Title
Socrates vs. Commission on Elections
Case
G.R. No. 154512
Decision Date
Nov 12, 2002
A recall election was initiated against Mayor Socrates; Hagedorn, despite serving three terms, was deemed eligible to run due to a 15-month gap, winning the election.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 154512)

Procedural Background and Antecedents

On July 2, 2002, a Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA) of barangay officials of Puerto Princesa convened and adopted Resolution No. 01-02 initiating a recall of Mayor Socrates. The PRA designated Mark David M. Hagedorn as interim chair. Socrates sought COMELEC relief to nullify the Recall Resolution; COMELEC en banc dismissed his petition and gave due course to the Recall Resolution. The COMELEC set a campaign calendar, and recall election scheduling and candidate qualification disputes (chiefly whether Edward Hagedorn was disqualified for having served three consecutive terms before the recall) produced several administrative petitions (SPA Nos. 02-492 and 02-539, consolidated) and subsequent Supreme Court interventions enjoining proclamation pending adjudication.

Consolidated Petitions and Core Issues Presented to the Court

The consolidated petitions raised: (1) whether COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in giving due course to the PRA Recall Resolution and scheduling the recall election (Socrates); (2) whether the short campaign period fixed by COMELEC (10 days) constituted grave abuse (Sandoval) — later rendered moot by Court order extending campaign period; and (3) whether Edward Hagedorn was disqualified from running in the recall election by reason of having already served three consecutive terms as mayor (Adovo, Gilo, Ollave; with Socrates intervening).

COMELEC Findings on Notice, PRA Conduct, and Evidentiary Record

COMELEC found that notices of the PRA convening were sent pursuant to Section 70 of the Local Government Code; proof of service, postings, media dissemination, attendance records, minutes and the authenticated list of barangay officials were submitted and certified. The City Election Officer and provincial/regional COMELEC officials certified the sufficiency and authenticity of the PRA documents and that the majority of PRA members approved the Recall Resolution. The Supreme Court noted that factual determinations by COMELEC on matters within its competence are binding unless patently erroneous, relying on Malonzo v. COMELEC for the standard that defective service-of-notice issues are factual questions for COMELEC.

Court’s Review and Rationale on the Validity of the Recall Resolution

The Court applied the deferential standard to COMELEC’s factual findings and found no patent error. Challenges that some PRA members were not notified, that proof of service was deficient, that PRA members were seeking new electoral mandates, or that proceedings violated Socrates’ right to information were rejected. The Court observed that PRA members were de jure barangay officials at the time of adoption, Socrates received notice and had representation, and the records were available for his inspection. Consequently, the Court concluded COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in upholding the Recall Resolution and scheduling the recall election (ultimately on September 24, 2002).

Constitutional and Statutory Framework Governing Term Limits

Article X, Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution provides for three-year terms for elective local officials (except barangay officials) and bars service for more than three consecutive terms; it further states voluntary renunciation of office does not interrupt continuity. Section 43(b) of RA 7160 restates the three-term prohibition. The Court explained these provisions as having two parts: (i) the bar on more than three consecutive terms (counting only consecutive terms), and (ii) the rule that voluntary renunciation does not interrupt continuity of service (whereas involuntary interruption does). The Court placed emphasis on the constitutional framers’ intent (as reflected in ConCom debates) that the constitutional ban targets immediate reelection that would produce a fourth consecutive term, while preserving the people’s freedom to choose their leaders in subsequent elections after an interruption.

Majority’s Analysis on “Immediate Reelection,” Continuity, and Recall Elections

The Court reasoned that the three-term limitation forbids an immediate reelection for a fourth consecutive term following completion of three full consecutive terms; it does not prohibit candidacy in subsequent elections after an involuntary interruption. The Court construed a recall election held during the term that follows a third consecutive term as a subsequent election, not an immediate reelection. In Hagedorn’s case, his three consecutive terms ended June 30, 2001, he did not run in the 2001 regular election and thus was a private citizen thereafter; the PRA-initiated recall election occurred on September 24, 2002 — after a nearly 15-month hiatus. The Court found that the hiatus constituted an involuntary interruption of continuity of service (the interruption need not be a full term), relying on prior rulings (e.g., Lonzanida, Adormeo) holding that interruptions prevent stitching together terms to make them consecutive. Therefore Hagedorn’s recall term (serving the unexpired 2001–2004 term) was not retroactively a fourth consecutive term and did not violate the three-term prohibition.

Interpretation of “Term” and the Effect of Recall Terms on Term Computation

The majority emphasized that a “term” is a fixed three-year period; a person who wins a recall serves only the unexpired portion of the incumbency and that unexpired portion is itself counted as a term for future term-limit computations, but it does not retroactively convert the prior completed service into a continuous fourth full term. The Court relied on Constitutional Commission debates and earlier cases (Borja, Lonzanida, Adormeo) to explain that the constitutional scheme aimed to prevent immediate fourth-term reelection while preserving voters’ choice and that involuntary interruptions break continuity even if the interruption is shorter than a full term.

Holding, Disposition, and Relief

Applying the above analysis, the Supreme Court dismissed the consolidated petitions (G.R. Nos. 154512, 154683, and 155083–84). The Court held that (1) COMELEC did not commit grave abuse in validating the Recall Resolution and scheduling the recall election and (2) Edward Hagedorn was qualified to run in and to assume the office after winning the September 24, 2002 recall election. The temporary restraining order previously enjoining proclamation was lifted; petitions were dismissed with no costs.

Concurring and Dissenting Views — Chief Justice Davide’s Dissent and Other Opinions

  • Chief Justice Davide (dissent): Agreed with the majority on the validity of the PRA and the mootness of the short campaign period issue, but dissented on Hagedorn’s qualification. He read Article X, Section 8 and Section 43(b) as prohibiting a fourth consecutive term (not merely immediate reelection), contending that Hagedorn’s candidacy and election in the recall effectively sought a fou
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