Title
Spouses Louh, Jr. vs. Bank of the Philippine Islands
Case
G.R. No. 225562
Decision Date
Mar 8, 2017
BPI sued Spouses Louh for unpaid credit card debt; default declared due to late Answer. SC upheld debt but reduced excessive charges (3.5% & 6% to 12% p.a.) and attorney’s fees (25% to 5%).
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 207342)

Petitioner and Respondent

Petitioners: Cardholder (William) and extension cardholder (Irene) who used BPI credit cards and became delinquent in payment.
Respondent: BPI, issuer of the credit cards and claimant in the collection action.

Key Dates

Relevant chronology from the record: initial delinquency noted October 14, 2009; account balance as of August 7/15, 2010; demand letters August 7, 2010 and later; complaint filed August 4, 2011; default procedures and judgment in 2012–2013; CA decisions in 2015 and 2016; Supreme Court resolution in 2017. The Supreme Court decision falls after 1990; therefore the 1987 Philippine Constitution is the controlling constitution.

Applicable Law and Precedents

Controlling legal authorities relied upon in the decision: 1987 Philippine Constitution; Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 9, Section 3 regarding default and relief therefrom); New Civil Code provisions including Article 1229 (equitable reduction of penalty) and Article 2227 (reduction of liquidated damages/attorney’s fees if iniquitous); and binding precedents cited by the Court, notably Magsino v. De Ocampo, Macalinao v. BPI, and MCMP Construction Corp. v. Monark Equipment Corp.

Antecedents and Contractual Terms

BPI issued a credit card to William with Irene as an extension cardholder. The card’s terms and conditions stipulated finance charges of 3.5% per month and late payment charges of 6% per month on unpaid credit availments. The Spouses Louh made purchases and paid regularly until becoming delinquent beginning October 14, 2009. By mid‑August 2010 their outstanding account reached P533,836.27, and BPI sent multiple written demand letters which the bank asserts were received but ignored.

Trial Proceedings and Default

BPI filed a complaint for collection on August 4, 2011. The Spouses Louh requested an extension to file an answer; the RTC granted a 15‑day extension to March 4, 2012, but no answer was filed within that period. BPI moved to have the Spouses Louh declared in default. The Spouses Louh later filed an answer on July 20, 2012—more than three months late. On July 24, 2012 the RTC declared them in default, set an ex parte presentation of evidence, and ultimately rendered judgment. The RTC found BPI’s evidence persuasive that the indebtedness existed, but deemed the contractual monthly finance and penalty charges iniquitous and reduced them. The RTC ordered payment of P533,836.27 plus finance and late payment charges at 12% per annum (reduction from the contract rates), 25% of the amount due as attorney’s fees (as provided in the contract), P1,000 per hearing, and P8,064.00 filing fees, plus costs.

Appellate Proceedings and CA Ruling

The Spouses Louh moved for reconsideration before the RTC, which was denied. The CA affirmed the RTC’s judgment in toto. The CA held the Spouses Louh were properly declared in default for failing to timely file an answer and for not moving to set aside the order of default. The CA found BPI had presented sufficient evidence: signed delivery receipts and terms and conditions, computer‑generated copies of Statement of Accounts (SOAs), and demand letters. The CA also upheld contractual attorney’s fees because the card terms expressly provided for a 25% charge as attorney’s fees when an account was referred for collection.

Issues Presented to the Supreme Court

The Spouses Louh sought relief on two principal grounds: (1) that the default declaration should be set aside and procedural rules relaxed because William’s medical condition (a heart bypass surgery) excused their delay; and (2) that BPI failed to prove the actual indebtedness and the asserted amounts, because the SOAs and demand letters were unilaterally prepared by the bank and the computations lacked sufficient detail. They also argued the demanded amount exceeded their credit limit, suggesting unconscionable charges. BPI did not file an answer to the Supreme Court petition.

Standard on Relaxation of Procedural Rules and Default Relief

The Supreme Court applied controlling precedent (Magsino) emphasizing that procedural rules must be strictly observed, and their relaxation is allowed only in exceptional cases with persuasive justification and evidence of due diligence. Under Rule 9, Section 3, a party declared in default may move under oath to set aside the order upon proper showing of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence and a meritorious defense. The Spouses Louh did not file such a motion and failed to demonstrate the requisite diligence or exceptional circumstances that would warrant relaxing the rules.

Sufficiency of BPI’s Evidence and Effect of Default

The Court relied on the principle articulated in Macalinao that when a defendant is in default, the plaintiff’s evidence admitted before the lower courts should generally stand unless convincingly rebutted; dismissal or remand for further evidence would unjustly prejudice the creditor. BPI presented testimony (Account Specialist Carlito M. Igos) and documentary evidence: delivery receipts and signed terms and conditions, computer‑generated SOAs, and demand letters. Because the Spouses Louh did not timely contest these proofs or move to set aside the default, the Court found BPI’s showing adequate under the circumstances and determined the Spouses Louh had “slept on their rights” to refute the evidence.

Excessiveness of Contractual Charges and Equitable Reduction

While affirming liability, the Supreme Court found the aggregate contractual charges excessive and unconscionable. The record showed BPI’s contractual rates yielded a cumulative annual rate substantially above previously held reasonable levels (the Court identified 114% per annum plus 25% attorney’s fees under the bank’s scheme). Relying on precedent (Macalinao and MCMP) and Civil Code provisions allowing equitable reduction of unconscionable penalties and liquidated damages, the Court reduced the finance and late payment charges to twelve percent (12%) per annum each and reduced attorney’s fees to five percent (5%) of the total amount due. The Court retained the award of filing/docket fees of P8,064.00 and costs of suit.

Computation Base and Reckoning Period

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