Title
Soliven vs. Makasiar
Case
G.R. No. 82585
Decision Date
Nov 14, 1988
Philippine journalists charged with libel for articles defaming President Aquino; court upheld arrest warrants, affirmed presidential immunity waiver, dismissed claims of denied due process.
libel charges
due process
freedom of speech

Case Summary (G.R. No. 82585)

Factual Background

The petitions arose from criminal libel informations lodged against the petitioners following a preliminary investigation by the City Fiscal of Manila that found a prima facie case. The City Fiscal’s finding was sustained by Undersecretary Silvestre Bello III. Petitioners moved for reconsideration before the Secretary of Justice. Instead of filing counter-affidavits during the preliminary investigation, petitioner Luis D. Beltran filed a “Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed.” The Secretary of Justice denied the motions for reconsideration, and the Executive Secretary subsequently affirmed those denials. Petitioners sought extraordinary reliefs in the Supreme Court, alleging denial of due process in the preliminary investigation, improper issuance of an arrest warrant by the respondent trial judge, and the impropriety of criminal proceedings initiated by the President through a complaint-affidavit.

Procedural History

The Supreme Court consolidated three petitions filed as G.R. No. 82585, G.R. No. 82827, and G.R. No. 83979. The Court identified three principal issues for resolution: the asserted denial of due process during preliminary investigation; the constitutionality of the procedure used by the trial judge in issuing a warrant of arrest; and whether the President may initiate criminal proceedings by filing a complaint-affidavit. Subsequent administrative determinations by the Secretary of Justice and the Executive Secretary rendered the prematurity contention largely moot as to the exhaustion of administrative remedies.

First Issue — Prematurity and Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

The Court held that the contention that petitioners were denied administrative remedies lost factual support after the Secretary of Justice and, on appeal, the Executive Secretary affirmed the fiscal’s prima facie finding. The denials of reconsideration by the Secretary on March 30 and April 7, 1988, and the Executive Secretary’s affirmance on May 2, 1988 with denial of reconsideration on May 16, 1988, removed the basis for a claim of prematurity. The Court therefore deemed the first issue moot and academic.

Preliminary Investigation and Due Process

The Court addressed petitioner Luis D. Beltran’s assertion of denial of due process during the preliminary investigation. It observed that due process does not require that a respondent actually file counter-affidavits; it requires only that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits. Because Beltran filed a “Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed,” the Court found that he effectively waived his right to file counter-affidavits. Thus the allegation of procedural deprivation in the preliminary investigation was negated.

Second Issue — Constitutional Provision on Warrants of Arrest

The Court examined Art. III, Sec. 2, 1987 Constitution, which provides that “no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.” Petitioners, particularly Beltran, argued that the insertion of the word “personally” requires the issuing judge to personally examine the complainant and the witnesses. The Court rejected that literal interpretation.

Interpretation of the Judge’s Duty in Probable Cause Determination

The Court ruled that the constitutional import of the word “personally” is to underscore the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. The judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and witnesses in every case. Instead, the judge may either: (1) personally evaluate the fiscal’s report and supporting documents and, on that basis, issue the warrant; or (2) if the judge finds that the fiscal’s report alone does not establish probable cause, require the submission of supporting affidavits or require further proof. The Court emphasized the policy rationale that judges should not be overburdened with preliminary fact-finding tasks to the detriment of their adjudicative docket.

Administrative Guidance and Adherence to Procedure

The Court noted that on June 30, 1987 it had unanimously adopted Circular No. 12, which set down guidelines for the issuance of warrants of arrest. The procedures specified in that circular were reiterated and clarified by the Court in this resolution. The record did not show that the respondent trial judge, The Hon. Ramon P. Makasiar, deviated from the prescribed procedure. Consequently, the Court found no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the issuance of the arrest warrants.

Third Issue — Presidential Immunity and the Filing of Complaints

Petitioner Luis D. Beltran contended that presidential immunity from suit implied a correlative disability to file a criminal complaint because a subsequent requirement that the President testify would subject her to the court’s jurisdiction and thereby erode the immunity. The Court explained that the privilege of immunity belongs to the office-holder and may be invoked only by the President. An accused cannot invoke the President’s privilege as a defense to prevent the prosecution from proceeding. The Court further held that nothing in the law prevents the President from waiving the privilege. The decision to invoke or waive the privilege is a presidential prerogative exercisable only by the President herself.

Libel Defense, Press Freedom, and the Chilling Effect

On the merits of libel and on the contention that prosecution would produce a “chilling effect” on press freedom, the Court observed that it is not the trier of facts and that claims of privilege and other defenses are matters for the trial court to resolve after evidence presentation. The Court found no basis at the interlocutory stage to decide whether continuation of the prosecution would chill press freedom. Therefore, the question was left to the trial court to consider in due course.

Separate Opinion of Justice

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