Title
Soriano vs. People
Case
G.R. No. 159517-18
Decision Date
Jun 30, 2009
Bank officials accused of falsifying loan documents and misappropriating funds; charged with DOSRI violations and estafa. SC upheld lower courts' rulings, denying motions to quash.
bank records
loan applications
loan proceeds

Case Summary (G.R. No. 159517-18)

Factual Background: Alleged DOSRI Loans and Falsified Loan Documents

The prosecution alleged that Soriano and Ilagan, while holding positions of responsibility in RBSM, caused fictitious or unauthorized loans to be reflected in the bank’s records. For the first loan transaction allegedly taking place on June 27, 1997, Soriano was charged with violating Section 83 of R.A. No. 337, as amended, by indirectly borrowing or securing a loan in the name of Virgilio J. Malang without the written approval of the majority of the directors and by converting the loan proceeds for personal benefit. The information alleged that Malang had no knowledge of the loan and that, once in possession of the loan amount, Soriano used it for himself, to the bank’s prejudice.

A second, related information was filed for estafa through falsification of commercial document arising from the same transaction. This information charged Soriano and Ilagan, as principals by direct participation, with falsifying various loan documents (including a loan application/information sheet and promissory note dated June 27, 1997, disclosure statement, and related banking instruments), by making it appear that Malang participated in the execution of these documents when he did not. It further alleged that by means of deceit and with intent to cause damage, petitioners credited the loan proceeds to Malang’s account in the bank and thereafter converted the amount to their personal gain, damaging the bank, its creditors, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), and Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC).

A third charge was filed for another alleged transaction on August 21, 1997, this time involving a purported P15,000,000.00 loan in the name of Rogelio Manaol. Soriano was again accused of violating Section 83 of R.A. No. 337, as amended, by obtaining or securing the loan indirectly without the required majority board approval, failing to record and transmit the approval as required by law, using Manaol’s name without his knowledge, and converting the loan proceeds for personal use.

Finally, a fourth charge was filed for estafa through falsification of commercial document for the August 21, 1997 loan. This information attributed to Soriano and Ilagan the falsification of the loan application/information sheet and related loan instruments by making it appear that Manaol executed the documents when he did not participate. It alleged that petitioners successfully secured the P15,000,000.00 loan in Manaol’s name, deposited the proceeds to Manaol’s account, and then converted the proceeds for their personal gain, to the damage and prejudice of the bank and other entities specified in the information.

Initiation of Criminal Cases and Motions to Quash

For the June 27, 1997 transaction, the informations were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 1719-M-2000 (for violation of Section 83 of R.A. No. 337) and 1720-M-2000 (for estafa through falsification of commercial document). They were raffled to RTC Branch 14 presided over by Judge Petrita Braga Dime. A separate but related set of charges for the August 21, 1997 transaction were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 1980-M-2000 and 1981-M-2000, respectively, and were raffled to RTC Branch 77 presided over by Judge Aurora Santiago-Lagman.

Petitioners moved to quash in both branches. In substance, their grounds were: (i) duplicity—that more than one offense was charged; and (ii) that the facts alleged did not constitute an offense. They focused on the structure of the charges, asserting that the prosecutor had charged more than one offense for a single act. They also maintained that the facts did not legally establish the offenses charged, particularly arguing that Soriano should not be charged with estafa through falsification because he was already being prosecuted for the DOSRI-related violation stemming from the same loan incident.

Orders of the Trial Court: Denial of Motions to Quash

In RTC Branch 77, Judge Santiago-Lagman denied petitioners’ motion to quash in an Order dated November 15, 2000. The court held that Section 13 of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that an information must charge only one offense, subject to exceptions for existing laws prescribing a single punishment for various offenses. It explained that the prohibition against charging two or more offenses in one information aims to give the accused necessary knowledge to prepare a defense. It further reasoned that Section 3(e), Rule 117—as a ground to quash—presupposes that one information charges more than one offense.

Applying these principles, the court observed that there were two separate informations in that docket—one charging Soriano with violation of Section 83 and another charging Soriano and Ilagan with estafa through falsification. It concluded that each information charged only one offense. Even assuming the cases arose from the same incident, it held that prosecution under one law does not bar prosecution under another where the offenses are distinct. The court added that the allegations were evidentiary and should be evaluated during trial.

In RTC Branch 14, Judge Braga Dime similarly denied the motion to quash. In an Order dated November 27, 2000, the court reiterated that duplicity refers to joining two or more distinct and separate offenses in one indictment or information. Citing doctrinal guides, it emphasized that the question of duplicity must depend on the facts alleged in the information, not on proof at trial. It found that in Criminal Case No. 1719-M-2000, Soriano was charged only with violation of Section 83, while in Criminal Case No. 1720-M-2000, Soriano and Ilagan were charged only with estafa through falsification. The court also rejected additional grounds raised, including prematurity and lack of probable cause, because these were not among the grounds enumerated under Section 3, Rule 117 and could not be considered in that context.

Proceedings in the Court of Appeals: Consolidation and Affirmance

Petitioners elevated the trial court orders to the Court of Appeals via certiorari. The CA consolidated the petitions as CA-G.R. SP. Nos. 64648 and 64649. In a decision promulgated on August 5, 2003, the CA denied the petitions and affirmed the RTC orders. The CA’s disposition sustained the trial courts’ findings that petitioners failed to demonstrate grave abuse of discretion sufficient to justify the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, and it affirmed both branches’ denials of the motions to quash.

Issues Raised before the Supreme Court

Before the Supreme Court, petitioners insisted that the RTC branches abused their discretion in denying the motions to quash. They further contended that the CA committed reversible error in dismissing their certiorari petitions. The core matters raised before the Court remained: whether the informations were duplicitous because more than one offense was charged, and whether the facts alleged failed to constitute an offense.

Supreme Court’s Ruling: No Grave Abuse of Discretion

The Court denied the petition. It held that the term grave abuse of discretion in the juridical sense connotes capricious, despotic, oppressive, or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The Court required a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness to warrant correction through certiorari. After reviewing the records, it found no caprice or arbitrariness in the RTC’s denial of the motions to quash.

Legal Basis and Reasoning: Duplicity and Multiple Charges for the Same Incident

The Court first addressed petitioners’ duplicity theory. It recognized that duplicity—when a single information charges more than one offense—is a recognized ground for quashal under Section 3(e), Rule 117. It reiterated that duplicity refers to a single complaint or information charging more than one offense, and that the rules prohibit duplicitous pleadings to avoid confusing the accused and impairing the preparation of a defense.

In petitioners’ case, however, the Court ruled out duplicity as a procedural defect. It reasoned that Soriano was not confronted with one information containing multiple offenses. Instead, Soriano faced multiple informations, each charging a different offense—one for violation of the DOSRI Rules and another for estafa through falsification of commercial documents. Similarly, Ilagan was charged in separate informations for estafa through falsification. Thus, petitioners’ reliance on duplicity was misplaced.

The Court then rejected petitioners’ argument that Soriano should be charged with only one offense because the charges originated from one act of obtaining fictitious loans. It explained that jurisprudence consistently holds that a single act or incident may offend two or more distinct and unrelated provisions of law, which justifies multiple charges. It cited Loney v. People, emphasizing that the only limitation arises from the constitutional prohibition against being placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense. Applying that doctrine, the Court concluded that the multiple charges based on the same incident were consistent with settled doctrine.

As the BSP had noted in its memorandum, the Court emphasized that the elements of the charged offenses differed. A DOSRI violation involves failure to comply with procedural, reportorial, or ceiling requirements in granting loans to directors, officers, stockholders, and related interests, including the absence of the required written board approval and failures relating to corporate records and transmission to the supervising department. Estafa, on the other hand, requires elements such as abuse of confidence, deceit, fraud or false pretenses, and damage, which are not elements of a DOSRI violation. Because each law required proof of facts not required by the other, the Court held that the filing of several charges against Soriano was proper.

Legal Basis and Reasoning: Sufficiency of the Allegations and Trial Matters

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