection subsisted. When conflict and animosity replaced the familial basis, the right to occupy terminated upon respondents’ demand, and ejectment was proper when petitioners refused to vacate.
Petitioners’ Successional and Dation Claims
The Court affirmed the lower courts’ rejection of claims that the lots had been allotted as advance inheritance or transferred by dation in payment. Successional rights remain inchoate until death of the decedent; dation in payment requires a valid transfer and meeting of minds, which petitioners failed to prove. Documentary and credible evidence were lacking.
Procedural Issue: Appearance at Preliminary Conference
The Supreme Court held that the pretrial rules (Rule 18) supplement the preliminary conference provisions of Rule 70. A party’s nonappearance can be excused for valid cause or by the appearance of a representative possessing a written special authority to enter into settlement, admissions, or alternative dispute resolution. Because respondents had an attorney-in-fact with written authorization at the conference, the MTCC did not err in proceeding.
Applicability of Civil Code Provisions on Improvements
- Article 447 inapplicable: Article 447 addresses the owner’s use of another’s materials and does not govern the present fact pattern where a possessor erected improvements on another’s land.
- Article 1678 inapplicable: The CA’s reliance on Article 1678 (pertaining to lease) was misplaced because the Supreme Court found that possession was not merely by tolerance analogous to a lessee with an expired term.
- Article 448 applicable: The Court invoked Article 448 for cases where a person builds in good faith on another’s land or where improvements are constructed with the owner’s consent. Because the parents invited and knew of the constructions, petitioners were deemed to have acted in good faith, bringing the case within Article 448 and the indemnity regime of Articles 546 and 548.
Rights and Remedies under Article 448 and Article 546
Under Article 448, the owner of the land may appropriate the works after payment of indemnity provided under Article 546 (necessary and useful expenses refunded to the possessor in good faith with right of retention until reimbursement) or may require the builder to buy the land unless land value is considerably greater than improvements, in which case reasonable rent applies. Article 546 provides that useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith; the person who defeats his possession may either refund expenses or pay the increase in value attributable to the improvements. The Supreme Court therefore recognized respondents’ option to: (a) appropriate improvements by paying indemnity; (b) compel petitioners to buy the land (if appropriate); or (c) require petitioners to pay reasonable rent if land value is considerably higher.
Remand for Determinat
...continue readingCase Syllabus (G.R. No. 154391-92)
Case Title, Citation and Procedural Posture
- Supreme Court of the Philippines, Third Division, G.R. Nos. 154391-92, Decision dated September 30, 2004; reported at 482 Phil. 853.
- Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing: (a) March 22, 2002 Decision and (b) June 26, 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP Nos. 56205 & 56467.
- Parties: Spouses Ismael and Teresita Macasaet (petitioners; sometimes Teresita referred to as "Rosita" in the records) v. Spouses Vicente and Rosario Macasaet (respondents; parents of Ismael).
- Case originated in an ejectment suit filed by respondents in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Lipa City, thereafter appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), and then to the Court of Appeals (CA), and finally to the Supreme Court.
Summary of Relief Sought and Lower Courts' Dispositions
- Relief sought by respondents: ejectment of petitioners from two parcels of land (TCT Nos. T-78521 and T-103141), removal of structures, and rental arrears for alleged verbal lease (P500 per week).
- MTCC (Assisting Judge Norberto P. Mercado): found petitioners occupied the lots by mere tolerance of respondents, disbelieved alleged verbal lease, dismissed claims of advance inheritance and dation in payment; ordered ejectment.
- RTC (Presiding Judge Jane Aurora C. Lantion): affirmed MTCC's findings; allowed respondents to appropriate buildings and improvements after payment of indemnity under Article 448 in relation to Articles 546 and 548; allowed option to require petitioners to purchase land or, if value of land considerably exceeds building, require petitioners to pay rent.
- CA: affirmed that petitioners' possession became illegal upon respondents' demand; held possession analogous to lessee whose term expired; applied Article 1678 (lease provision) and awarded petitioners one-half of the value of useful improvements (computed by CA at P950,000; CA ordered reimbursement of one-half = P475,000); deleted award of attorney's fees; remanded to trial court to determine option by respondents and implement.
- Supreme Court: partly meritorious petition; affirmed CA decision with modifications; deleted CA portion requiring reimbursement of one-half and right to remove improvements; remanded to court of origin to determine facts essential for proper application of Articles 448 and 546; deleted award of attorney's fees in CA decision; no pronouncement as to costs.
Facts (as established in the record)
- Parties are immediate family: respondents are the parents of petitioner Ismael; Teresita is Ismael's wife.
- Respondents alleged ownership of two parcels covered by TCT Nos. T-78521 and T-103141 at Banay-banay, Lipa City.
- Respondents alleged petitioners occupied the lots since March 1992 under a verbal lease at P500/week and failed to pay rent despite demands.
- Petitioners denied a verbal lease; testified respondents invited them to occupy the lots to live nearby, employ Ismael's sister (Marivic), and promote family solidarity.
- Petitioners claimed: (a) TCT No. T-103141 had been allotted to Ismael as an advance inheritance; (b) TCT No. T-78521 had been given to petitioners as payment (dation) for construction materials used in renovating respondents' house.
- Petitioners built structures and improvements on the lots and used one lot as situs for their construction business; they submitted a list of expenses but did not produce supporting receipts.
- Respondents sent demand letters (including demand letter dated August 13, 1997) and filed ejectment suit on December 10, 1997.
- There was a purported barangay conciliation date; petitioners purportedly waived presence at conciliation (letter dated October 14, 1997 appears in record); petitioners later alleged lack of conciliation but this contention rested on hearsay.
Central Legal Issues Presented to the Supreme Court
- Whether Section 17, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court on Judgment should have governed rendition of judgment in this ejectment case and whether complaint should be dismissed.
- Whether damages, including attorney's fees, should have been awarded to petitioners.
- Whether appearance rules applicable to pretrial apply to preliminary conference in unlawful detainer cases, and whether Philippine Pryce Assurance Corp. v. Court of Appeals is controlling.
- Whether Article 1678 of the Civil Code (lease) or Article 447 (accession/manner of using another's materials) in relation to Articles 453 and 454 should apply to reimbursement for improvements — or whether Article 448 (builder in good faith) applies.
- Whether the CA Decision is supported by evidence, applicable law, rules, and jurisprudence.
- Allegations regarding accountability of MTCC judge and counsel for respondents (whether they should be held personally accountable).
Standard and Nature of Ejectment Proceedings (Supreme Court's Legal Framework)
- Ejectment (summary unlawful detainer) focuses on entitlement to physical or material possession of premises; possession is an attribute of ownership.
- In unlawful detainer: originally lawful possession becomes unlawful upon expiration or termination of defendant's right to possess arising from express or implied contract; plaintiff's cause of action derives from termination/expiration; action must be filed within one year from the date of last demand.
- Jurisdiction and nature of action determined by the averments of the complaint; complaint here alleged refusal to pay accrued rentals and refusal to vacate; prayed for restitution and removal of structures — sufficient to allege unlawful withholding of possession.
Court's Findings on Possession: Tolerance versus Invited/Consensual Occupation
- MTCC and RTC ruled petitioners occupied the lots by mere tolerance; CA followed cases analogizing tolerated possession to a lessee whose term expired.
- Supreme Court held petitioners successfully established respondents had invited them to occupy the lots to live nearby and foster family solidarity; acceptance by petitioners evidenced a meeting of minds and therefore an implied agreement regarding possession.
- Key legal points and authorities:
- Tolerated possession definition: the owner permits acts out of neighborliness or courtesy without intending to confer rights; tacit consent insufficient to equate to an agreement.
- Citing Sarona v. Villegas and Professor Arturo M. Tolentino: tolerance is not equivalent to consent constituting a right; existence of permission determines question.
- Supreme Court concluded: possession was not mere tolerance; respondents had full knowledge and approval of occupancy and constructions; thus petitioners had a right to occupy based on invitation and implied agreement.
Duration and Termination of the Right to Use the Lots
- No fixed period was stipulated by parties at time of invitation; Article 1197 of Civil Code allows courts to fix period when intended; but Article 1197 applies only where parties intended a period — such intention could not be inferred here.
- Supreme Court found the arrangement was gratuitous and grounded on parental love and family solidarity; it contained a resolutory condition (i.e., subsisted so long as mutual benefit and familial love existed).
- When the familial relationship and solidarity dissolved (persistent conflict and animosity), the basis for the agreement ceased; respondents' demand to vacate terminated petitioners' right to possess.
- Petitioners' possession became unlawful upon re