Title
Soriano vs. People
Case
G.R. No. L-3008
Decision Date
Mar 19, 1951
Federico Soriano convicted of theft for unlawfully taking cinema equipment, claiming authority under a power of attorney; Supreme Court upheld conviction, ruling intent of gain and unauthorized possession.
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-3008)

Factual Background

The accused was charged with theft of an electric motor marked “Cyclix,” Western Electric Company cable, and a lantern slide projector with accessories, all valued at P6,000 and belonging to the Eagle Cinema Co., Inc., represented by its President‑Manager, Teodoro S. Benedicto. Sometime in September 1944, after the Japanese operator Ishii ceased operating the cinema, the keys to the building containing the equipment were delivered to the petitioner. The lantern slide projector (Exhibit C) and the “Cyclix” motor generator (Exhibit D) were later found in the petitioner’s house. The petitioner repeatedly denied knowledge of the equipment and disclaimed responsibility for their loss before finally admitting he had taken them. A power of attorney (Exhibit 16) given by Emilia Saenz authorized the petitioner to collect rents and to recover “other things of value,” but did not expressly authorize removal and concealment of the movables in question.

Trial Court Proceedings

After trial, the Court of First Instance of Iloilo convicted the petitioner and imposed an indeterminate penalty of from six months arresto mayor to two years, eleven months and eleven days prision correctional, with accessory penalties and costs.

Court of Appeals Decision

The Court of Appeals modified the sentence to three months arresto mayor as minimum to one year, eight months and twenty‑one days prision correctional as maximum, maintained the accessory penalties and costs, and ordered that Exhibits C and D be returned to the owner. The Court of Appeals found that the petitioner had been the representative and substitute administrator of the Saenz heirs, that the Eagle Cinema Co., Inc., was indebted to them for rents and that the cinema’s movable equipment remained the property of the Eagle Cinema Co., Inc. although mortgaged to the Saenz heirs. The appellate court held that the petitioner’s receipt of the building keys and physical control of the premises did not transfer juridical title or lawful authority to appropriate the chattels, and that the petitioner’s repeated denials and concealment supported an inference of intent of gain.

Issues Presented to the Supreme Court

The sole legal question presented was whether, as found by the Court of Appeals, the acts of the petitioner constituted the crime of theft under Art. 308 of the Kevised Penal Code. The petition to the Supreme Court raised only questions of law.

Petitioner's Contentions

The petitioner argued that the elements of theft were not present, that he acted without criminal intent, that his actions were susceptible of innocent interpretations consistent with his appointment as attorney‑in‑fact under Exhibit 16, and that the prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Counsel relied on authorities to the effect that an agent operating under a power of attorney cannot be said to have stolen property of his principal.

Supreme Court's Ruling

The Supreme Court denied the petition for the writ of certiorari and assessed costs against the petitioner. The Court concurred with the reasoning of the Court of Appeals and affirmed that the elements of theft under Art. 308 of the Kevised Penal Code had been established. The opinion was rendered by Jugo, J., with Moran, C. J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concurring.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

The Court reiterated the four elements of theft under Art. 308: (a) a chattel must have been taken; (b) the taking must have been with intent of gain; (c) the property must belong to another; and (d) the taking must be without violence, intimidation, or force upon things. The Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the projector and generator belonged to the Eagle Cinema Co., Inc., not to the petitioner or to his principals in a form that authorized appropriation without judicial foreclosure. The power of attorney (Exhibit 16) empowered the petitioner to collect rents and to recover sums and “other things of value,” but did not authorize removal, concealment or appropriation of the cinema’s equipment. The Court emphasized that physical delivery of keys and possession of the premises did not transfer juridical possession or title to the chattels therein. Citing Viada and United States vs. Nieves de Vera (as quoted by the Court of Appeals), the Court stated that when delivery does not transfer juridical possession, the owner is presumed to retain title and that unauthorized disposition by the custodian constitutes theft. The Court further held that concealment and denial of possession by the petitioner, together with the unexplained removal of the articles, supported the inference of intent of gain, and that intent is proved by the overt acts pointing to that mental state.

Dissenting Opinion

Justice Paras dissented. He agreed with many factual finding

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