Case Summary (G.R. No. 172678)
Factual Background
Petitioner was alleged to have contracted a second marriage with Ma. Lourdes Unson on February 15, 1975, while his prior marriage to Virginia C. Nievera remained valid and subsisting. Petitioner produced the second marriage contract as Annex "K" to his petition. Petitioner did not deny his coverture with Virginia C. Nievera. The second marriage entry bears Entry No. 1572, Book No. 36, pages 96–97, and was recorded in the local civil register in 1975. The offended spouse alleged that she discovered the bigamous marriage in July 1991.
Trial Court Proceedings
An information for bigamy was filed against petitioner on May 26, 1992, as Criminal Case No. 92582, RTC-Pasig. Petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground of prescription. On October 1, 1992, the respondent judge denied the motion to quash. The judge denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on October 27, 1992. Petitioner then sought relief from the Court of Appeals.
Court of Appeals Proceedings
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals, challenging the trial court orders denying his motion to quash and motion for reconsideration. In a decision penned by Justice Gloria C. Paras, with Justices Luis L. Victor and Fermin A. Martin, Jr., concurring, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit on January 21, 1993. The appellate court reasoned that the rule of constructive notice applicable in certain civil and property cases should not be applied to the crime of bigamy.
Issue Presented
The principal legal issue was whether the prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy began to run from the date of registration of the second marriage in the civil registry in 1975 under the doctrine of constructive notice, or from the date of discovery of the crime by the offended party, authorities, or their agents.
Parties' Contentions
Petitioner argued that registration of the second marriage made the fact of marriage a matter of public record and thus constituted constructive notice to the whole world. Petitioner maintained that prescription should have commenced from the 1975 registration and that the information filed in 1992 was therefore time-barred. Petitioner further contended that there was no concealment because the marriage was publicly recorded and open to inspection. The prosecution maintained that prescription for bigamy does not run from the date of registration but from the date of discovery by the offended party, which it placed in July 1991.
Supreme Court's Legal Reasoning
The Court observed that bigamy under Art. 349 is a punishable offense carrying an afflictive penalty and that the crime prescribes in 15 years under Art. 90, par. 3. The Court noted that Art. 91 provides that prescription commences to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents. The Court agreed that the doctrine of constructive notice has been applied in criminal cases involving property disputes, citing People v. Reyes and People v. Dinsay, but declined to extend that doctrine to bigamy. The Court reasoned that bigamous marriages are typically contracted in secrecy by the offender who conceals the prior subsisting marriage from the officiating authority, the legitimate spouse, and the public. The Court emphasized the practical difficulty that an offended spouse or the authorities would face in verifying records nationwide to detect a second marriage. The Court further observed that Sec. 52, P.D. 1529 provides for constructive notice only in the context of registered land transactions, and that there is no counterpart provision in Act No. 3753 or in Arts. 407 to 413 of the Civil Code to support a rule of constructive notice for documents registered in the civil registry. The Court concluded that to compute prescription for bigamy from the date of registration would effectively immunize many offenders because they typically conceal the second marriage and rely on the unlikelihood of discovery by the offended spouse.
Ruling
The Court affirm
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Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 172678)
Parties and Procedural Posture
- JOSE C. SERMONIA, PETITIONER was charged by information with the crime of bigamy in Crim. Case No. 92582 before the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, BR. 151.
- The information alleged that petitioner contracted a second marriage with Ma. Lourdes Unson on 15 February 1975 while his prior marriage to Virginia C. Nievera remained valid and subsisting.
- The presiding judge, HON. DEOGRACIAS FELIZARDO, denied petitioner's motion to quash on 1 October 1992 and denied his motion for reconsideration on 27 October 1992.
- Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ELEVENTH DIVISION, which dismissed the petition in a decision dated 21 January 1993.
- Petitioner brought the present recourse to the Supreme Court seeking reversal of the Court of Appeals decision and dismissal of the prosecution on the ground of prescription.
Key Factual Allegations
- The second marriage of petitioner to Ma. Lourdes Unson was solemnized on 15 February 1975 and the corresponding marriage contract was recorded as Entry No. 1572, Book No. 36 in the local Civil Registry.
- The information for bigamy was filed on 26 May 1992, more than fifteen years after the date of the second marriage.
- Petitioner did not deny his prior marriage to Virginia C. Nievera and submitted the second marriage contract as Annex "K" to his petition.
- The prosecution asserted that discovery of the bigamous marriage by the offended party occurred in July 1991, after which the prescriptive period began to run.
Issues Presented
- The principal issue was whether the crime of bigamy was already prescribed when the information was filed in 1992.
- The dispositive legal question was whether the prescriptive period for bigamy commences from the date of the commission of the offense or from the date on which the offended party had actual or constructive discovery of the subsequent marriage.
- A subsidiary issue was whether registration of the subsequent marriage in the Civil Register constituted constructive notice that would commence prescription against the accused.
Contentions of Petitioner
- Petitioner contended that the registration of his second marriage in 1975 made the fact of such marriage a matter of public record and therefore constituted constructive notice to the whole world.
- Petitioner argued that constructive notice triggered the running of the fifteen-year prescriptive period from 1975 so that the prosecution should have been instituted on or before 1990.
- Petitioner further asserted that there was no concealment because the second marriage was publicly held at Our Lady of Nativity Church in Marikina and the marriage contract was open to inspection in the Civil Registry.
Contentions of Prosecution and Court Below
- The prosecution maintained that prescription began to run only from the time the offense was discovered by the offended party, which it alleged occurred in July 1991.
- The Court of Appeals held that the doctrine of constructive notice was inapplicable to the