Case Summary (G.R. No. 236827)
Key Dates and Procedural Posture
Relevant procedural events included filing of the petition for prohibition, intervention by the Commission on Appointments, filing of comments and replies, and oral argument (record reflects argument on 8 December 1987). The Court took the case on the merits and resolved it promptly because of public interest and the need for administrative stability; the decision addresses constitutional interpretation of Article VII, Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution.
Applicable Constitutional Provision
Article VII, Section 16, 1987 Constitution: the President “shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions or boards. The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress … but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.”
Framework Adopted by the Court: Four Groups of Appointees
The Court classified presidential appointees under Section 16 into four groups: (1) the first group—those expressly requiring CA consent (heads of executive departments, ambassadors/public ministers/consuls, certain military officers, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution); (2) all other officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; (3) officers whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and (4) officers lower in rank whose appointment Congress may, by law, vest in the President, courts, or heads of departments. The principal question: which of these groups require CA confirmation?
Interpretive Method and Historical Context Considered
The Court applied established principles of constitutional construction — give effect to framers’ intent embodied in the text, and construe provisions against limits on executive power unless clearly imposed. The decision examined historical antecedents: the 1935 Constitution generally required CA confirmation for most presidential appointments; the 1973 Constitution centralized appointment power in the executive (parliamentary context). The 1987 framers, the Court found from the text and the 1986 Constitutional Commission records, reflected a deliberate “middle ground” limiting CA’s confirmatory role compared with 1935 but restoring checks absent under 1973.
Deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission as Evidence of Intent
The Court relied on the recorded debates of the Constitutional Commission showing amendments to the draft Section 16: deletion of “and bureaus” (removing bureau heads from the list requiring CA confirmation) and other textual adjustments to clarify that certain appointments need not be confirmed. The debates show an expressed desire to narrow the CA’s confirmatory scope so that not all presidential appointments would require CA consent. The Commission’s acceptance of proposals (and the context of those proposals) was used as persuasive evidence of the framers’ intent.
Textual Distinctions and the Meaning of “Also”
The majority emphasized the different language between the first sentence (which expressly addresses nomination and appointment “with the consent” of the CA) and the second sentence (which speaks only of the President’s power to “appoint” other officers). The Court reasoned that this deliberate difference in wording indicates that the second and third groups of officers (and officers lower in rank, as addressed in the third sentence) are appointive by the President without prior CA confirmation. The word “also” in the second sentence was interpreted in context as not mandating “in like manner” the nomination-plus-confirmation process required by the first sentence; alternative dictionary meanings and contextual usage supported the majority’s reading.
Treatment of the Third Sentence and the Word “Alone”
The Court addressed an argument that the phrase “President alone” in the third sentence implies that, absent a law, appointments of lower-ranked officers require CA confirmation. The majority treated the word “alone” as a drafting lapsus imported from the 1935 text and concluded the third sentence was intended merely to state that Congress may, by law, vest appointment of lower-ranked officers in the President, courts, or departmental heads. Because the second sentence already vests appointment power in the President for many officers, the “alone” is redundant and cannot override the clear intent that appointments outside the first-sentence list need not be CA-confirmed.
Statutory Interaction: Customs Commissioner Appointment Authority
The Court examined existing statutory law governing the Bureau of Customs. RA No. 1937 (Tariff and Customs Code) initially provided that the Assistant Commissioner was appointed by the department head; PD No. 34 (1972) amended Section 601 to provide that the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner “shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines.” The Court held that, under the 1987 Constitution, those statutes must be read in harmony with Article VII, Section 16: the statutory authorization for the President to appoint the Customs Commissioner means the appointment is within presidential power and, in light of Section 16’s scheme, no longer requires CA confirmation.
Holding
The Court held that the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is not among the officers whose appointment requires prior confirmation by the Commission on Appointments under Article VII, Section 16. Accordingly, the President validly appointed Salvador Mison as Commissioner of Customs without CA confirmation. The petition for prohibition (and the petition-in-intervention) was dismissed; Mison was entitled to perform the functions of the office and to receive salaries and emoluments.
Remedies and Immediate Consequences
Because the Court sustained the presidential appointment, the requested injunctive relief to prevent Mison from exercising authority and to restrain budget disbursements was denied; the payroll disbursements by the Department of Budget for Mison’s salary were therefore permissible under the holding.
Concurrences: Emphasis on Language and Executive Prerogative
Concurring opinions (Justices Melencio-Herrera, Sarmiento, Chief Justice Teehankee, and others) largely agreed with the majority’s t
...continue readingCase Syllabus (G.R. No. 236827)
Court and Citation
- Supreme Court of the Philippines, En Banc.
- Reported at 240 Phil. 505; G.R. No. 79974.
- Decision date: December 17, 1987.
- Opinion of the Court by Justice Padilla; judgment dismissing petition and petition in intervention.
- Concurrences by Justices Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Cortes; Chief Justice Teehankee (brief statement); Justices Melencio-Herrera and Sarmiento (concurring separately).
- Dissenting opinion by Justice Cruz; joined by Justice Gutierrez, Jr.; Justice Cruz authored a detailed dissent; Justice Gutierrez, Jr. filed a separate dissenting opinion.
Procedural Posture and Relief Sought
- Petitioners: taxpayers, lawyers, Integrated Bar members and Constitutional Law professors — Ulpiano P. Sarmiento III and Juanito G. Arcilla.
- Respondents: Salvador Mison (in his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs) and Guillermo Carague (as Secretary of the Department of Budget).
- Intervenor: Commission on Appointments.
- Nature of action: Petition for prohibition to enjoin:
- Respondent Mison from performing functions as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs; and
- Respondent Carague from making disbursements to pay Mison’s salaries and emoluments.
- Principal ground asserted by petitioners: Mison’s appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional because it was not confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
- Respondents contend Mison’s appointment without prior confirmation by the Commission on Appointments was constitutional.
- The Court, in the interest of public stability and public interest, gave due course to the petition and decided the constitutional question, setting aside finer procedural questions on whether prohibition was the proper remedy and whether petitioners had standing.
- The Court allowed the Commission on Appointments to intervene and to file a petition in intervention; comment and reply were filed; oral argument heard December 8, 1987.
Factual Background Relevant to the Constitutional Question
- Respondent Salvador Mison was directly appointed by the President as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs without prior confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
- Petitioners sought to enjoin him and to prevent payment of his salary and emoluments.
- Statutory history relevant to the Bureau of Customs appointment:
- Original Sec. 601 of Republic Act No. 1937 (Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, enacted 22 June 1957) provided for a Commissioner and Assistant Commissioner; Assistant Commissioner was appointed by the proper department head.
- Sec. 601 was amended by Presidential Decree No. 34 (27 October 1972) to read that the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of Customs "shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines."
- These statutes were enacted and promulgated initially under the 1935 Constitution.
Constitutional Provision at Issue (Text and Structure)
- Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution (as quoted in the decision):
- "The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions or boards. The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress."
- The Court parsed Section 16 into four groups of officers for purposes of analysis:
- First group: heads of executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution — expressly appointed "with the consent of the Commission on Appointments" after nomination.
- Second group: "all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law."
- Third group: those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint.
- Fourth group: "officers lower in rank" whose appointment Congress may, by law, vest in the President alone, or in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions or boards.
Issue(s) Presented
- Primary constitutional issue: Whether the President may validly appoint Salvador Mison as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs without submitting the nomination to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation, i.e., whether the appointment required prior consent of the Commission on Appointments under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
- Subsidiary issues the Court noted but set aside for decision’s purposes:
- Whether prohibition is the proper remedy to test Mison’s right to the office.
- Whether the petitioners had standing to bring the suit.
- Related interpretive questions:
- Whether the first sentence of Section 16 exhaustively lists officers requiring Commission on Appointments consent (expressio unius est exclusio alterius).
- Whether the second sentence’s use of the word "also" or its omission of "nominate" implies that officers in the second and third groups must be confirmed in the same way as the first group.
- Effect and meaning of the third sentence’s use of the word "alone" after "President."
Legal and Historical Context Considered by the Court
- Comparative constitutional background considered by the Court:
- 1935 Constitution (Sec. 10, Art. VII): required the President, upon nomination and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, to appoint virtually all presidential appointees (including heads of executive departments and bureaus; officers of the army from colonel; Navy/Air Force from rank of captain or commander; and all other officers whose appointments were not otherwise provided for).
- 1973 Constitution (Sec. 10): vested appointment power more absolutely in the President (reflecting parliamentary/authoritarian features) and allowed the Batasang Pambansa to vest appointment of inferior officers in various entities.
- The Court observed the two historical extremes — 1935 (broad Commission on Appointments confirmation) and 1973 (very limited legislative check) — and concluded the 1987 framers and the people adopted a middle ground.
- The Court relied on the recorded deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission (extensive quotations provided) to determine framers’ intent, noting specific amendments and votes (notably deletion of the words "and bureaus" and the drafting choices to restrict Commission on Appointments’ reach).
- Precedent and interpretive guidance cited in the opinion:
- Gold Creek Mining Corp. v. Rodriguez — fundamental principle: give effect to the intent of framers as expressed in constitutional provisions.
- Barry v. Truax and other authorities on presumption that framers acted with awareness of prior laws.
- Judge Learned Hand’s aphorism that "words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition" referenced for textual interpretation.
Arguments Advanced by Key Parties and Amici (as stated in the record)
- Petitioners:
- Asserted Mison’s appointment unconstitutional because it was not confirmed by the Commission on Appointments; sought prohibition and to enjoin salary payments.
- Respondents (Mison and Carague):
- Maintain constitutionality of Mison’s appointment without Commission on Appointments’ confirmation; President acted within constitutional authority.
- Intervenor (Commission on Appointments):
- Emphasized the third sentence (Congress may, by law, vest appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone) and argued that because a law is needed to vest such appointments in the President alone, then absence of such law would imply lower-ranked officers must be appointed subject to confirmation — implying that higher-ranked officers likewise should require confirmation in absence of such law.
- Amicus curiae (Senator Neptali Gonzales):
- Argued that the word "also" in the second sentence implies the President shall "in like manner" appoint the officers mentioned there, meaning with nomination and confirmation by the Commission on Appointments (i.e., that the second sentence was not a