G.R. No. 184274 - Soledad y Cristobal vs. People

Case Summary (G.R. No. 184274)

Key Dates and Applicable Law

Approximate commission of the offense: on or about August 13, 2004. Applicable statutory law: Republic Act No. 8484 (Access Devices Regulation Act of 1998) — specifically Section 9(e) (prohibiting “possessing one or more counterfeit access devices or access devices fraudulently applied for”) and Section 10 (penalty provision). Procedural law: Rule 110, Section 6 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure (sufficiency of complaint or information). Civil-law definition relied upon: Article 523, Civil Code (definition and elements of possession). Relevant jurisprudential principle cited: People v. Villanueva (relationship between preamble and accusatory portion of an information). Constitutional basis: 1987 Constitution (guarantees of due process and the accused’s right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation).

Procedural History

An information charging petitioner with violation of Section 9(e), R.A. No. 8484, was filed in the RTC. Petitioner pleaded not guilty, moved a demurrer to evidence (denied), and was convicted by the RTC on September 27, 2006. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction but modified the RTC’s notation of specific prison terms. Petitioner filed a petition for review under Rule 45 to the Supreme Court, raising challenges to the information’s validity, whether the charged offense matched the proof, adequacy of notice, and whether petitioner was in legal possession of the credit card. The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the CA decision.

Facts as Found by the Courts

The prosecution’s factual narrative (as adopted by the courts) is: in June 2004 petitioner’s co-conspirators induced complainant Henry Yu to submit personal documents for a purported loan. Those documents were thereafter used fraudulently to open additional mobile lines and to apply for a Metrobank credit card in Yu’s name. An NBI entrapment operation resulted in an NBI agent, posing as a messenger, delivering the card to the Las Piñas address shown on the delivery receipt; petitioner answered as “Henry Yu,” presented two identification cards bearing Yu’s name but petitioner’s photograph and a forged signature, signed the delivery receipt acknowledging receipt of the Metrobank credit card, and was then arrested. The two identification cards were recovered from petitioner.

Issues Raised on Review

Whether the information was valid.
Whether the information charged the offense of which petitioner was ultimately found guilty.
Whether petitioner was sufficiently informed of the nature of the accusations (i.e., notice/due process).
Whether petitioner was legally in “possession” of the credit card subject to the case.

Sufficiency and Validity of the Information

The Court applied Section 6, Rule 110 (complaint or information sufficiency), noting that a sufficient information must state: the accused’s name; designation of the offense by statute; acts or omissions constituting the offense; offended party; approximate date; and place of commission. The information here named petitioner (including aliases), designated Section 9(e), R.A. No. 8484 in the preamble, narrated the acts constituting the offense (applying for a credit card using the complainant’s name and fraudulently obtained documents, having the card issued and delivered to petitioner under a fictitious identity), identified the offended party (Henry Yu), and alleged the approximate date and place. The Court therefore held the information sufficient.

The Court also explained the legal significance of the preamble: the preamble and the accusatory portion must be read together. Quoting People v. Villanueva, the Court emphasized that the preamble lays down the predicate in general terms while the accusatory paragraph supplies details, and that together they satisfy the constitutional requirement of notice. Even though the operative word “possessing” did not appear verbatim in the accusatory paragraph, it appeared in the information’s preamble and the accusatory paragraph described acts that necessarily encompassed possession (i.e., successful issuance and delivery of the credit card to the accused), thus appriseing petitioner of the charge.

Legal Standard for Possession

Because R.A. No. 8484 does not define “possession,” the Court adopted the Civil Code (Article 523) concept: possession is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. Possession has two elements: (1) corpus — material holding or physical control of the thing; and (2) animus possidendi — the intent to possess. Animus is a state of mind proven from attendant circumstances, prior or contemporaneous acts, and may be inferred from the behavior of the accused.

Application of Possession Standard to the Facts

The Court found both elements present. Corpus: petitioner physically held and signed for the envelope containing the credit card; the acknowledgment receipt specifically indicated the envelope’s contents (a Metrobank credit card), and petitioner signed that receipt as recipient. Animus possidendi: petitioner took active steps constituting intent to possess — he had participated earlier in fraudulently obtaining the complainant’s documents, used those documents to secure cellular lines and to apply for the credit card in Yu’s name, and presented identification cards (bearing the complainant’s name but petitioner’s photograph and forged signature) to the messenger to secure delivery. These antecedent and contemporaneous acts allowed the Court to infer the requisite intent to possess. The Court rejected petitioner’s argument that mere delivery prior to his inspection negated possession, concluding that his active participation and his signature on the acknowledgement demonstrated both receipt and intent to possess the card.

Notice and Constitutional Considerations

Relying on the preamble-plus-accusatory-portion analysis and established doctrine, the Court concluded that petitioner received constitutionally adequate notice of the offense. The Court treated the infor

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 184274)

Procedural Posture

Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision dated June 18, 2008 and Resolution dated August 22, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR. No. 30603.
The CA had affirmed with modification the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 202, Las Piñas City, September 27, 2006 decision that found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 9(e), R.A. No. 8484 (Access Devices Regulation Act of 1998); the CA denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in its August 22, 2008 Resolution.
The RTC decision convicted petitioner and imposed an indeterminate imprisonment penalty and a fine; the CA affirmed the conviction but modified the penalty language by deleting the terms prision correccional and prision mayor.
The Supreme Court (Second Division), through Justice Nachura, J., resolved G.R. No. 184274 on February 23, 2011, and denied the petition for lack of merit, affirming the CA Decision and Resolution.

Facts of the Case

Sometime in June 2004, private complainant Henry C. Yu received a solicitation call from a credit card agent identified as “Tess” or “Juliet Villar,” later identified as Rochelle Bagaporo, offering a Citifinancing loan assistance at a low interest rate.
Henry Yu invited Rochelle Bagaporo to his office in Quezon City; while there, Rochelle Bagaporo indorsed Yu to her immediate boss, a person referred to as “Arthur,” later identified as petitioner Mark C. Soledad y Cristobal.
Petitioner instructed Yu to submit documents to a person called “Carlo,” later identified as Ronald Gobenchiong (also referenced as Ronald Gobenciong in the Information).
Henry Yu submitted various documents including his Globe handyphone original platinum gold card, identification cards, and statements of account.
Yu’s subsequent inquiries found he could not reach petitioner or Ronald Gobenchiong; in the first week of August 2004 Yu received a Globe handyphone statement charging two mobile numbers not his and discovered, upon verification, five additional mobile numbers in his name with the application bearing petitioner’s picture and a forged signature.
Yu also discovered alterations in Citibank credit card database information and a credit card application with Metrobank Card Corporation in his name.
Yu and Metrobank’s junior assistant manager Jefferson Devilleres lodged a complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), which conducted an entrapment operation.
During the entrapment, NBI Special Investigator Salvador Arteche posed as a Metrobank credit card delivery boy, arrived in Las Piñas at about 5:00 P.M., asked for Henry Yu, and received a response from petitioner claiming to be Henry Yu.
Petitioner presented two identification cards bearing the name and forged signature of Henry Yu but displaying petitioner’s photograph; petitioner signed the delivery/acknowledgment receipt which indicated the envelope contained the Metrobank credit card; upon introduction as an NBI operative, Arteche apprehended petitioner and recovered the two identification cards.

Charge and Accusatory Information

Petitioner was charged with Violation of Section 9(e), R.A. No. 8484, for “possessing a counterfeit access device or access device fraudulently applied for.”
The accusatory portion of the Information alleged that on or about 13 August 2004, in Las Piñas, petitioner, conspiring with Rochelle Bagaporo a.k.a. Juliet Villar/Tess and Ronald Gobenciong a.k.a. Carlo, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defrauded Henry Yu by applying for a credit card (an access device under R.A. 8484) from Metrobank Card Corporation using Yu’s name and personal documents fraudulently obtained, and that the credit card was successfully issued and delivered to the accused using a fictitious identity and addresses of Henry Yu to the damage and prejudice of the real Henry Yu.
The Information identified the accused by name and aliases (“Mark Soledad y Cristobal a.k.a. Henry Yu/Arthur”), the designation of the offense under the statute, the acts constituting the offense, the offended party (Henry Yu), the approximate date (on or about 13 August 2004), and the place of commission (City of Las Piñas).

Trial Proceedings and Motions

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded “not guilty.”
After presentation of the prosecution’s evidence, petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence contending he was not in physical and legal possession of the credit card presented in evidence, asserting that he was arrested immediately after signing the acknowledgment receipt a