G.R. No. 191889 - Spouses Ferdo vs. Ferdo

Case Summary (G.R. No. 191889)

Factual Background

The parties’ titles originated from their registered co-ownership of the three Quezon City lots in equal pro-rata shares of one-third each. Under the deed of October 27, 1994, the properties were to be allotted as follows: Lot No. 22 to petitioners, Lot No. 24 to Juliana, and Lot No. 26 to Celerina. The deed also purported that Juliana would sell her share over Lot No. 24 to petitioners for P300,000.00, thereby resulting in the transfer of the corresponding titles.

After the deed was presented to the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, TCT Nos. 120654 and 120655 were issued on November 3, 1994 in the name of petitioners for Lot Nos. 22 and 24, respectively, and TCT No. 120656 was issued in the name of Celerina for Lot No. 26.

However, on December 10, 1997, respondent caused the annotation of an Affidavit of Adverse Claim on petitioners’ and Celerina’s respective titles, asserting a right and interest as an heir of the late Celerina. On February 22, 2000, respondent filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a complaint for annulment of the deed and the derivative titles, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-40041. The complaint alleged that Celerina’s signatures were forged because she had died on April 28, 1988 long before the supposed execution of the deed in 1994. It further alleged that Juliana’s purported sale of her share over Lot No. 24 to petitioners was simulated and fictitious, for lack of valid consideration, which allegedly deprived respondent of his asserted right of pre-emption or redemption as an heir under Article 1620 of the Civil Code.

Respondent prayed for cancellation and invalidation of the deed and the questioned titles, and for the revival of the earlier titles TCT Nos. RT-7108 and RT-7109.

Trial Court Proceedings and Claims of the Parties

Respondent later became administrator of Celerina’s intestate estate on December 21, 2001. On January 30, 2002, Matias Fernando and Procilo Fernando—previously appointed special co-administrators of Juliana’s estate by the Quezon City RTC, Branch 95—filed a complaint-in-intervention, invoking an interest in the outcome. They echoed respondent’s position that the sale of Juliana’s share was fictitious due to lack of consideration, and they prayed for reconveyance to Juliana’s estate.

Petitioners denied the allegations through an Answer Ad Cautelam dated May 11, 2002, with a compulsory counterclaim. In substance, petitioners asserted that the deed was actually executed in 1986 during Celerina’s lifetime and merely notarized on October 27, 1994 before being presented to the Register of Deeds. Petitioners also contended that Juliana left a holographic will, which was being probated in Branch 95.

At trial, respondent confirmed the key allegations of his complaint. Petitioners presented Montserrat, petitioner Ireneo’s widow, who testified that she was present when the deed was signed by Ireneo, Juliana, and Celerina in 1986. She claimed that, by agreement, it remained in Juliana’s safekeeping until notarization on October 27, 1994.

On cross-examination, Montserrat stated that she could not recall the witnesses to the deed and that when Juliana signed, the document was still undated, with entries on the notarial page still blank regarding the date and the parties’ community tax certificate details. She also testified that she appeared before the notary public but could not remember if her husband did. She could not explain whether the typewriter used for preparing the deed differed from that used for typing the notarial date and the inserted consideration amount and words. She further testified that Ireneo issued a check-payment drawn on his account in favor of Juliana but she could not produce the check. Petitioners likewise did not present the notary public to testify regarding the belated notarization.

RTC Decision

By Decision dated April 13, 2005, RTC Branch 220 dismissed both the complaint and the complaint-in-intervention, and additionally ordered respondent to pay petitioners moral damages and attorney’s fees on the counterclaim. The RTC reasoned that, because there was allegedly no dispute as to the genuineness of Celerina’s and Juliana’s signatures, the notarization occurring later did not render the document void; it merely exposed the notary public to possible prosecution for violation of notarial laws. The RTC also held that respondent and intervenors, not being compulsory heirs of Celerina or Juliana, had no legitime and could not assail Juliana’s sale in favor of Ireneo. The RTC concluded that the sale was supported by valuable consideration.

Court of Appeals Ruling

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed. It ruled that the deed was void because Celerina’s signature was forged. The appellate court emphasized the timing: Celerina died on April 28, 1988, so she could not have affixed her signature in a document bearing notarization and acknowledgment on October 27, 1994. It also noted supposed inconsistencies in the deed’s particulars, including the inability of Celerina to secure a misrepresented community tax certificate and to personally appear before the notary public on the stated date to acknowledge execution as her free act.

The Court of Appeals further found that Montserrat’s testimony was insufficient to establish the petitioners’ claimed 1986 execution. It underscored that she did not adduce evidence beyond her bare testimony and failed to explain why the correct execution date had not been reflected in the instrument. It held that the discrepancy between the deed’s notarization/execution date and Celerina’s death date was too glaring to ignore, and it treated the evidentiary support offered against the forgery claim as inadequate.

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated January 6, 2010, declared the deed null and void, declared the derivative titles null and void, directed the Register of Deeds to revive the earlier titles so that the three lots would be held again as co-owned by Irineo, Juliana, and Celerina, and ordered the defendants to pay damages, including P100,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees.

Petitioners’ Arguments in the Petition for Review

After the denial of reconsideration on April 13, 2010, petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari. They argued, in substance, that the Court of Appeals disregarded the trial court’s findings on signature authenticity based on Montserrat’s eyewitness testimony, and failed to consider petitioners’ explanation that the deed had been executed earlier but notarized later. Petitioners further claimed that notarization was not required for validity of an earlier-executed deed even if notarial defects existed. Lastly, petitioners challenged the Court of Appeals for upholding respondent’s legal personality to question the deed.

Issues and the Supreme Court’s Treatment of Factual Questions

The Court treated the principal issue—whether the deed was genuine—as one involving a question of fact. It acknowledged the general rule that petitions under Rule 45 are limited to questions of law because the Court is not a trier of facts. It recognized, however, that exceptions exist, including when the factual findings of the trial court and the appellate court are conflicting. In such cases, the Court may review the matter.

Supreme Court’s Legal Reasoning on Forgery and Invalidity of the Deed

The Court held that petitioners failed to overturn the Court of Appeals’ factual and legal conclusion. It noted that the trial court’s brief one-paragraph ruling affirming signature genuineness did not sufficiently articulate the factual or legal basis for its conclusion. The RTC appeared to rely on the assertion that no dispute existed as to signatures and then reasoned that later notarization did not affect validity. The Court of Appeals, by contrast, had provided a detailed scrutiny of the deed’s irregularities.

The Court rejected petitioners’ assertion that the deed was actually executed in 1986 and only notarized in 1994. It observed that the deed’s acknowledgment portion bore details that indicated preparation and typesetting consistent with the 1994 date, including the notarial year “Series of 1994” and the same typeset as that used in the body of the document. For the Court, these formatting and document-composition indicators negated the claim of a prior 1986 execution with later notarization. It reasoned that if the notarial year after “Series of” had been properly intended for later completion, it should have been left blank consistent with the entries the notary would fill upon notarization. Instead, it found that the acknowledgment and related particulars reflected a coherent drafting/execution consistent with 1994, at which time Celerina was already deceased.

The Court also considered the Court of Appeals’ and its own examination of handwriting and signature style, including observations that the family name “Fernando” on page 2 appeared to have been written by the same hand for both Juliana and Celerina, with similar flourish in the letters “F” and “D,” raising additional doubts on genuineness and actual participation.

The Court likewise found Montserrat’s testimony inadequate to rehabilitate petitioners’ forgery theory. Except for her claim of presence at a 1986 signing, she could not recall witnesses and could not state whether her husband appeared before the notary public. She could not explain why the deed was not dated at the time of execution or why it was supposedly entrusted to Juliana for safekeeping. She also did not justify the failure to present the check-payment for P300,000.00. Importantly, petitioners did not present the notary public to testify on circumstances su

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 191889)

Parties and Procedural Posture

SPS. Ireneo T. Fernando and Monserrat Magsalin Fernando filed a petition for review on certiorari after an adverse Court of Appeals decision.
Marcelino T. Fernando sued for annulment as the brother of petitioners and as an heir of his late sister Celerina T. Fernando.
Matias I. Fernando and Panfilo M. Fernando intervened in their capacity as administrators of the estate of late Juliana T. Fernando.
The case began in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City as a civil action for annulment of a Deed of Partition with Sale and the derivative Torrens titles.
The RTC, Branch 220 dismissed the complaint and complaint-in-intervention and awarded moral damages and attorney’s fees on respondent’s counterclaim.
The Court of Appeals reversed and declared the deed and derivative titles null and void.
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals.

Key Factual Allegations

The parties were registered co-owners in pro-rata shares of three Quezon City parcels designated as Lot Nos. 22, 24, and 26, all in Block 329, each with an area of 264 square meters, more or less.
Lot No. 22 was covered by TCT No. RT-7108 (141363), while Lot Nos. 24 and 26 were covered by TCT No. RT-7109 (141364).
Marcelino T. Fernando was the full-blood brother of petitioners’ predecessor co-owners, namely Juliana and Celerina.
Celerina died on April 28, 1988, single, without issue, and without a will.
Juliana died on December 1, 1998, single, without issue, and purportedly executed a holographic will.
On November 3, 1994, petitioners and Juliana and Celerina presented a Deed of Partition with Sale dated October 27, 1994 before the Register of Deeds, which purported to terminate co-ownership.
Under the deed, Lot No. 22 was allotted to petitioners, Lot No. 24 to Juliana, and Lot No. 26 to Celerina.
The deed also contained a sale: Juliana allegedly sold her share over Lot No. 24 to petitioners for PHP 300,000.00.
New titles were issued on November 3, 1994 in the names of petitioners for Lots 22 and 24, and in the name of Celerina for Lot 26.
On December 10, 1997, respondent annotated an Affidavit of Adverse Claim, asserting a right as heir of Celerina.
On February 22, 2000, respondent filed an action for annulment alleging that Celerina’s signature on the deed was a forgery because she had already died on April 28, 1988.
The complaint further alleged that Juliana’s “sale” of her share to petitioners was simulated and fictitious for lack of valid consideration, thereby depriving respondent of his right of pre-emption or redemption under Article 1620 of the Civil Code.
Respondent later became administrator of Celerina’s intestate estate on December 21, 2001.
The intervenors filed a complaint-in-intervention on January 30, 2002, adopting the allegations that the sale was fictitious due to lack of consideration and seeking reconveyance to Juliana’s estate.
Petitioners denied liability and asserted that the deed was actually executed in 1986 during Celerina’s lifetime but was notarized only on October 27, 1994 after safekeeping by a party.
Petitioners also asserted that Juliana left a holographic will subject of probate proceedings.

Issues Submitted

The central issue was whether the deed of partition with sale was genuine, particularly whether Celerina’s signature was forged.
A secondary issue was whether the date discrepancy between the supposed execution and the notarization date rendered the deed void or merely constituted a notarial irregularity.
Another issue was whether respondent and the intervenors had the legal personality to assail the deed and the derivative titles.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners argued that the trial court correctly sustained the deed because the signatures of Celerina and Juliana were not disputed in a manner that voided the document.
Petitioners contended that belated notarization did not automatically nullify an otherwise valid conveyance, and it only exposed the notary public to prosecution under notarial laws.
Petitioners maintained that the deed had been executed in 1986 while Celerina was alive and only notarized later, and thus the deed remained valid and binding.
Petitioners also argued that respondent and the intervenors were not compulsory heirs and therefore lacked standing to attack Juliana’s sale.
Respondent confirmed the material allegations of his complaint and asserted that Celerina could not have consented to the deed because she was already dead.
Respondent further argued that Juliana’s sale to petitioners was simulated due to lack of valid consideration, which effectively impaired the alleged redemption/pre-emption rights under Article 1620 of the Civil Code.
The intervenors echoed respondent’s theory and sought reconveyance to Juliana’s estate on the same ground of fictitious sale for lack of consideration.
Petitioners relied on the testimony of Monserrat Fernando, who claimed she was present when the deed was signed in 1986 and that it remained with Juliana for notarization until October 27, 1994.
Monserrat admitted that she could not recall the witnesses, the deed entries at the time of signing, who appeared before the notary public, or the payment evidence allegedly exchanged for the sale.

Court Proceedings and Evidentiary Findings

The RTC dismissed the complaint and complaint-in-intervention by sustaining the deed’s validity.
The RTC reasoned that there was no dispute as to the genuineness of the signatures of Celerina and Juliana, so the later notarization did not render the deed voi