G.R. No. L-16570 - Solidum vs. Herdez

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-16570)

Factual Background

In Criminal Case No. 171.52 entitled People of the Philippines vs. Secretary Jaime Hernandez, the City Fiscal filed an amended information alleging that the respondent, having acquired shares in the Avegon Construction and Electrical Co., Inc., and thus becoming directly or indirectly interested in its business, granted the corporation tax exemptions and otherwise acted favorably upon its requests while serving as Secretary of Finance and as presiding officer and member of the Monetary Board of the Central Bank, including the grant of dollar allocations totaling $1,612,224 from 1954 to 1958.

Motion to Quash and Grounds

On June 15, 1959 the respondent filed a motion to quash the amended information, asserting three grounds: first, that mere ownership of shares in a private corporation does not fall within the purview of prohibited interest in a "contrato u operacion" under Article 216 of the Revised Penal Code; second, that he had no interest or shareholding in Avegon, Inc. on the material dates when privileges and allocations were granted; and third, that Article 216 of the Revised Penal Code did not apply to a department head by virtue of Article VII, Section 11, paragraph 2 of the Philippine Constitution.

Prosecution's Opposition

On July 9, 1959 the City Fiscal filed an opposition to the motion to quash, contending that the respondent’s stockholding created the sort of interest prohibited by Article 216 of the Revised Penal Code, that the respondent’s denial of shareholding was a matter of evidence and proper defense at trial, and that the constitutional provision cited did not render Article 216 inoperative as to department heads.

Trial Court Orders

On July 17, 1959 the respondent Judge issued an order denying the motion to quash, stating that the motion raised fundamental questions which could not be properly decided without evidence and reserving decision on the alleged repugnancy between Article 216 and Article VII, Section 11, paragraph 2 of the Philippine Constitution; the court set arraignment for July 25, 1959. A motion for reconsideration was denied on August 1, 1959.

Petition to the Court of Appeals

On August 12, 1959 the respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition and/or mandamus with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, alleging that the trial judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to quash and that the judge neglected the duty enjoined under Section 6, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court by deferring resolution of the fundamental questions until after trial. In answer, the petitioners asserted that the judge acted within jurisdiction and without grave abuse of discretion and that an adequate remedy by appeal existed, citing prior rulings including Eulogio Mill vs. Hon. Nicasio Yatco.

Court of Appeals Decision

On January 23, 1960 the Court of Appeals issued the writ of prohibition, annulled the orders complained of, and directed respondents to desist from further proceedings in the criminal case on the ground that Article 216 of the Revised Penal Code had been rendered pro tanto inoperative by Article VII, Section 11, paragraph 2 of the Philippine Constitution insofar as heads of departments, chiefs of bureaus or offices and their assistants are concerned.

Petition to the Supreme Court and Issues Presented

The petitioners brought the matter to the Supreme Court, contending that the Court of Appeals erred in assuming jurisdiction over the petition; erred in holding that Article 216 was rendered inoperative as to department heads by the constitutional provision; and erred in annulling the trial court orders and issuing a writ of prohibition when appeal was the available remedy.

Supreme Court Analysis on Prohibition as Extraordinary Remedy

The Court reviewed the settled doctrine that writs of prohibition issue only upon a showing of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion by an inferior tribunal, board or person, invoking Rule 67, Sec. 2, Rules of Court and authorities such as Aglipay vs. Ruiz and Reyes et al. vs. The Hon. Guillermo Romero et al., and explaining the policy basis that inferior tribunals must be allowed latitude in exercising discretionary judgment so that their discretion remains real rather than illusory.

Application of Doctrine to the Trial Judge’s Conduct

Applying the doctrine, the Court found that the orders of the respondent Judge reflected a cautious and mature exercise of discretion rather than capricious or whimsical conduct equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The July 17, 1959 order expressly recognized that the fundamental questions raised by the motion to quash could not be resolved properly without presentation of evidence, and the record disclosed no exigency warranting bypass of the ordinary remedy by appeal.

Supre

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-16570)

Parties and Posture

ARSENIO SOLIDUM, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA and HERMOGENES CONCEPCION, JR. AS CITY FISCAL OF MANILA filed the petition before the Supreme Court seeking relief from a writ of prohibition issued by the Court of Appeals.
JAIME HERNANDEZ was the accused in Criminal Case No. 171.52 captioned People of the Philippines vs. Secretary Jaime Hernandez in the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XVII.
The Court of Appeals annulled the trial court orders denying a motion to quash and issued a writ of prohibition which petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court.

Key Facts

An amended information alleged that the accused owned shares in Avegon Construction and Electrical Co., Inc., and in his official capacity as Secretary of Finance and presiding officer of the Monetary Board acted favorably toward the corporation.
The information charged that the accused participated in granting dollar allocations totaling $1,612,224 from 1954 to 1958 and granted tax exemptions and other favors to the corporation.
The accused filed a motion to quash alleging three grounds, including that mere stock ownership did not fall within the purview of Article 216 of the Revised Penal Code, that he possessed no interest on material dates, and that Article 216 of the Revised Penal Code did not apply to department heads by virtue of Article VII, Section 11, paragraph 2 of the Constitution.
The City Fiscal opposed the motion to quash and contended that the issues raised were matters of evidence and that Article 216 of the Revised Penal Code remained applicable to department heads.
The trial judge denied the motion to quash by an order stating that the fundamental questions raised could not be properly decided without the presentation of evidence and reserved decision on the constitutional contention.

Procedural History

The amended information was filed on April 18, 1959, and the accused filed a motion to quash on June 15, 1959.
The trial court denied the motion to quash on July 17, 1959 and denied reconsideration on August 1, 1959.
The accused filed a petition for prohibition and/or mandamus with the Court of Appeals on August 12, 1959 seeking also a preliminary injunction.
The Court of Appeals, on January 23, 1960, issued the writ of prohibition, annulled the trial court orders, and held that Article 216 of the Revised Penal Code had been rendered pro tanto inoperative by Article VII, Section 11, paragraph 2 of the Constitution as to department heads.
Petitioners elevated the matter to the Supreme Court to annul the writ of prohibition issued by the Court of Appeals.

Issues

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in assuming jurisdiction to issue the writ of prohibition in the circumstances of this ca