G.R. No. 73077 - Son vs. Son

Case Summary (G.R. No. 73077)

Factual Background

During his lifetime, Pedro Son inherited from his parents Juan Son and Susana Perilla a parcel of land in Caputatan Norte, Medellin, Cebu with an area of two (2) hectares and seven (7) centares. In 1972, respondents discovered that petitioners were occupying a portion of the land measuring 6,324 square meters. Respondents demanded that petitioners return that portion, but petitioners refused, asserting ownership based on a Deed of Absolute Sale allegedly executed by Pedro Son on 5 November 1957.

Respondents, disputing the deed, filed suit in 1976 to annul the 5 November 1957 deed on grounds of forgery, and also sought recovery of real property. During pre-trial, the parties limited the issue to the validity or invalidity of the 5 November 1957 deed.

Trial Court Proceedings

On 10 September 1979, the Court of First Instance rendered a decision declaring the 5 November 1957 deed null and void, ordering petitioners to return the 6,324-square-meter portion to respondents, and directing petitioners to pay respondents P1,500.00 annually from 1972 until actual delivery, as well as P1,500.00 attorney’s fees, with costs against defendants.

On 28 September 1979, petitioners moved for reconsideration, invoking a different earlier transaction: petitioners claimed that, by virtue of a Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase dated 17 December 1951, Pedro Son allegedly sold to them one-half (1/2) of the inherited land with a right to repurchase within one (1) year, and that petitioners became owners due to Pedro Son’s failure to repurchase.

On 27 December 1979, the trial court reversed itself and dismissed the complaint, ordering respondents to pay petitioners P1,500.00 as attorney’s fees. After petitioners’ subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied on 5 March 1980, respondents appealed.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its decision dated 3 October 1985, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and reinstated the trial court’s original disposition declaring the 5 November 1957 deed void and ordering return and payment as decreed earlier.

The Court of Appeals held that the validity of the earlier 17 December 1951 deed, which petitioners had raised in their motion for reconsideration, had been waived because the parties had delimited the issues at the pre-trial conference to the validity or invalidity of the 5 November 1957 deed. The appellate court emphasized that the pre-trial order governed the subsequent course of the case unless modified before trial to prevent manifest injustice. It reasoned that respondents were deprived of a fair opportunity to study and prepare for the belated defense involving the 1951 deed, and it observed that the identity of the land involved in the two deeds had not been established by sufficient evidence.

Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s finding that the 5 November 1957 deed was simulated, forged, and therefore void.

The Parties’ Contentions Before the Supreme Court

Petitioners pursued the Rule 45 review on three principal fronts, framed in the issues presented. First, they argued that the 17 December 1951 deed could be admitted in evidence notwithstanding its absence from the pre-trial issues, asserting that it had been properly pleaded and that respondents did not object and even cross-examined petitioners’ evidence on the deed extensively.

Second, they contended that the Court of Appeals had gravely misapprehended the facts and had engaged in conjecture when it treated the land covered by the 1957 deed as distinct from that covered by the 1951 deed.

Third, they maintained that the appellate court’s conclusion regarding the nullity of the 5 November 1957 deed relied on speculation, particularly because it allegedly capitalized on discrepancies in the notarization testimony and disregarded the fact that the notarized deed was already eighteen (18) years old, and because petitioners had occupied the land as owners for more than twenty (20) years.

Legal Basis and Reasoning of the Supreme Court

The Court began by resolving the last issue first, but its decisive analysis focused on the pre-trial delimitation of issues and whether the 1951 deed could be considered. The Court held that petitioners’ invocation of the principle that a plaintiff must rely on the strength of his own evidence, not on the weakness of the defendant’s evidence, was misplaced because the challenge was, in substance, directed at the credibility of respondents’ witnesses and not at the legal sufficiency of plaintiff’s cause. The Court reiterated that the matter of assessing the credibility and weight of testimony is best handled by the trial judge, who has the opportunity to observe witnesses. After a meticulous review, it found no misapprehension of essential facts that would change the outcome.

Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals’ reversal turned on procedural grounds regarding the 1951 deed and the binding effect of the pre-trial order. The Supreme Court held that the principal question was whether the parties were bound by the delimitation of issues in the Pre-trial Order dated 7 December 1976, and it cited Section 4, Rule 20 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that the order after pre-trial limits issues for trial and controls the subsequent course of action unless modified before trial to prevent manifest injustice. It explained that pre-trial is intended to clarify and narrow the issues, ascertain the facts relative to those issues, and prevent trials from being conducted “in the dark,” thereby obviating surprise by requiring disclosure of all issues law and fact that the parties intend to raise except privileged or impeaching matters. It also reiterated that determinations at pre-trial generally bar the consideration of other questions on appeal.

However, the Court emphasized that the Rules are not applied with rigidity and recognized exceptions to prevent manifest injustice. In particular, the Court relied on the concept that issues not raised by pleadings may be treated as raised when they are tried by express or implied consent, consistent with the Rules on amended and supplemental pleadings and the power of courts to allow amendments to conform to evidence. The Court also invoked the qualification laid down in Velasco v. Apostol that a pre-trial order is not a detailed catalogue of each and every issue and that issues impliedly included or inferable by necessary implication are integral parts of the pre-trial order. It further recognized that there may be an undesirable resort to technicalities to evade a defense determinative of a case. It stressed that where evidence on a late-raised issue is introduced without objection and the adverse party actively participates through cross-examination, the failure to object may amount to implied consent conferring jurisdiction to try the issue.

Applying these principles, the Supreme Court ruled that the case fell within the exception. It found that petitioners did not raise the 17 December 1951 deed only in the motion for reconsideration. Instead, petitioners had already pleaded that deed in their answer to respondents’ original complaint. Petitioners specifically stated in their answer that on 17 December 1951 Pedro Son sold, with right to repurchase, one-half (1/2) of the property inherited by him, and that Pedro Son did not repurchase. Petitioners also pleaded that on 5 November 1957 Pedro Son conveyed, by absolute sale, a portion consisting of 6,324 square meters with a deed attached as annex. The Court thus treated the 1951 deed as part of the pleaded defense, not as a purely belated innovation at the motion-for-reconsideration stage.

The Court further found implied assent by respondents. It noted respondents’ failure to object when petitioners presented the 1951 deed in evidence, and when petitioners’ counsel vigorously cross-examined Teofista Son Arcipe regarding the deed. It also noted that Anastacio Son testified about the document. The Court also pointed to respondents’ own extensive cross-examination, which addressed both the 1951 and 1957 deeds, thus demonstrating that respondents were not caught in surprise. It found respondents had every opportunity to present rebuttal or

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 73077)

Parties and Procedural Posture

Escolastica Montesclaros Son, and Heirs of Anastacio Son pursued a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 to assail the Court of Appeals decision in AC-G.R. CV No. 67364 dated 3 October 1985.
Carmelino Son, Teofista Son, Primitivo Son, Cipriana Son, Anatalia Son, Lareano Son, and Gerarda Son appeared as the private respondents and were identified as children and heirs of the late spouses Pedro Son and Marcelina Tudtud.
The dispute originated from a civil case for annulment of a deed of absolute sale and recovery of real property filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu.
The trial court initially declared the 5 November 1957 Deed of Absolute Sale null and void, but later reversed itself upon reconsideration.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reinstated the plaintiffs’ victory by reversing the trial court’s reconsideration outcome.
The present petition challenged the Court of Appeals handling of the pre-trial delimitation of issues and the sufficiency of evidence on the identity and validity of the disputed property transactions.

Key Factual Allegations

The private respondents claimed inheritance rights over a parcel of land in Caputatan Norte, Medellin, Cebu from the late parents Juan Son and Susana Perilla, as later transmitted through Pedro Son.
The private respondents’ mother, Marcelina Tudtud, died on 2 January 1972, while Pedro Son died sometime in November 1957.
Petitioners, as heirs of Anastacio Son (brother of Pedro Son), were alleged to be occupying a portion of the land measuring 6,324 square meters.
The private respondents demanded return of the occupied portion after discovery of petitioners’ occupation in 1972.
Petitioners resisted return by claiming ownership based on a Deed of Absolute Sale allegedly executed by Pedro Son on 5 November 1957.
Private respondents filed an action seeking annulment of the 5 November 1957 Deed of Absolute Sale on grounds of forgery, and recovery of the real property.
Petitioners also relied on an earlier transaction consisting of a Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase dated 17 December 1951, which allegedly covered one-half (one-half) of Pedro Son’s inherited share, with repurchase within one year.
Petitioners asserted that because Pedro Son did not repurchase within the stipulated time, petitioners acquired ownership of the portion covered by the 1951 deed.

Issues Raised on Review

The first issue asked whether the Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase dated 17 December 1951, though not taken up as an issue during the pre-trial, could nevertheless be admitted in evidence given that the adverse party allegedly failed to object and cross-examined on it.
The second issue asked whether the Court of Appeals gravely misapprehended facts or indulged in speculation when it ruled that the land covered by the 5 November 1957 Deed of Absolute Sale was part of the same land covered by the 17 December 1951 Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase.
The third issue asked whether the Court of Appeals conclusion effectively violated the rule that the plaintiff must rely on the strength of the plaintiff’s own evidence rather than on the weakness of the defendant’s defense.
The petitioners’ third issue focused on alleged reliance on perceived discrepancies in the testimonies of the notary and of Anastacio Son, while allegedly disregarding that the notarial deed was already 18 years old and that petitioners had possessed the land in the concept of owners for over 20 years.

Statutory and Rules Framework

The case involved the application of the Revised Rules of Court emphasizing that procedure aims to provide fair, orderly, and systematic prosecution and defense of cases.
The Court of Appeals reasoning centered on Section 4, Rule 20 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that the pre-trial order recites action taken, amendments, and agreements, and then limits the issues for trial, controlling the subsequent course of the action unless modified before trial to prevent manifest injustice.
The decision treated pre-trial as a device to clarify and narrow issues, ascertain facts, and prevent trials carried on in the dark.
The decision reiterated that, in principle, the determination of issues at a pre-trial conference bars consideration of other questions on appeal.
The decision also applied the rule flexibility contained in Section 5 of Rule 10 on Amended and Supplemental Pleadings, which permits treating unraised issues as raised when they are tried by express or implied consent.
The decision applied the qualification articulated in Velasco v. Apostol, where the Court recognized that a pre-trial order is not an exhaustive catalogue of every possible issue and that issues may be impliedly included or inferable by necessary implication, especially where evidence on the issue was introduced without objection and implied consent conferred authority on the court to try the issue.
The syllabus reflects that the Court’s approach considered implied waiver through failure to object and active participation in cross-examination on the introduced document.
The evidentiary discussion also referenced controlling principles on witness credibility, placing weight on the trial judge’s superior position to assess testimony.

Trial and Appellate Findings

The trial court first ruled on 10 September 1979 that the 5 November 1957 Deed of Absolute Sale was null and void and ordered petitioners to return possession and pay P1,500.00 annually from 1972 until delivery, with interest at the legal rate and attorney’s fees P1,500.00.
Petitioners sought reconsideration on 28 September 1979, invoking the 17 December 1951 Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase and asserting that ownership vested in petitioners due to non-repurchase within the one-year period.
On 27 December 1979, the trial court reversed its earlier decision and dismissed the complaint, ordering plaintiffs to pay defendants jointly and severally P1,500.00 as attorney’s fees.
Private respondents appealed, and the Court of Appeals on 3 October 1985 reversed the trial court’s reconsideration ruling.
The Court of Appeals held that the va