Title
Securities and Exchange Commission vs. Commission on Audit
Case
G.R. No. 252198
Decision Date
Apr 27, 2021
SEC's use of retained income for provident fund contributions disallowed by COA for violating GAA 2010 restrictions; officers not liable due to good faith, no malice.
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 252198)

Factual Background

The SEC established a provident fund for its officials and employees by Resolution No. 31, Series of 2002 and subsequently approved a fifteen percent counterpart contribution of the Commission to the provident fund by SEC-EXS Resolution No. 144, Series of 2003, to be sourced from retained income under Section 75 of the SRC, with employee contribution set at three percent. The Department of Budget and Management issued a letter dated August 19, 2004 advising that the utilization of SEC retained income was left to the discretion of the Commission, subject to accounting and auditing rules, and the SEC approved annual allocation of its provident fund counterpart from retained income by SEC-EXS Resolution No. 137, Series of 2004.

Disbursements at Issue

For fiscal year 2010 the SEC allocated P81,000,000.00 for salary differentials and other personnel benefits from retained income and disbursed P19,723,444.66 as the Commission’s counterpart contribution to the provident fund by a series of checks dated January to December 2010. COA auditors thereafter issued Notice of Disallowance No. 11-003-101-(10) dated December 10, 2011 disallowing the P19,723,444.66 on grounds that the disbursement was inconsistent with Special Provision No. 1 of GAA 2010, contravened PD 1177 and pertinent laws governing appropriations and pay scales, and exceeded the permissible use of retained income.

Proceedings before COA-NGS Cluster 2

The SEC appealed to COA-NGS Cluster 2, contending that its retained income was an off-budget account under Section 75 of the SRC, that the DBM letter and SEC resolutions authorized the use of retained income for the provident fund, that the GAA 2010 did not negate the SEC’s discretion, and that the officers acted in good faith. COA-DTI defended the disallowance, arguing that retained income remained subject to auditing requirements and that Special Provision No. 1 of GAA 2010 limited the use of retained income to augmentation of MOOE and Capital Outlay, and that payments for contributions to provident funds are chargeable to Personal Services under the GAA. By Decision No. 2013-004 dated April 1, 2013, COA-NGS Cluster 2 affirmed the disallowance but absolved the SEC employees of refund obligations on account of honest belief in entitlement.

Ruling of the COA En Banc

On automatic review the COA En Banc issued Decision No. 2018-010 dated January 17, 2018 affirming with modification the COA-NGS ruling. The COA En Banc affirmed the disallowance of P19,723,444.66 for using retained income for provident fund contributions and held the approving, certifying and authorizing SEC officers solidarily liable to return the full disallowed amount, while reiterating that the SEC personnel need not refund the amounts they received.

Petition to the Supreme Court

The SEC filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 64, alleging that COA acted with grave abuse of discretion in disallowing the P19,723,444.66 because the amount was drawn from SEC retained income under Section 75 of the SRC, which made the funds off-budget and subject to the Commission’s discretion; the SEC maintained that the GAA 2010 should be read with the SRC as a special law and that Special Provision No. 1 did not divest the SEC of its authority. The Office of the Solicitor General countered that SEC discretion was limited by auditing requirements and that COA properly applied the law.

Issues Presented

The Court identified and addressed two threshold issues: first, whether COA Decision No. 2018-010 validly disallowed the allocation and payment of P19,723,444.66 to the provident fund; and second, whether the approving, certifying, and authorizing SEC officials were liable to refund the disallowed amount.

Legal Analysis on the Disallowance

The Court applied the plain meaning rule of statutory construction to Section 75 of the SRC, observing that the provision authorizes retention and utilization of up to P100,000,000.00 but expressly subjects the use of such additional amount to the “auditing requirements, standards and procedures under existing laws.” The Court concluded that one such existing law was Special Provision No. 1 of the GAA 2010, which limited the use of the P100,000,000.00 retained income “to augment the MOOE and Capital Outlay requirements of the Commission.” The Court analyzed the statutory definitions and DBM glossary for MOOE and Capital Outlay and determined that payments to a provident fund constituted an item properly classified as Personal Services rather than MOOE or Capital Outlay. The Court therefore held that the SEC’s use of retained income to fund its fifteen percent counterpart contribution to the provident fund violated the plain terms of Special Provision No. 1 and warranted COA’s disallowance.

Rules on Return and Their Application

The Court reviewed its jurisprudence on return of disallowed amounts as articulated in Madera, et al. v. COA and refined in Abellanosa v. COA, reiterating that approving and certifying officers who acted in good faith and with due diligence are not civilly liable to return absent bad faith, malice, or gross negligence, while payee-recipients are generally liable under solutio indebiti subject to limited exceptions where amounts were genuinely given in consideration of services rendered or where equity, undue prejudice, or social justice demand excusal. Applying those principles, the Court found no evidence that the approving, certifying, and authorizing SEC officers acted with malice, bad faith, or gross negligence. The Court weighed factors indicative of good faith: the longstanding practice since 2004 of SEC contributions to the provident fund without prior disallowance; the DBM letter of August 19, 2004 advising discretion over retained income; absence of prior audit findings; and the officers’ honest belief that they were effectuating Section 7.2 of the SRC to adopt a compensation plan comparable to government financial institutions. These circumstances, the Court held, negated culpable state of mi

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