G.R. No. 139853 - Soller vs. Commission on Elections

Case Summary (G.R. No. 139853)

Factual Background and Election-Case Filings

Following the May 11, 1998 elections, the municipal board of canvassers proclaimed Soller duly elected on May 14, 1998. Saulong then filed two related proceedings. First, on May 19, 1998, Saulong pursued a COMELEC pre-proclamation remedy, filing a petition for annulment of the proclamation/exclusion of election return. Second, on May 25, 1998, Saulong instituted an election protest in the Regional Trial Court, docketed as EC-31-98. Soller filed an answer with counter-protest on June 15, 1998 and simultaneously moved to dismiss the election protest on several grounds, including lack of jurisdiction, forum-shopping, and failure to state a cause of action.

Proceedings Before COMELEC and the Trial Court

The records showed that COMELEC dismissed Saulong’s pre-proclamation case on July 3, 1998. In the election protest, the Regional Trial Court denied Soller’s motion to dismiss on October 1, 1998. Soller later sought reconsideration, but the motion for reconsideration was denied on February 1, 1999. Soller then elevated the interlocutory denial to the COMELEC through a petition for certiorari, alleging that the Regional Trial Court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to dismiss the election protest.

COMELEC’s Resolution in SPR No. 10-99 and the Petition to the Court

On August 31, 1999, the COMELEC en banc dismissed Soller’s petition. The COMELEC held, among others, that the required filing fee had been paid; it treated the defect in the verification as a mere technical defect; and it found no forum shopping. The COMELEC also relied on the COMELEC procedural framework that, under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a motion for reconsideration of its en banc ruling was prohibited except in election offense cases. Since the controversy involved no election offense, the COMELEC concluded that reconsideration was not possible and that petitioner had no appeal or plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

While the matter was already pending before the Court, the Court required the parties to maintain the status quo ante as of September 17, 1999, the date of the filing of the petition. Soller anchored his assertions on the COMELEC’s alleged grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in sustaining the Regional Trial Court’s refusal to dismiss the election protest despite several supposed defects.

Issues Framed and Threshold Question of COMELEC En Banc Jurisdiction

Petitioner structured his arguments around multiple alleged jurisdictional and procedural errors, including the failure of Saulong to pay all requisite filing fees, the insufficiency of Saulong’s pleading in form and substance, the alleged failure to state a cause of action, and the alleged failure to comply with Supreme Court requirements on truthful certification against non-forum shopping. Despite this formulation, the Court identified the principal question as whether the COMELEC, in sustaining the Regional Trial Court’s refusal to dismiss, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Before reaching the merits, the Court held that it had to resolve the issue of COMELEC’s jurisdiction, because without a proper jurisdictional resolution it could not proceed further.

Constitutional Allocation of Powers Among COMELEC Divisions and the En Banc

The Court applied Art. IX, Sec. 3(2), 1987 Constitution, which provides that COMELEC may sit en banc or in two divisions and that election cases shall be heard and decided in division, with motions for reconsideration of decisions decided by the Commission en banc. Relying on prior rulings such as Sarmiento vs. COMELEC, and subsequent cases including Abad vs. COMELEC and Zarate vs. COMELEC, the Court reiterated that the COMELEC, sitting en banc, did not have the requisite authority to hear and decide election cases in the first instance. It further held that any decision by COMELEC en banc in election cases decided by it first is null and void.

The Court found a fatal procedural infirmity. Petitioner’s certiorari petition challenging the Regional Trial Court’s denial of Soller’s motion to dismiss was not referred to a division but was submitted directly to the COMELEC en banc. The Court emphasized that the Regional Trial Court’s order denying the motion to dismiss was interlocutory, because it did not end the trial court’s adjudication of the parties’ rights and liabilities. In the Court’s view, petitions for certiorari involving incidental issues of an election protest, such as the order denying a motion to dismiss, belong to a division, not to the COMELEC en banc. The Court reasoned that if the principal election case, once decided on the merits, is appealable or otherwise reviewable within the division framework, there was no reason to treat certiorari petitions addressing incidents differently.

Nullity of COMELEC En Banc Action and Grant of Certiorari

Having determined that COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction by taking cognizance of petitioner’s petition in the first instance, the Court held that the COMELEC en banc ruling could not stand. It ruled that the petition was therefore meritorious and granted. To fully terminate the controversy, the Court proceeded to resolve, seriatim, the substantive issues raised by petitioner.

Filing Fee Defect and Jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court

First, the Court addressed whether Saulong’s protest should have been dismissed for failure to pay the required P300.00 filing fee under COMELEC rules. The Court reviewed the receipts and found that Saulong did not pay the full amount. It noted that the receipts reflected varying charges, including amounts shown for the Judiciary Development Fund, summons fee, legal research fund fee, and victim compensation fund fee. Close scrutiny, the Court held, showed that the protest did not include the full P300.00 filing fee. It treated the P368.00 evidenced by one receipt as creditable for the Judiciary Development Fund rather than as the filing fee. Only P32.00 supported as the filing fee paid for the protest under the COMELEC filing-fee requirement.

Applying the doctrine that a court acquires jurisdiction only upon payment of the prescribed docket fee, the Court ruled that the Regional Trial Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the election protest. Consequently, COMELEC committed grave error in not ordering dismissal. The Court supported the approach with prior cases including Miranda vs. Castillo, Loyola vs. COMELEC, Gatchalian vs. Court of Appeals, and Pahilan vs. Tabalba, and it reiterated that, after Loyola vs. COMELEC (promulgated March 27, 1997), mistakes or omissions in payment of the full filing fee in election cases were no longer excusable. For the Court, the dismissal was thus called for on jurisdictional grounds alone.

Defective Verification: Failure to State Truths of Personal Knowledge or Authentic Records

Second, the Court examined verification. It held that Saulong’s verification was defective because Saulong merely stated that he caused the preparation of the petition and had read and understood the allegations, but failed to state that the allegations were true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records. The Court treated the defective verification as a failure of proper verification, and it held that a pleading lacking proper verification should be treated as an unsigned pleading, requiring dismissal under Section 4, Rule 7, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court also referenced the subsequent requirement embodied in A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC, effective 1 May 2000, describing verification as an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that allegations are true and correct of personal knowledge or based on authentic records.

Certification Against Forum Shopping: Mandatory Disclosure Despite Alleged Absence of Actual Forum Shopping

Third, the Court addressed certification against forum shopping. It found that Saulong failed to comply with the required disclosure. The Court observed that Saulong first filed a petition for annulment of proclamation/exclusion of election return before filing the election protest. Yet, in the certification against forum shopping in the election protest, Saulong did not disclose that earlier petition. The Court rejected excuses grounded on the characterization of the earlier filing as a pre-proclamation case. It noted that the earlier petition had been filed after proclamation and was already no longer viable before COMELEC after the winning candidate had been proclaimed. It further recognized that Saulong might have believed that the earlier case was abandoned upon filing of the protest, but it held such belief did not excuse non-disclosure.

The Court emphasized that the pre-proclamation case was dismissed only on July 3, 1998, which meant that the case was legally pending at the time of filing the election protest. It also rejected the argument that the two remedies did not involve the same cause of action, because the certification requirement was mandatory for any initiatory pleading. The Court held that failure to comply could not be excused by the claim that the party had not committed forum shopping. The requirement applied regardless of whether actual forum shopping was committed, because the contrary interpretation would permit parties themselves to determine whether their conduct constituted a forum-shopping violation, thereby defeating the rule’s purpose.

Final Disposition: Annulment of COMELEC Resolution and Dismissal of the Election Protest

After resolving the threshold jurisdictional defect and th

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 139853)

The case arose from a special civil action for certiorari filed by Ferdinand Thomas M. Soller to annul a COMELEC resolution dated August 31, 1999 in COMELEC special relief case SPR No. 10-99.
The assailed COMELEC resolution dismissed petitioner’s petition that sought to set aside interlocutory orders of the Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro (Branch 42) dated October 1, 1998 and February 1, 1999.
The RTC orders denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss the election protest and denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, respectively.
Petitioner and private respondent Angel M. Saulong were candidates for mayor of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro in the May 11, 1998 elections.
After proclamation by the municipal board of canvassers on May 14, 1998, petitioner was proclaimed duly elected mayor.
Private respondent first filed with the COMELEC on May 19, 1998 a “petition for annulment of the proclamation/exclusion of election return.”
Private respondent then filed with the RTC on May 25, 1998 an election protest docketed as EC-31-98.
Petitioner filed an answer with counter-protest on June 15, 1998 and also moved to dismiss the election protest on grounds of lack of jurisdiction, forum-shopping, and failure to state a cause of action.
The COMELEC dismissed the pre-proclamation case on July 3, 1998.
The RTC denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss on October 1, 1998, and petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
Petitioner then sought certiorari with the COMELEC, contending that the RTC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion for failing to dismiss the election protest.
The COMELEC en banc dismissed petitioner’s suit, reasoning that the private respondent paid required filing fees, that defects in verification were technical, that there was no forum shopping, and that a motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling was prohibited under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure absent an election offense.
The COMELEC concluded petitioner had no appeal or plain, speedy and adequate remedy, but nevertheless denied the petition on the merits as to the RTC’s refusal to dismiss.
The petition reached the Court with petitioner asserting that COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The Court required the parties to maintain the status quo ante as of September 17, 1999 pending resolution.

Constitutional and Procedural Issues Framed

The Court identified the principal question as whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in not ordering dismissal of the election protest.
The Court held it must first resolve COMELEC’s jurisdiction because without proper resolution, it could not proceed to the remaining issues.
The Court treated the COMELEC’s jurisdictional defect as a threshold matter that required immediate correction.

COMELEC En Banc Jurisdiction Limit

The Court applied Section 3, Subdivision C of Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that while the COMELEC may sit en banc or in two divisions and promulgate rules to expedite election cases, election cases shall be heard and decided in division, with motions for reconsideration decided by the COMELEC en banc.
The Court relied on Sarmiento vs. COMELEC and subsequent cases to hold that the COMELEC sitting en banc lacked authority to hear and decide election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, in the first instance.
The Court held that any decision by the COMELEC en banc on election cases it took cognizance of in the first instance was null and void.
The Court found that petitioner’s certiorari petition was not referred to a division and instead was submitted directly to the COMELEC en banc.
The Court noted that the challenged RTC order denying the motion to dismiss an election protest was an interlocutory order, because it did not terminate the RTC’s adjudication of the case on the merits.
The Court held that certiorari involving incidental issues of an election protest—such as an RTC’s order denying a motion to dismiss—fell within the competence of a COMELEC division, not the COMELEC en banc.
The Court concluded that the COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction by taking cognizance of petitioner’s petition in the first instance.
As a result of this jurisdictional infirmity, the Court granted the petition and annulled and set aside the COMELEC resolution.

Incidental Issues Resolved

Despite granting on jurisdictional grounds, the Court proceeded to resolve petitioner’s raised issues to “write finis” to the controversy.
The Court treated the case as warranting dismissal of the election protest based on the specific defects identified: insufficient filing fee, defective verification, and non-compliance with the certificate against forum shopping.

Filing Fee Requirement and Jurisdiction

Petitioner contended private respondent’s election protest should have been dismissed because private respondent failed to pay the required filing fee of P300.00 under the COMELEC rules.
The Court examined Section 9, Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules of P