Sevilla vs. Cardenas

Factual Background

The petitioner alleged that on May 19, 1969 he and respondent went to Manila City Hall and, before a certain Reverend Cirilo D. Gonzales, executed a civil marriage contract that bore the annotation of Marriage License No. 2770792. Petitioner denied that he applied for or obtained any marriage license. The parties also executed a religious marriage contract on May 31, 1969 at the Most Holy Redeemer Parish before Monsignor Juan Velasco, which likewise referenced the same marriage license number. The couple lived together, lived abroad for a time, produced two children, began living apart in 1976, separated in 1978, and petitioner secured a United States divorce in 1981 and subsequently a judicial separation of their conjugal partnership in 1983. Petitioner filed the present complaint in 1994 seeking a declaration that the parties’ marriage was null and void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.

Trial Court Findings and Ruling

The Regional Trial Court accepted petitioner’s evidence that the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan issued certifications stating that Marriage License No. 2770792 was not issued by that office. The trial court found that those certifications had probative value under Section 28, Rule 132, Rules of Court and that the absence of a valid marriage license, being an essential requisite under Article 53 of the Civil Code, rendered the marriages void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3). The RTC thus declared both the civil solemnization of May 19, 1969 and the religious ceremony of May 31, 1969 null and void, ordered cancellation of the marriage record in the Local Civil Registry of Manila, and directed recording and notification in accordance with Article 52 of the Family Code.

Court of Appeals Decision

On appeal the Court of Appeals reversed. It observed that the certifications from the Local Civil Registrar contained language indicating that the office had “failed to locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is registered” and that the custodian of that record had retired. The appellate court held that the presumption of regularity of official acts, as explained in People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 106025, February 9, 1994, prevailed until overcome by clear and convincing evidence. The Court of Appeals found the failure to produce the logbook attributable to the registry’s inability to locate records, and not necessarily to the nonexistence of the license. The Court of Appeals therefore declined to annul the parties’ marriage on the basis of the certifications and emphasized the strong presumption favoring the validity and indissolubility of marriage.

Issues Presented to the Supreme Court

The petitioner raised chiefly three issues: whether a valid marriage license was issued in accordance with law; whether the Court of Appeals correctly applied the presumption of regularity of official acts to the issuance of the marriage license that appeared on the marriage contracts; and whether respondent could invoke the presumption of validity of marriage arising from the parties’ admitted cohabitation and conduct as husband and wife.

Legal Analysis and Reasoning

The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals. It recognized that under the Civil Code a marriage license is an essential requisite for the validity of a marriage, citing Articles 53, 58, and 80. The Court reviewed precedents such as Carino v. Carino, G.R. No. 132529, and Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103047, which accord probative value to a certification by a local civil registrar that, after diligent search, no entry exists. The Court scrutinized the three certifications issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan (March 11, 1994; September 20, 1994; July 25, 2000) and found material differences in their tenor. The first two certifications contained language implying that the office could not exert its “full force” to locate the record because of its “loaded work” and did not state categorically that the license never existed. Testimony by the registry’s representative confirmed that the logbook could not be located because the employee handling it had retired and that that employee’s testimony was not produced. The Court held that such documentary and testimonial facts rebutted the presumption that the Local Civil Registrar had regularly performed his official duty in making an exhaustive search. The Court relied on Rule 131, Sec. 3(m) to recognize that the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed is disputable and may be overcome. The Court further held that the absence of the logbook was not conclusive proof of nonissuance; it could simply mean the logbook could not be found. In the light of these circumstances the Court found that the certifications did not establish the nonissuance of the license with the requisite certainty contemplated by Section 28, Rule 132.

The Court also emphasized the strong judicial preference for upholding the validity of marriage and the constitutional policy to protect and strengthen the family under the 1987 Constitution. It reiterated that every intendment of the law leans toward validating matrimony and that the presumption that persons deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered a lawful contract is of great weight. The Court noted the parties’ long cohabitation, the birth of two children