G.R. No. L-13374 - Bautista vs. Murillo

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-13374)

Governing Rules and the Threshold Requirement

The Supreme Court identified that the operative Philippine rule authorixed admission without examination for applicants who had been admitted to practice in specified United States courts or equivalents, and who could show that they had practiced at least five years in any of those courts. Critically, the Philippine rule required that the foreign jurisdiction, in this case New York, “by comity confer the same privilege on attorneys admitted to practice in the Philippine Islands.” The Court then described the New York rule as permitting admission without examination, in the discretion of the Appellate Division, in circumstances that included: first, persons admitted to practice who had practiced for five years as members of the bar in the highest law court in another “state or territory of the American Union”; and second, persons admitted to practice who had practiced for five years in another country whose jurisprudence was based on the principles of the English Common Law.

Disputed Administration of New York’s Comity Rule

The Court noted that it had been advised informally that one member of the bar of the Philippine Islands had been admitted in New York without examination, while another member had been refused. The Court emphasized that the rulings were not brought to it authoritatively. It therefore proceeded, assuming the New York rulings were true, to consider whether, under the New York rule as it existed, the principle of comity had been sufficiently established to satisfy the Philippine rule. The Court further underscored that, under the rules of both jurisdictions, admission in any particular case remained in the discretion of the court, and that a refusal in a given case would not necessarily conclusively determine the general rule.

Whether the Philippine Islands Fell Within “State or Territory of the American Union”

The Court first addressed the possibility of comity under the New York rule’s paragraph 1, which required practice for five years in the highest law court in any “state or territory of the American Union.” The Court reasoned that if the Philippine Islands were a territory of the United States in the sense used by New York, comity would appear to exist. It held that the Philippine Islands was not an “organized territory” incorporated into the United States under the Constitution, citing Dorr vs. U. S., 195 U. S., 138. It likewise held that the Philippine Islands was not a “foreign country,” citing The Diamond Rings, 183 U. S., 176, and characterized it as a “territory of the United States over which civil government could be established.”

To support that characterization, the Court relied on federal jurisprudence and related doctrine concerning other United States territorial arrangements, including De Lima vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 1 (Porto Rico), and the proposition that Porto Rico was not a foreign territory and that federal statutes covering “territories” extended to Porto Rico, as in American Railroad Co. of Porto Rico vs. Didricksen, 227 U. S., 145. The Court likewise cited authorities reflecting that Porto Rico, Hawaii, and Alaska were now incorporated, organized territories, including Muratti vs. Foote, 25 Porto Rico, 527; Hawaii vs. Mankichi, 190 U. S., 197; Rasmussen vs. U. S., 197 U. S., 516. It further referenced an opinion of the United States Attorney-General that, while the Philippine Islands were not incorporated into the United States, they were “clearly” territory of the United States to the extent Congress had assumed to legislate and granted a form of territorial government.

The Court also cited authority that the Philippine Islands were not “another country” for purposes of a Cuban Commercial Treaty, citing Faber vs. U. S., 221 U. S., 649. In construing the breadth of the term “United States,” it quoted Chief Justice Marshall’s observation in Loughborough vs. Blake, 5 Wheat (U. S.), 317, regarding states and territories as part of the Republic.

Interpretation of the New York Phrase and the Avoidance of Anomalous Status

From those premises, the Court reasoned that the New York rule’s phrase “any state or territory of the American Union” indicated a sweeping intention to include all United States territory not characterized as a foreign country, rather than limiting “territory” to the technical category of organized territory. It observed that New York’s phrasing contemplated “state,” “territory,” and “another country.” It found it clear that the Philippine Islands was not “another country.” It also rejected the notion that the New York court intended “territory” to be limited to organized territory, because the rule used a broader phrase that would otherwise leave the Philippine Islands in an anomalous position—neither “another country,” nor a “state,” nor a “territory,” a characterization the Court considered untenable.

While the Court acknowledged that the final construction of the phrase rested with the New York courts, it held that in the absence of authoritative decisions from New York on the point, it was justified to conclude that under paragraph 1 of the New York rule there existed between New York and the Philippines a basis of comity sufficient to satisfy the requirement in the Philippine rule governing admission without examination.

Alternative Basis Under the English Common Law Provision

The Court then stated an alternative inquiry. Even if comity were not permitted under paragraph 1, it considered whether comity could exist under paragraph 2, which applied where the applicant had practiced for five years in “another country whose jurisprudence is based on the principles of the English Common Law.” The Court assumed that if the Philippine Islands were not a “state or territory,” it would fall under “another country.” The Court therefore examined on what principles the jurisprudence of the Philippine Islands was based, treating this as a matter it could properly determine.

“Jurisprudence Based on the English Common Law” in General and in the Philippine Setting

The Court defined “jurisprudence” as the ground-work of written law and, in its broad sense, as case law. It then explained that New York’s reference to such jurisprudence assumed that New York State itself was based upon principles of English common law. It therefore reviewed, by reference to New York decisions, the extent to which English common law principles applied in New York. It treated English common law as never being purely static and observed that codification and statute law had come to predominate in American jurisdictions. It explained that, for present purposes, jurisprudence may be described as based on English common law if the statute law and case law substantially include the science and application of law derived from English common law as perpetuated and modified by American decisions.

The Court emphasized that there were no jurisdictions today with a pure English common law system except England itself, because the English common law concept necessarily blended with codification and other sources. Accordingly, the Court treated “based on the principles of the English Common Law” as a general descriptive label for Anglo-American law when the English common law’s principles remained embedded through case law and statutory structures.

The Court’s Account of the Philippine Jurisprudential Foundation

Turning to the Philippine Islands, the Court stated that the extent to which English or Anglo-American common law was in force had not been definitely decided. It then relied on the Court’s prior pronouncements in Philippine Reports indicating that, while English and American common law was not in force as binding doctrine except insofar as it rested on sound principles applicable to local conditions and not in conflict with existing law, many common law rules, principles, and doctrines had been imported. It cited, among others, Alzua and Arnalot vs. Johnson, 21 Phil., 308, and quoted extensively from it to show that the Philippine legal system had been modeled upon the judicial systems of the United States and that common law served as an aid in construing and applying statutes enacted under American sovereignty. It also invoked U. S. vs. De Guzman, 30 Phil., 416, for the proposition that borrowed or modeled legislative enactments could be authoritatively guided by American and English decisions, and U. S. vs. Abiog and Abiog, 37 Phil., 137, for the statement that what existed was a “Philippine Common Law” influenced by English and American common law, Spanish dederecho comun, and customary law.

Role of Spanish Statute Law and Absence of Spanish Common-Law Precedent

To explain the sources of Philippine law, the Court undertook a survey of Spanish law’s retained force and its manner of operation after the change of sovereignty. It explained that Spanish law had become highly codified during the nineteenth century and that only those Spanish laws were effective in the Philippines that were extended by royal decree. It listed major Spanish codes made effective in the Philippines, including Penal Code, Code of Commerce, Civil Code, codes on criminal and civil procedure, and other specialized laws. It stated that Spanish jurisprudence did not recognize stare decisis and thus did not preserve a binding common law of precedent comparable to English or American systems.

The Court described Spanish Civil Code, Art. 6, for the hierarchy applied when there was no law exactly applicable: customs of the place, and then general principles of law, while asserting that judicial decisions could not be resorted to under the Spanish system. It thereby concluded that, upon the change of sovereignty, Spanish written law was severed from Spanish jurisprudential precedent and made effective as statute law without a binding background of Spanish case law.

Preponderance of Anglo-American Case Law and the Emergence of a Philippine Common Law

The Court then stressed tha

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-13374)

Max Shoop applied to the Court for admission to the practice of law in the Philippine Islands under paragraph four of the Rules for the Examination of Candidates for Admission to the Practice of Law, effective July 1, 1920.
The application was supported by papers showing that the applicant had been admitted to practice and had practiced for more than five years in the highest court of the State of New York.
The Court treated the application as one for admission without examination, contingent upon the existence of the comity requirement built into the Philippine rules.
The Court resolved the application by interpreting the Philippine rule through the rule of the New York court, and it granted admission based on the Court’s conclusion that the comity basis existed under a reasonable construction of the New York rule.

Parties and Procedural Posture

The only applicant was Max Shoop, who petitioned the Court for admission to practice law.
The petition invoked Rule authority that allowed admission without examination in the Court’s discretion when a foreign jurisdiction granted similar privileges through comity.
The Court acted in its capacity to decide the petition upon the submitted papers and its interpretation of the applicable rule of the New York court.

Legal Basis for Admission Without Exam

The Philippine rule permitted admission without examination for applicants admitted to practice in the Supreme Court of the United States, or in specified federal appellate or district courts, or in the highest court of a State or territory of the United States that, by comity, conferred the same privilege on attorneys admitted in the Philippine Islands.
The rule required that the applicant show by satisfactory affidavits that the applicant practiced at least five years in any of the specified courts.
The Court emphasized that admission in any particular case remained within the discretion of the court, and that a refusal in an isolated case would not necessarily negate a general comity principle.
The Court noted that the Philippine rule expressly required an antecedent determination of whether the foreign jurisdiction’s rule established comity.

Applicable New York Rule

The New York rule allowed admission without examination, in the discretion of the Appellate Division, in enumerated situations.
The Court identified relevant portions of the New York rule as including:
The rule covered five years’ practice by a person admitted to practice as a member of the bar in the highest law court in another state or territory of the American Union.
The rule also covered five years’ practice by a person admitted to practice in another country whose jurisprudence was based on the principles of the English Common Law.
The Court was informed informally that one member of the bar of the Philippine Islands had been admitted without examination in New York under the rule and that another had been refused in a more recent instance.
The Court observed that New York rulings were not brought to it authoritatively, and it therefore proceeded by assuming the reported New York rulings were true and focused on whether comity was established.

Core Issues Presented

The Court addressed whether the New York rule, as written and as interpreted, satisfied the Philippine rule’s requirement of comity.
The Court considered two possible New York pathways to comity under the New York rules:
The pathway under the New York rule referring to “any state or territory of the American Union.”
The pathway under the New York rule referring to “another country” whose jurisprudence was based on the principles of the English Common Law.
The Court also clarified that its interpretation of the New York rule would control the disposition of the petition, while it would not necessarily create a controlling precedent for future cases if later enforcement by New York diverged.

The Philippine Islands as “Territory”

The Court examined whether the Philippine Islands could be considered a “territory of the United States” within the meaning of the New York phrase “state or territory of the American Union.”
The Court held that the Philippines was not an organized territory incorporated into the United States under the Constitution, citing Dorr vs. U. S., 195 U. S., 138.
The Court also held that the Philippine Islands was not a “foreign country,” citing The Diamond Rings, 183 U. S., 176.
The Court relied on United States cases to describe the Philippines as a territory of the United States over which civil government could be established, and it analogized the Philippines to Porto Rico, citing De Lima vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 1.
The Court cited further United States holdings that Porto Rico was not foreign and that federal law covering “territories” included Porto Rico, citing American Railroad Co. of Porto Rico vs. Didricksen, 227 U. S., 145.
The Court referenced that Porto Rico, Hawaii, and Alaska had been incorporated as organized territories, citing Muratti vs. Foote, 25 Porto Rico, 527; Hawaii vs. Mankichi, 190 U. S., 197; Rasmussen vs. U. S., 197 U. S., 516.
The Court cited an Attorney-General opinion stating that although the Philippines was not incorporated in the United States, it was still a territory of the United States to the extent Congress had assumed to legislate for it, citing 30 Op. Atty.-Gen., U. S., 462, reversing 24 Op. Atty.-Gen., U. S., 549.
The Court cited that the Philippines was not “another country” within the meaning of a treaty, referencing Faber vs. U. S., 221 U. S., 649.
The Court used Chief Justice Marshall’s observation on “United States” as a composite of states and territories to support a broad reading, citing Loughborough vs. Blake, 5 Wheat, 317, at p. 319.
The Court reasoned that the phrase “any state or territory of the American Union” suggested a sweeping intention to include all United States territory subdivisions, as contrasted with foreign country status.
The Court rejected a narrow limitation to only organized territories, stating the New York courts’ likely intent based on the full phrase used.
The Court concluded that, in the absence of authoritative New York guidance on the precise point, the Court could conclude that the Philippine Islands fell within the comity basis contemplated by New York’s paragraph one.

Common Law Jurisprudence Alternative

In the alternative, the Court considered whether comity existed under the New York rule’s paragraph two, which referred to a jurisdiction whose jurisprudence was based on the principles of the English Common Law.
The Court framed the inquiry as whether the Philippines’ present jurisprudence rested on English Common Law principles.
The Court noted that the question was partly one of legal characterization that the Court itself could answer.
The Court treated “jurisprudence” as the ground-work of written law and as the “science of law,” and it referenced Bouvier’s definition to distinguish jurisprudence from the narrower concept of mere case law.
The Court inferred that the New York court likely treated the jurisprudence of a jurisdiction as based on English Common Law principles if th