Title
Spouses Alfarero vs. Spouses Sevilla
Case
G.R. No. 142974
Decision Date
Sep 22, 2003
Spouses Sevilla sold land to Alfarero et al. in 1986 with a 5-year repurchase clause. Sevilla sought repurchase in 1991; SC upheld their right, ruling the notarized 1986 deed as the valid conveyance date, rejecting Alfarero's un-notarized 1985 claim.
notarized
private document
motion for new trial
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 142974)

Factual Background

Respondents Spouses Petra and Sancho Sevilla were the registered owners of a parcel of land in San Vicente, Panabo, Davao del Norte, with an area of 14.038 hectares, more or less, covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-15615. On May 25, 1986, a portion of the property with an area of 1.000 hectare, more or less, was sold to petitioners under a Deed of Sale executed and ratified before Notary Public Jose B. Banzon, entered in his Notarial Registry as Doc. No. 148; Page No. 30; Book No. LV; Series of 1986. The stated consideration was P12,000.00. As a result, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-49928 was issued in petitioners’ names.

On the face of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-49928, the title bore the limitation that it was “Subject to the rights of repurchase by the Original Patentee or his heirs within a period of five (5) years from the date of the conveyance pursuant to Section 119 of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended.” Petitioners’ challenge later hinged on what the “date of conveyance” meant for purposes of counting the five-year period.

Respondents allegedly expressed their desire to repurchase through a letter sent sometime in October 1986 to petitioners’ parents and to petitioners themselves, but petitioners allegedly objected. Respondents then filed the action for repurchase on January 3, 1991. Petitioners opposed the action, asserting that it had prescribed because it was filed beyond five years from the time the property was conveyed to them.

Petitioners’ theory was anchored on their claim that the sale was executed in December 1985 but notarized only on May 26, 1986. On that premise, they argued that counting from December 1985 to January 3, 1991 showed that the five-year period had already lapsed. Petitioners invoked two alternative dates appearing in the sale document: the alleged date of signing and the date of notarization.

Trial Court Proceedings

During pre-trial, on August 23, 1996, the parties again moved for judgment on the pleadings. The RTC granted the motion and required the submission of memoranda. After memoranda were filed, the RTC resolved the case in favor of respondents based on the pleadings and memoranda submitted under that procedural posture.

The RTC’s decretal portion ordered, among others, that respondents were allowed to repurchase the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-49928, with petitioners jointly ordered to reconvey and/or sell back the property to respondents. In return, respondents were required to pay petitioners the purchase price of P12,000.00, plus the legal rate of interest from May 25, 1986 until petitioners’ reconveyance and/or resale. The RTC also provided that, in the event petitioners refused to accept the consideration, respondents could deposit it in court with legal interest, subject to disposal to petitioners. The RTC awarded attorney’s fees of P7,500.00 to respondents and imposed no further costs.

Appellate Review and the Court of Appeals’ Treatment of Evidence

Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58277. On November 22, 1999, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC in toto and later denied reconsideration on April 5, 2000.

The Court of Appeals agreed with the RTC’s conclusion that the notarized Deed of Sale executed on May 25, 1986, offered by respondents, deserved greater evidentiary weight than the deed offered by petitioners to support their prescription defense. The appellate court noted that petitioners’ deed bore a date that merely read “__th day of December 1985,” and that the document was not notarized nor was its authenticity supported by substantial evidence.

Contrastingly, respondents’ deed was notarized and plainly indicated the execution date. The Court of Appeals thus applied the evidentiary principle that a public document executed and attested through a notary public constitutes evidence of the facts expressed therein in a clear and unequivocal manner. It also treated the certificate of acknowledgment as prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument, requiring more than merely preponderant evidence to overturn the presumption of regularity.

Issues Raised on Petition for Review

In the Supreme Court, petitioners presented two principal issues. First, they questioned whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in determining the “date of conveyance” under Section 119 of CA No. 141 for purposes of counting the five-year repurchase period, where the deed showed two dates—one allegedly reflecting the signing of the instrument and another reflecting the date of notarization. Petitioners insisted that the signing date (December 1985) should control, not the notarized date (May 25, 1986).

Second, petitioners questioned the Court of Appeals’ denial of their Motion for New Trial, which they anchored on what they claimed to be newly discovered evidence: that respondents delivered P45,000.00 to petitioners’ counsel on December 28, 1990, allegedly one week before Civil Case No. 91-01 was filed, and that respondents later filed an estafa case against the counsel after the amount was not consigned with the trial court. Petitioners argued that this would show the true purchase price was P45,000.00 rather than the P12,000.00 reflected in the notarized deed.

Petitioners’ Arguments

As to prescription, petitioners contended that the date May 25, 1986 was only superimposed on the deed when notarized. For that reason, petitioners maintained that the notarized date could not be controlling against their claim that the sale occurred in December 1985, supported by their deed.

As to the motion for new trial, petitioners argued that their newly discovered evidence warranted a new trial because it purportedly proved a different purchase price and implied material factual consequences for the judgment.

Respondents’ Counterarguments

Respondents countered that, for the issue of prescription, the decisive question was the evidentiary value of a private instrument versus a notarized deed, and they maintained that the Court of Appeals correctly gave greater credence to the notarized instrument. They invoked the evidentiary presumption attached to public documents and acknowledged that contradiction required clear and convincing evidence rather than conjecture or imprecision.

On the motion for new trial, respondents argued that petitioners’ submissions were procedurally unavailing because the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure require a motion for new trial or reconsideration to be filed within the period for taking an appeal. Respondents maintained that petitioners effectively sought a new trial only after the Court of Appeals had already rendered its decision.

Legal Basis and Reasoning on Issue of “Date of Conveyance” and Prescription

The Supreme Court found petitioners’ prescription argument unpersuasive. The Court first emphasized that in Civil Case No. 91-01, petitioners had raised prescription as an affirmative defense, and thus they carried the burden of evidence to establish the affirmative allegation. Specifically, they needed to prove that the property had been conveyed to them in December 1985, such that the action filed on January 3, 1991 would exceed the five-year period under Section 119.

The Supreme Court noted that at pre-trial, petitioners moved for judgment on the pleadings, which the RTC granted. The Court held that, by doing so, petitioners failed to present at the first instance evidence that categorically and definitively established that the sale occurred in December 1985. The Court therefore treated petitioners as estopped from later insisting that the Court of Appeals erred in holding there was no evidence supporting their December 1985 allegation.

Second, the Court considered the evidentiary effect of respondents’ deed. It reiterated that the date May 25, 1986 accepted by the lower courts appeared in a notarized instrument. In that respect, the Court held that the appellate court merely applied the settled doctrine that public or notarial documents—those acknowledged and proved as provided by law—may be presented in evidence without further proof, and that the certificate of acknowledgment is prima facie evidence of due execution. The Court further explained that to contradict a public document’s presumption of regularity, the evidence must be clear and convincing and more than merely preponderant. The Court held that such evidence was absent.

Legal Basis and Reasoning on the Motion for New Trial

On petitioners’ second issue, the Supreme Court treated their arguments as procedurally defective. The Court began by ide

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