Title
Silva vs. National Labor Relations Commission
Case
G.R. No. 110226
Decision Date
Jun 19, 1997
Employees retrenched in 1985 sought re-employment under a CBA clause after company expansion in 1986. Philtread refused, prompting an unfair labor practice complaint. NLRC initially ruled for re-employment, but later reversed, citing CBA interpretation jurisdiction. Supreme Court reinstated the initial NLRC resolution, ruling it final due to untimely reconsideration and affirming jurisdiction over unfair labor practice claims.
unfair labor practice
damages
late motion for reconsideration

Case Summary (G.R. No. 110226)

Factual Background

Petitioners were rank-and-file employees and members of Philtread Workers Union who in 1985 accepted a company retrenchment program with the understanding, under Section 4, Article III of the Collective Bargaining Agreement executed July 5, 1983, that they would have priority in re-employment when the company recovered. In November 1986 Philtread expanded operations and hired new personnel, and petitioners’ applications for re-employment were deferred or ignored despite repeated demands and a union request to halt hiring until petitioners were rehired.

Initial Procedural Course

On December 5, 1988 petitioners filed with the National Capital Region Arbitration Branch of the NLRC a complaint for unfair labor practice, damages and attorneys’ fees, docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 12-04975-88. Both parties submitted position papers, and Philtread moved to dismiss asserting lack of NLRC jurisdiction and lack of locus standi because petitioners allegedly were not privy to the CBA.

Labor Arbiter Decision and Appeal

Labor Arbiter Edgardo M. Madriaga issued a decision on August 31, 1989 dismissing the complaint but directing Philtread to give petitioners priority in hiring for available positions subject to qualifications. The Labor Arbiter did not resolve the jurisdictional question raised by Philtread. Petitioners appealed to the NLRC; Philtread did not appeal the Labor Arbiter’s decision.

NLRC Resolution of April 15, 1992

On April 15, 1992 the NLRC issued a resolution reversing the Labor Arbiter’s dismissal and directing Philtread to re-employ petitioners and similarly situated former employees regardless of age and other pre-employment conditions, subject to existing vacancies and a finding of good physical condition. The resolution was returned by the bailiff showing receipt by Atty. Abraham B. Borreta on May 5, 1992.

Service, Late Motion and Subsequent NLRC Reconsideration

Atty. Borreta filed an ex parte manifestation on May 20, 1992 claiming erroneous service because Atty. Daniel C. Gutierrez had exclusively handled the case and the law firm of Borreta, Gutierrez and Leogardo had been dissolved. Philtread’s counsel in fact filed a motion for reconsideration on June 5, 1992, thirty-one days after receipt of the April 15, 1992 resolution. Despite the late filing, the NLRC entertained reconsideration and, by resolution dated November 18, 1992, dismissed petitioners’ complaint on the ground that the principal controversy involved interpretation and implementation of the CBA and should have been brought before a voluntary arbitrator pursuant to Article 261 of the Labor Code. The NLRC reiterated that position in a further resolution dated April 7, 1993.

Petitioners’ Recourse to the Supreme Court

Petitioners sought certiorari, contending that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion by reconsidering and reversing its April 15, 1992 resolution after the ten-day reglementary period for filing motions for reconsideration had lapsed under Article 223 and Section 14, Rule VII of the NLRC’s New Rules of Procedure. Petitioners argued that the April 15, 1992 resolution became final and executory because Philtread failed to timely file a motion for reconsideration.

Legal Issue Presented

The central legal questions were whether the NLRC erred in entertaining Philtread’s late motion for reconsideration and in holding that the voluntary arbitrator, rather than the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, had jurisdiction to resolve petitioners’ complaint; and whether the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 6715 applied retroactively to divest the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC of jurisdiction over the complaint filed December 5, 1988.

Court’s Conclusion on Finality and Timeliness

The Court held that the seasonable filing of a motion for reconsideration within ten calendar days after receipt of an NLRC resolution was mandatory and jurisdictional under Article 223 of the Labor Code and Section 14, Rule VII of the NLRC rules. Because Philtread’s motion for reconsideration was filed thirty-one days after receipt, the NLRC should have dismissed it as late. The Court found the NLRC’s acceptance of the late motion and subsequent reconsideration whimsical and capricious and thus subject to certiorari.

Jurisdictional Analysis under Pre- and Post-Amendment Law

The Court examined jurisdictional provisions as they stood when the complaint was filed. It noted that on December 5, 1988 Article 217 vested Labor Arbiters with original and exclusive jurisdiction over unfair labor practice cases and that Article 248 treated violation of a collective bargaining agreement as an unfair labor practice. The Court then considered the amendments introduced by R.A. 6715 effective March 21, 1989, which narrowed Labor Arbiter jurisdiction by assigning to voluntary arbitrators grievances arising from interpretation or implementation of CBAs, except where gross violations of economic provisions were alleged.

Retroactivity and Precedent Distinction

The Court addressed whether R.A. 6715 should be applied retroactively. It acknowledged precedent in which the Court treated certain jurisdictional amendments as curative and retroactive, notably Briad Agro Development Corporation v. Dela Cerna; however, it distinguished those cases and aligned with Erectors, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, holding that the general rule is that jurisdiction is determined by the law in force at the time an action commenced and that retroactive application is not warranted unless the amendatory law is curative or legislative intent for retroactivity is clear. The Court concluded that R.A. 6715 was a change in policy rather than a curative statute that corrected a defect in the prior law. Consequently, the Labor Arbiter’s jurisdiction that attached upon filing on December 5, 1988 remained valid and the amended allocation of disputes to voluntary arbitration did not retroactively divest that jurisdiction.

Application of Precedent on Voluntary Arbitrator Jurisdiction

The Court rejected Philtread’s and the NLRC’s simplistic view that any dispute involving interpretation of a CBA must be referred to a voluntary arbitrator. Relying on Sanyo Philippines Workers Union-PSSLU v. Canizares, the Court explained that only disputes between the employer and the bargaining representative (the union) fall within grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration; disputes not involving the union fall within the Labor Arbiter’s competence even when they involve a CBA provision’s implementation or interpr

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