Title
Soriano vs. Marcelo
Case
G.R. No. 163178
Decision Date
Jan 30, 2009
A petitioner accused a prosecutor of dereliction and graft for referring a falsification case to the DOJ, but the Ombudsman and Supreme Court dismissed the claims, finding no malice or undue injury.
dereliction of duty
favoring a law violator
lack of evidence

Case Summary (G.R. No. 163178)

Factual Background

Soriano filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila an Affidavit-Complaint, docketed as I.S. No. 01F-22547, against Bank Examiner Mely Palad (Palad) of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. He charged Palad with falsification of public document and use of falsified document. Assistant City Prosecutor Celedonio P. Balasbas issued a resolution dated August 27, 2001 recommending that Palad be charged in court for falsification of public document. First Assistant City Prosecutor Leoncia R. Dimagiba (Dimagiba) recommended approval of that resolution.

Thereafter, Palad filed a Motion to Re-open the investigation. Dimagiba recommended the re-opening of I.S. No. 01F-22547. Garcia approved Dimagiba’s recommendation. However, in an Indorsement dated August 5, 2002, Garcia forwarded the complete records of I.S. No. 01F-22547 to Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuno of the DOJ, with the recommendation that the preliminary investigation be transferred to the DOJ. The stated purpose was to avoid any suspicion of partiality and bias because Soriano had allegedly filed separate complaints with the Ombudsman against Garcia and against Balasbas, both then pending thereat.

On September 5, 2002, Soriano filed with the Ombudsman an affidavit-complaint against Garcia for violation of Article 208 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. Soriano alleged that, more than fourteen months after he had filed his complaint against Palad, Garcia unilaterally endorsed and forwarded the complaint to the DOJ for investigation and resolution. Soriano contended that Garcia’s refusal to allow the Manila prosecutors to finally resolve the complaint constituted a malicious dereliction of duty that allegedly served as retaliation for Soriano’s prior complaint against Garcia. Soriano further alleged that the delay caused him undue injury because resolution of his complaint against Palad had been unduly delayed, which, in his view, amounted to denial of justice.

Ombudsman’s Findings on Lack of Probable Cause

The Ombudsman dismissed Soriano’s complaint in an Order dated October 3, 2002 for lack of probable cause. As to Article 208—prosecution of offenses; negligence and tolerance—the Ombudsman treated it as requiring essential elements: (1) the offender is a public officer or officer of the law with a duty to cause prosecution or prosecute offenses; (2) there is dereliction of duty; and (3) the offender acts with malice and deliberate intent to favor the law violator. The Ombudsman also relied on U.S. vs. Mendoza, 23 Phil. 194, which it quoted to the effect that the crime committed by the law-violator must be proved first. If the guilt of the law-violator is not proved, the person charged with dereliction of duty under Article 208 is not liable.

Applying that framework, the Ombudsman reasoned that Soriano’s complaint was premature because the controversy involving Palad was still pending at the preliminary stage. The Ombudsman further held that the element of malice and deliberate intent could not be entrenched without Palad’s guilt being pronounced first. It likewise ruled that Garcia’s referral of the dispute to the DOJ could not be construed as malicious dereliction because, according to the Ombudsman, the referral was made to avoid doubts on Garcia’s impartiality in disposing of the subject case.

On Soriano’s charge under Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, the Ombudsman ruled that the provision required undue injury to be actual and certain. It invoked Llorente v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 122166 (March 11, 1998), for the view that undue injury does not simply arise from delay or injustice deferred; rather, it must refer to actual damages capable of pecuniary estimation and quantifiable as to amount. Based on this, the Ombudsman found Soriano’s theory inadequate.

Thus, the Ombudsman dismissed the complaint.

Motion for Reconsideration and the Present Petition

Soriano filed a motion for reconsideration, but the Ombudsman denied it in an Order dated July 14, 2003. Soriano then filed the present Rule 65 certiorari petition, seeking annulment of both orders on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.

Soriano argued that, even if his Article 208 charge were premature because Palad’s case was still under preliminary investigation, his Section 3(e) charge should have been sustained. He maintained that Garcia clearly derelicted his duty when he referred I.S. No. 01F-22547 to the DOJ. He emphasized that the referral was unilateral and was not sought by either Soriano or Palad, and that the DOJ referral was not based on any recommendation of Investigating Prosecutor Liberato Cabaron (Cabaron). Soriano contended that since Cabaron was already in the process of conducting the preliminary investigation, Garcia should have awaited Cabaron’s recommendation. Soriano argued that by referring the case instead of waiting, Garcia caused unwarranted delay, thereby inflicting a clear and ascertainable injury.

The Solicitor General, for the Ombudsman, maintained that the Ombudsman’s finding of lack of probable cause was discernible from the records and that its plenary power to conduct a preliminary investigation could not be interfered with by the courts. The Solicitor General argued that the decision was within the discretion of Garcia to refer the case to the DOJ after Soriano had administratively charged Garcia with the Ombudsman.

Legal Framework on Certiorari Against Ombudsman Findings

In resolving the petition, the Court emphasized the constitutional and statutory character of the Ombudsman’s powers. It referred to Sections 12 and 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution and to R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989) as endowing the Ombudsman with plenary powers to investigate and prosecute public officers or employees for acts or omissions that appear illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. The Court held that these powers are generally insulated from legislative, executive, and judicial intervention and shielded from outside pressure and improper influence. Accordingly, it applied a policy of non-interference with the Ombudsman’s investigatory and prosecutorial functions.

Nevertheless, the Court recognized a limited exception. When the Ombudsman’s findings in criminal cases are tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, an aggrieved party may file certiorari under Rule 65 upon a showing that the Ombudsman acted arbitrarily or despotically, driven by passion or personal hostility, evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to act in contemplation of law.

The Court then held that Soriano failed to establish grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman in dismissing his complaint against Garcia.

Elements of Section 3(e) and the Requirement of Proven Undue Injury

On the substantive requirements for a charge under Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, the Court reiterated that to justify an indictment, the prosecution must establish: (a) that the accused are public officers or private persons charged in conspiracy; (b) that prohibited acts were committed during the performance of official duties or in relation to public positions; (c) that the accused caused undue injury to any party, whether government or private; (d) that the injury was caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference; and (e) that the public officers acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence.

The Court then explained the nature of undue injury in the context of Section 3(e). It cited Santos v. People, where the Court equated undue injury with the civil law concept of “actual damage.” It further relied on Llorente v. Sandiganbayan to underscore that unlike tort actions where damages may be presumed, undue injury under Section 3(e cannot be presumed even after a wrong or a violation of a right has been established. The Court held that undue injury is an element that must be proven beyond reliance on speculation, conjecture, or guesswork. It must be specified, quantified, and proven to the point of moral certainty.

The Court referred to Article 2199 of the Civil Code, which provides that one is entitled to adequate compensation only for pecuniary loss duly proved, characterizing such compensation as actual or compensatory damages. From this, the Court drew the consequence that undue injury must likewise be determined with competent proof and not by bare allegations.

Application to Soriano’s Claim of Injury

Applying these doctrines, the Court addressed Soriano’s alleged injury. Soriano claimed that the injury he suffered from Garcia’s referral to the DOJ manifested as the resultant delay in the resolution of his complaint against Palad. The Court found, however, that beyond this assertion, Soriano did not adduce evidence of actual loss or damage caused by the delay. The Court stressed that while absolute certainty of the amount need not be proven, there must be a reasonable basis for measuring the damage.

The Court concluded that Soriano utterly failed to support his bare allegation of undue injury. It also noted a pleading deficiency: the affidavit-complaint

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