Case Summary (G.R. No. 148157)
Factual Background
Petitioners, as lessees, sublet portions of a residential house and lot owned by the University of the Philippines to private respondent Empaynado in April 1984, with an agreed monthly rental of P550.00. Private respondent did not pay the rent for July 1985. Although petitioners demanded payment, private respondent still failed and refused to pay.
Petitioners sought barangay-level assistance for settlement, but the attempt was unsuccessful. As a result, the office of the barangay captain issued on August 20, 1985 a certification to file action against “Domingo Empaynado for ejectment and non-payment of house rentals including light and water.” After obtaining this certification, petitioners proceeded to file an ejectment case.
Filing of the Ejectment Complaint and Trial Court Ruling
On November 26, 1985, petitioners filed a complaint for ejectment against Empaynado and attached the barangay certification. The case was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Metro Manila, Quezon City and docketed as Civil Case No. XXXV-48898.
In his answer, Empaynado admitted that he had not paid rentals since July 1985, but he denied that there was a demand to vacate and pay made by petitioners. After trial, the Metropolitan Trial Court ruled for petitioners. Its decision dated March 6, 1986 held, among others, that “a demand to vacate before the barangay court is a substantial equivalent of the required extrajudicial demand to pay and vacate required by the Rules of Court prior to the filing of an ejectment case court.” It then ordered Empaynado and all persons claiming rights under him to vacate and peacefully surrender the premises and required payment of unpaid rentals from July 1985 at P550.00 per month, plus P700.00 attorney’s fees and the costs of suit.
Regional Trial Court Proceedings
Empaynado appealed to the Regional Trial Court, which rendered a decision dated June 2, 1986 dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. The Regional Trial Court set aside the Metropolitan Trial Court’s decision and dismissed the action on the ground that the Metropolitan Trial Court did not acquire jurisdiction.
Court of Appeals Proceedings
Petitioners sought review with the Court of Appeals. In a decision promulgated on January 14, 1987, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition as well, likewise for lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals reasoned that because the Metropolitan Trial Court did not acquire jurisdiction, it had no recourse but to dismiss the case. It denied the petition and affirmed the dismissal.
Petitioners’ Arguments in the Supreme Court
Before the Supreme Court, petitioners assigned as the sole error the claim that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Regional Trial Court’s ruling that the Metropolitan Trial Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioners contended that after the barangay certification to file action was issued, there was no need for an additional demand to vacate because the case had already been certified for court action. They argued that any further demand would have been repetitive and unnecessary.
Core Issue: Jurisdictional Requirement of Prior Demand to Vacate
The Supreme Court focused on whether the complaint conferred jurisdiction on the Metropolitan Trial Court. It noted that the complaint contained no allegation that petitioners made a prior demand to vacate upon the private respondent. The Court treated this omission as jurisdictional because ejectment proceedings require compliance with the rules on prior extrajudicial demand, particularly a demand to vacate. It reiterated the settled rule that when the complaint alleges only a demand for payment of rentals and not a demand to vacate, the pleading is insufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the tribunal tasked to try the case.
The Court cited Casilan vs. Tomassi, et al., 10 SCRA 261, 264, and Santos vs. Vivas, 96 Phil. 538, 540, as authorities for the proposition that a complaint that does not allege a demand to vacate fails to confer jurisdiction upon the justice of the peace court (jurisdictional defect).
Effect of the Barangay Certification to File Action
The Supreme Court held that the barangay certification was not conclusive as to jurisdiction. The certification did not establish that all requisites for filing an unlawful detainer case had been satisfied. What the certification certified was merely that the parties had not reached a settlement at the barangay level. Therefore, the Court rejected petitioners’ view that certification relieved them from the need to plead and prove a prior demand to vacate.
Petitioners’ Reliance on Co Tiamco and Distinguishing Circumstances
Petitioners invoked Co Tiamco vs. Diaz, L-7, January 22, 1946 (75 Phil. 672), where the Court had discussed a situation involving deficiency in the complaint regarding notice to quit, with reference to evidence subsequently offered and admitted.
The Supreme Court distinguished the cited case. It noted that in Co Tiamco, there was proof that a notice to quit or demand to vacate had actually been served, and the notice was offered as evidence, objected to, and eventually admitted through mandamus. The Court observed that even if the complaint was initially deficient for not alleging the notice to quit, the deficiency was cured by the evidence because the notice to quit existed and was presented in trial.
By contrast, in the present case, the Supreme Court ruled that the defect persisted because the complaint was defective for failing to allege a prior demand to vacate, and no evidence of such prior demand to vacate was shown during trial.
Treatment of Evidence Offered to Show Demand
The Supreme Court also assessed the relevance of an affidavit relied upon by the trial court. The affidavit stated, in substance, that the private respondent believed the plaintiffs referred to him due to alleged bad behavior and that the spouses “wanted him out” of the extension.
The Court held that this did not prove an actual or definite demand to vacate. The affidavit showed only an intention to expel, not a definite demand to
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Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 148157)
- The petitioners, Spouses Marciano Bandoy and Segundina Bandoy, sought review by petition for certiorari of a Court of Appeals decision dismissing their case for lack of jurisdiction.
- The respondents were the Court of Appeals and Domingo P. Empaynado.
- The controversy arose from a landlord-tenant dispute in which petitioners filed an ejectment case against a sublessee for non-payment of rentals and alleged refusal to vacate.
Parties and Procedural Posture
- Petitioners were lessees of a residential house and lot owned by the University of the Philippines at No. 88-D, phase 4, Pook Amorsolo, U.P. Campus, Quezon City.
- Petitioners sublet certain spaces of the property to Domingo Empaynado for a monthly rental of P550.00.
- Petitioners filed a complaint for ejectment with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Metro Manila, Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. XXXV-48898.
- The Metropolitan Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners and ordered the defendant to vacate and to pay unpaid rentals plus attorney’s fees.
- Empaynado appealed to the Regional Trial Court, which dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
- Petitioners then sought review in the Court of Appeals, which likewise dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
- Petitioners ultimately came to the Supreme Court through a petition for certiorari raising a single assignment of error on the appellate courts’ jurisdictional rulings.
Key Contractual and Sublease Facts
- In April 1984, petitioners sublet spaces of the U.P. property to Eduardo Empaynado, but the case ultimately named Domingo Empaynado as the respondent in the ejectment proceedings.
- The agreed rental was P550.00 per month.
- Empaynado did not pay the rental for July 1985.
- Petitioners claimed they made demand after the non-payment and that the defendant still failed and refused to pay.
- Petitioners brought the matter to the barangay captain for settlement, but the effort did not produce a settlement.
- On August 20, 1985, a certification to file action was issued by the barangay captain for ejectment and non-payment of house rentals including light and water.
Barangay Certification and Filing for Ejectment
- Petitioners filed the ejectment complaint on November 26, 1985 and attached the barangay captain’s certification to file action.
- Empaynado admitted non-payment of rentals since July 1985.
- Empaynado denied that there was a demand to vacate and pay made upon him by petitioners.
- Petitioners’ complaint did not allege, in the pleadings, that petitioners had previously demanded that Empaynado vacate the premises.
- Petitioners relied on the barangay proceedings and the certification to support their claim that the case was properly filed in court.
Metropolitan Trial Court Ruling
- The Metropolitan Trial Court ruled for petitioners and ordered vacation of the premises and surrender of the property peacefully.
- The Metropolitan Trial Court required the defendant to pay all unpaid rentals at P550.00 a month from July 1985 until vacating.
- The Metropolitan Trial Court awarded P700.00 as reasonable attorney’s fee and imposed costs of suit.
- The Metropolitan Trial Court held that a demand to vacate before the barangay court was a substantial equivalent of the extrajudicial demand required by the Rules of Court prior to filing an ejectment case in court.
Regional Trial Court Ruling
- On appeal, the Regional Trial Court set aside the Metropolitan Trial Court’s decision.
- The Regional Trial Court dismissed the ejectment case for lack of jurisdiction.
- The Regional Trial Court treated the lack of required allegations and jurisdictional requisites as fatal to the Metropolitan Trial Court’s acquisition of jurisdiction.
Court of Appeals Ruling
- The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners’ petition for review.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court’s view that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction.
- The Court of Appeals emphasized that where the Metropolitan Trial Court did not acquire jurisdiction, the appropriate remedy was to dismiss the case for lack of