Title
Sarmiento vs. Javellana
Case
G.R. No. 18500
Decision Date
Oct 2, 1922
Defendant refused return of pledged jewelry despite repayment offer; court ruled for plaintiff, mandating return or payment of P12,000 upon loan settlement.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 18500)

Factual Background

On August 28, 1911, the defendant lent the plaintiffs P1,500 at an interest rate of 25 per cent per annum for one year. As security the plaintiffs pledged several pieces of jewelry, which the parties appraised at P4,000. The loan was evidenced by two written instruments (Exhibits A and 1) showing an amount of P1,875, inclusive of one year’s interest. When the loan matured, plaintiffs alleged that defendant agreed to an extension such that the indebtedness would continue to draw interest at 25 per cent per annum so long as the pledged jewels sufficed to secure principal and accrued interest. In August, 1919, Eusebio, accompanied by Carlos M. Dreyfus, went to defendant’s house with P11,000 to redeem the jewels, but defendant refused, saying the redemption period had elapsed. Plaintiffs renewed their offer to pay and redeem but were again refused.

Defendant’s Account

The defendant acknowledged the original pledge but asserted that at maturity he demanded payment because he needed funds to purchase land. He alleged that about one month after maturity Filomena offered to sell him the pledged jewels for P3,000, that he said he would consult his brother, and that on the third day he paid Filomena P1,125, the remainder after deducting the plaintiffs’ loan, thus constituting a purchase.

Procedural History and Trial Findings

Plaintiffs sued to compel return of the pledged jewels or their value upon payment of the indebtedness and interest. The trial court accepted evidence valuing the jewels at P12,000 and rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs in the terms later described. The defendant appealed. The Supreme Court reviewed the record and affirmed the judgment below. The defendant thereafter moved for reconsideration, which the Court denied on April 4, 1923.

The Parties’ Contentions on Appeal

The plaintiffs contended that the pledge continued under the extension and that they had the right to redeem upon payment of the debt and accrued interest. The defendant contended that the jewels had been sold to him by Filomena and that, alternatively, plaintiffs’ action had prescribed. The defendant relied on testimony and the asserted payment to Filomena as proof of sale and maintained that prescription barred the action.

The Court’s Findings on Evidence

The Court found that the defendant failed to prove a valid sale. The testimony of the defendant stood against Filomena’s positive denial and required strong corroboration, which the Court found lacking. The testimony of Jose Sison did not furnish such corroboration because his presence in the defendant’s house for three days appeared coincidental and implausible. The Court also observed that the defendant continued to retain Exhibits A and 1, the written instruments evidencing the loan and pledge, a circumstance inconsistent with a bona fide purchase by Filomena and tending to show the absence of sale. The Court therefore concluded that the jewels remained pledged to the defendant and had not been sold.

Valuation and Relief Ordered

The trial court’s valuation of the jewels at P12,000 was accepted by the Supreme Court on the record. The Court held that, because the jewels were in the defendant’s possession as pledge to secure a P1,500 loan with interest at 25 per cent per annum from August 28, 1911, and because the defendant extended the loan under the condition stated, the plaintiffs were entitled to recover the jewels or their value upon payment of the indebtedness. The Court declared that the plaintiffs could demand return of the jewels upon payment of P1,500 plus interest at 25 per cent per annum from August 28, 1911. The judgment below was affirmed without special pronouncement as to costs.

Legal Basis and Reasoning on Prescription and Accrual

In the resolution on the motion for reconsideration the Court addressed the defendant’s prescription defense. The Court treated the contract of loan with pledge as a valid written contract. It reasoned that the creditor’s duty to return the pledged thing upon fulfillment of the principal obligation is essential to the contract of pledge and therefore the right to demand return is covered by the written instrument. Accordingly, the action to enforce that right falls under the ten-year prescriptive period of section 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court rejected the defendant’s contention that the plaintiffs’ action accrued on the date of contract execution, August 28, 1911. Relying on article 1128 of the Civil Code, the Court held that where a term is fixed it is presumed to have been established for the benefit of both creditor and debtor unless the tenor or circumstances show otherwise. In a loan with interest the term benefits both parties; the plaintiffs had no right to pay before the one-year term without the defendant’s consent because prepayment would deprive the creditor of agreed interest. Therefore the action to recover the pledged thing did not accrue until the loan’s maturity, August 31, 1912. Counting from that date to the filing of the complaint on October 9, 1920, the ten-year period had not elapsed. The Court further o

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