G.R. No. 139524 - Santos vs. Santos

Case Summary (G.R. No. 139524)

Factual Background

The controversy concerned a 391 square meter parcel known as the Isidra property in San Mateo, Rizal, originally owned by Isidra M. Santos, who died intestate and without issue on April 1, 1967. She was survived by her two brothers, Ladislao and Eliseo Santos. The adjacent and larger holdings appeared in cadastral Lot 1522. Tax declarations relating to the Isidra property show successive changes: Tax Declaration No. 1115 in Isidra’s name (effective 1966), Tax Declaration No. 7892 in the names of Virgilio and Virginia Santos (issued September 9, 1969), later cancellations and reissuances, and finally Tax Declaration No. 04-0566 under Philip C. Santos (effective 1981) following a purported Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Virgilio Santos on December 16, 1980. Family transactions and an application for registration of Lots 1522 and 2433 culminated in a 1986 RTC decision that issued an Original Certificate of Title over Lot 1522 to Noe Santos and others and to Eliseo Santos, and in 1987 a partition agreement subdivided Lot 1522 into Lot 1522‑A (3,000 sq.m.) and Lot 1522‑B (3,387 sq.m.), the former adjudicated to Eliseo.

Trial Court Proceedings

On May 13, 1993, Ladislao Santos, through his attorney-in-fact, filed a complaint for judicial partition seeking a division of the intestate estate of the late Isidra and the declaration null and void of the tax declarations and the Deed of Sale relied upon by petitioners. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint, finding that the plaintiff failed to prove entitlement to relief and that acquisitive prescription may already have set in. The trial court emphasized that the subject property was reflected only in the tax declaration under Isidra; that co-ownership by inheritance was not reflected in the assessor’s records; that petitioners failed to prove fraud or misrepresentation in the cancellation and reissuance of tax declarations; and that many assessment records were unavailable because of a fire that gutted the Provincial Assessor’s Office.

Court of Appeals Ruling

The Court of Appeals granted the appeal and reversed the trial court. It declared that Ladislao Santos and Eliseo Santos were each entitled to twelve pro indiviso shares in the Isidra property and ordered the trial court to effect partition conformably with Rule 69, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The appellate court based its ruling on the insufficiency of petitioners’ proof to show exclusive title by means of the alleged Combined Deed of Partition or other original instruments, and on the principle that secondary evidence was not properly admissible in the absence of proof of loss or unavailability of originals.

Issues Presented

The petition to the Supreme Court raised several questions which the Court consolidated into two principal issues: (1) whether the transfers of the Isidra property first to Virgilio Santos and later to Philip C. Santos were valid and regular; and (2) whether the action for partition was barred by ordinary acquisitive prescription of ten years or by estoppel through laches.

Parties’ Contentions

Petitioners contended that the transfer sequence was lawful, relying on tax declarations and testimonial proof of a document authorizing cancellation of the tax declaration in Isidra’s name and the issuance of a new declaration in Virgilio’s name; they asserted that Philip was a buyer in good faith and that the passage of time and uninterrupted possession established acquisitive prescription and laches. The respondent maintained that co-ownership between Ladislao and Eliseo subsisted; that petitioners failed to produce the original Combined Deed of Partition or other documentary proof required by Section 3, Rule 130; that tax declarations do not vest ownership; and that prescription and laches did not bar a co-owner from seeking partition.

Evidentiary Posture on the Alleged Deed

The petitioners relied chiefly on testimonial accounts and an annotation in the tax declaration indicating cancellation by Tax Declaration No. 7892. Testimony was adduced from Virginia Santos, Philip, and the municipal assessor, Rodolfo Bautista, concerning the existence of a document. The Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court emphasized the best-evidence rule under Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court, and concluded that the alleged original deed was not produced, that the offerors failed to establish the loss, destruction, or unavailability of all originals, and that testimonial accounts were therefore, at most, inadmissible secondary evidence.

Supreme Court’s Ruling

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals in toto. The Court held that petitioners failed to overcome the presumption of co-ownership between Ladislao and Eliseo. It ruled that the purported Combined Deed of Partition or transfer document was not proved by the best evidence and that tax declarations and tax receipts were not conclusive proof of ownership. The Court ordered the trial court to effect partition in conformity with Rule 69, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Legal Basis and Reasoning — Best Evidence and Tax Declarations

The Court applied the best-evidence rule strictly and noted that before secondary evidence is admissible to prove the contents of a writing, an offeror must establish (a) the execution and existence of the original, (b) loss or destruction of the original or its non-production without bad faith, and (c) that non-availability is not due to bad faith. The Court observed that a notary public is required to retain copies and that petitioners did not pursue available avenues to produce the notarial copy, such as subpoenaing Atty. Sixto Natividad or the Notarial Section records. The Court further held that a tax declaration is not conclusive of ownership, citing the rule that tax records and receipts do not constitute adequate evidence of title.

Evidence from the Municipal Assessor

The Court found that the municipal assessor witness, Rodolfo Bautista, disclaimed knowledge of the nature of the particular document that had been filed with the Provincial Assessor and thus his testimony did not establish the existence or contents of the alleged Combined Deed of Partition. The mere annotation on a tax declaration indicating cancellation and a new tax declaration in another name did not identify the instrument used or the parties thereto.

Prescription and Laches Analysis

Addressing the prescription contention, the Court applied Article 494, Civil Code, and held that prescription does not run in favor of a co-owner against his co-owners so long as the latter expressly or impliedly recognize the co-ownership. The Court followed Adile vs. Court of Appeals and related authorities to require clear and conclusive evidence of repudiation and open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession before prescription can extinguish a co-owner’s rights. The Court found no such repudiation by Eliseo, and it concluded that possession by Virgilio and later by Philip was tolerated and did not constitute ouster. The Court also held that an action for partition is imprescriptible and that laches did not bar Ladislao from demanding partition.

Application of the Principle Nemo Dat Quod

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 139524)

Parties and Procedural Posture

Petitioners PHILIP C. SANTOS AND HEIRS OF ELISEO M. SANTOS filed a petition under Rule 45 seeking review of a Court of Appeals decision reversing the trial court and declaring partition rights in the Isidra property.
Respondent LADISLAO M. SANTOS represented herein by his attorney-in-fact NOE M. SANTOS was the plaintiff below who sought judicial partition of the Isidra property.
The action below was an original complaint for judicial partition filed in the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Branch 76.
The trial court dismissed the complaint; the Court of Appeals reversed and awarded equal undivided shares; the present appeal sought review of the Court of Appeals’ Decision.
The Supreme Court entertained the appeal under Rule 45, Rules of Court and ultimately affirmed the Court of Appeals.

Key Factual Allegations

Isidra M. Santos died intestate and without issue on April 1, 1967, owning a parcel of land of approximately 391 square meters (the Isidra property).
The Isidra property was allegedly inherited by her two brothers, LADISLAO SANTOS (respondent) and ELISEO SANTOS (petitioner’s ancestor).
Tax Declaration No. 1115 in Isidra’s name was later annotated as cancelled and replaced by Tax Declaration No. 7892 in the names of VIRGILIO and VIRGINIA SANTOS dated September 9, 1969.
On December 16, 1980, VIRGILIO SANTOS executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of the Isidra property in favor of PHILIP SANTOS for P24,460.00, which was the basis for Tax Declaration No. 04-0566 in PHILIP SANTOS’s name effective 1981.
A cadastral and registration sequence produced Lot 1522 (6,340 sq.m.), subdivision into Lot 1522-A (3,000 sq.m.) and Lot 1522-B (3,387 sq.m.), and issuance of titles culminating in partition agreements among Noe Santos and siblings and ELISEO SANTOS.
The plaintiff filed for partition on May 13, 1993 after discovering the tax and title changes placing the Isidra property under PHILIP SANTOS’s name.

Procedural History

The Regional Trial Court dismissed Ladislao’s complaint for judicial partition for failure of proof and on the ground of acquisitive prescription.
The Court of Appeals (Special Tenth Division) granted the appeal, reversed the trial court, declared Ladislao and Eliseo each entitled to twelve pro indiviso shares in the Isidra property, and ordered partition in accordance with Rule 69 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Petitioners elevated the case to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 contesting the transfer validity and raising defenses of prescription and laches.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision in toto and remanded for partition in conformity with Rule 69.

Issues Presented

Whether the transfers of the Isidra property from Eliseo to Virgilio and subsequently to Philip were valid and regular.
Whether Ladislao’s action for partition was barred by ordinary acquisitive prescription, estoppel, or laches.
Whether Philip qualified as a buyer in good faith and for value.
Whether the tax declarations and assessor’s testimony sufficed to prove title and oust co-ownership.

Contentions of the Parties

Petitioners contended that the tax declaration entries and testimonial evidence established a valid transfer to Virgilio and a valid sale to Philip, who was a buyer in good faith and for value.
Petitioners also argued that possession by Virgilio and Philip accrued acquisitive prescription and that Ladislao was estopped by laches from seeking partition.
Respondent LADISLAO contended that co-ownership persisted, that the alleged Combined Deed of Partition or Deed of Transfer was not proved by original documentary evidence, and thus any subsequent transfers were ineffective against his co-ownership.

Court of Appeals’ Findings