Case Summary (G.R. No. 112019)
Facts
Leouel and Julia were civilly married on 20 September 1986 before a Municipal Trial Court judge in Iloilo City and subsequently had a church wedding. They lived with Julia’s parents. Their son was born on 18 July 1987. Julia left for the United States on 18 May 1988 to work as a nurse. She phoned Leouel once on 1 January 1989, promising to return after her contract expired in July 1989, but did not return and thereafter avoided contact. Leouel attempted to locate or contact her during a visit to the United States (10 April–25 August 1990) but failed. More than five years after Julia’s departure, Leouel filed an action to declare the marriage void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Procedural history
Leouel filed a complaint for "Voiding of Marriage Under Article 36" in the RTC of Negros Oriental (Civil Case No. 9814); summons to Julia was by publication. Julia answered and denied the allegations. The provincial prosecutor reported no collusion between the parties. After repeated failed pre‑trial settings, Julia filed a manifestation that she would neither appear nor submit evidence. The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Leouel elevated the case to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari. The Supreme Court denied the petition. The Court noted contemporaneously that the petition also failed to comply with Circular 28‑91 requiring a certification of non‑forum‑shopping.
Central legal issue
Whether the marriage of Leouel and Julia is void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code because Julia was, at the time of the celebration of the marriage, “psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations,” even though such incapacity may have become manifest only after solemnization.
Text and provenance of Article 36
Article 36 (as amended by E.O. No. 227) declares void ab initio any marriage contracted by a party who, at the time of solemnization, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with essential marital obligations, even if the incapacity becomes manifest later. The provision was adopted from Canon Law (cf. Canon 1095) and was the subject of extended deliberations by the Family Code Revision Committee; the Committee deliberately omitted a restrictive list of examples to allow case‑by‑case adjudication.
Legislative deliberations and intent
Committee debates reveal careful but divergent views: drafters distinguished psychological incapacity from vices of consent (insanity and defects in mental faculties) and considered it to mean an incapacity to assume essential marital obligations rather than a defect purely in consent. The Committee wrestled with issues of retroactivity, relationship to canon annulments, possible abuse, whether mental incapacity should be equated with vice of consent, and the desirability of prescribing a ten‑year period for filing actions. Members expressly intended the provision to address serious personality disorders or psychological anomalies that render a party unable to assume marital obligations, with judges to interpret the provision guided by experience and expert findings.
Elements and legal conception of "psychological incapacity"
The Court distilled the concept into core characteristics informed by legislative history, Canon Law commentary, and ecclesiastical tribunal practice: (a) gravity — the incapacity must be serious and show a true inability to fulfill essential marital obligations (cohabitation, love, respect, fidelity, mutual help and support, procreation and education of offspring); (b) juridical antecedence — it must exist at the time of the marriage (even if overt manifestations appear only later); and (c) incurability — or at least that cure would be beyond reasonable means. Psychological incapacity thus refers to a mental (not physical) disorder whose severity at the time of marriage deprived the party of the capacity to assume marital obligations. The Court emphasized that the term was not intended to encompass every psychosis, immaturity, or low intelligence, and that lesser mental defects ordinarily yield voidable marriage remedies or other Family Code remedies (e.g., Article 46, Article 55).
Relation to other Family Code provisions
Article 36 must be construed in context with other Family Code provisions. The Court explained that sexual impotence or physical incapacity to copulate is governed elsewhere and that other conditions (unsound mind, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality/lesbianism) may be voidable under Article 46 or grounds for legal separation under Article 55 if they arise after marriage. Nonetheless, depending on degree and severity, these conditions could be indicia of psychological incapacity. The law’s protective character toward marriage and family under the 1987 Constitution and Family Code (Article 1) was stressed as a fundamental policy constraint against indiscriminate application.
Evidentiary standards and role of experts
Because Article 36 lacks precise statutory examples, the Court instructed courts to evaluate claims on a case‑by‑case basis, taking into account experience and expert evidence from psychiatrists, psychologists, and professionals in psychological disciplines. Ecclesiastical tribunal decisions and canonical jurisprudence may be persuasive though not binding. The Court warned against precipitate or indiscriminate decrees of nullity and stressed careful, thorough assessment of the degree, antecedence, and incurability of the claimed incapacity.
Application to the present case
Applying the foregoing standards to the factual record, the Court found that the circumstances presented by Leouel — Julia’s departure for work abroad, infrequent communication, and ultimate nonreturn and noncommunication — did not establish the requisite grave psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage. The Court held that the factual setting did not meet the high threshold the provision contemplates: there was no convincing proof of a serious, antecedent, incurable psychological disorder that rendered Julia incapable, at the time of solemnization, of assuming essential marital obligations. Accordingly, the trial court’s dismissal and the Court of Appeals’ affirmance were upheld.
Procedural and ancillary rulings
The Supreme Court also observed procedural infirmity: the petition failed to comply with Circular 28‑91’s requirement for certification against forum‑shopping. The Court reiterated that absolute nullity of marriage under Article 36 can be invoked only by final judgment (consistent with draft Article 32) and that the action for declaration of absolute nullity is governed by the procedural safeguards and evidentiary rigor described.
Majority outcome and concurrence
The majority (opinion by Justice Vitug) denied the petition, concluding that the record lacked proof of Article 36 psychological incapacity. The opinion elaborated the interpretive framework, emphasizing gravity, antecedence, and incurability, and cited the Family Code Revision Committ
...continue readingCase Syllabus (G.R. No. 112019)
Procedural Posture and Parties
- Petitioner: Leouel Santos (hereinafter "Leouel"), then a First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army.
- Private respondent: Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos (hereinafter "Julia").
- Respondent: The Honorable Court of Appeals (respondent in the certiorari review).
- Nature of petition: Petition for review on certiorari seeking declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 (as amended by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July 1987) of the Family Code.
- Case citation and disposition: Reported at 310 Phil. 21; decided en banc, G.R. No. 112019, January 04, 1995. Majority opinion by Justice Vitug. Narvasa, C.J., and Justices Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quaison, Puno, Kapunan, and Mendoza concur. Justice Padilla dissents. Justice Feliciano on leave.
- Lower courts: Complaint filed in Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 30 (Civil Case No. 9814); dismissed by the trial court; decision affirmed by the Court of Appeals; petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court.
Facts
- Meeting and marriage:
- Leouel and Julia met in Iloilo City.
- They exchanged civil vows on 20 September 1986 before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed shortly thereafter by a church wedding.
- Early cohabitation and family relations:
- The couple lived with Julia’s parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City.
- Conflict arose, according to Leouel, from frequent interference by Julia’s parents into the spouses’ affairs and quarrels over when and where to live independently and over Leouel’s visits to his parents.
- Child:
- On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, christened Leouel Santos, Jr.
- Separation and communications:
- On 18 May 1988 Julia left for the United States to work as a nurse despite Leouel’s pleas.
- Julia called Leouel by long distance telephone for the first time seven months after her departure, on 01 January 1989, and promised to return after her contract expired in July 1989; she did not return.
- Leouel traveled to the United States for training from 10 April to 25 August 1990 and attempted to locate or contact Julia without success.
- By the time of litigation more than five years had elapsed without Julia’s return or consistent communication.
- Julia’s responses in litigation:
- Summons was served by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in Negros Oriental.
- Julia answered (through counsel) on 31 May 1991, opposing the complaint and denying its allegations; she claimed Leouel had been irresponsible and incompetent.
- A report from the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor ruled out possible collusion between the parties.
- Julia filed a manifestation on 25 October 1991 stating that she would neither appear nor submit evidence.
- Trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit on 06 November 1991; the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Trial and Appellate Proceedings
- Trial court (Regional Trial Court, Negros Oriental, Branch 30):
- Docketed Civil Case No. 9814: "Voiding of Marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code."
- Summons by publication; Julia filed an answer denying allegations; later manifested she would neither appear nor submit evidence.
- On 06 November 1991, the complaint was dismissed for lack of merit.
- Court of Appeals:
- Affirmed the trial court’s dismissal (opinion penned by Justice Jainal Rasul, concurred in by Justices Pedro Ramirez and Ramon Mabutas, Jr.).
- The Court of Appeals’ opinion noted procedural deficiencies in the petition to the Supreme Court (non-compliance with Circular 28-91 requiring a certification of non-forum shopping) and found the petition lacking in merit on the substantive claim.
- Supreme Court (this case):
- Petition for review on certiorari by Leouel challenging the Court of Appeals’ affirmation.
- Majority denies the petition; petitioner’s request to declare the marriage nullity under Article 36 is denied.
- Separate and dissenting opinions filed: Justice Romero (separate observations), Justice Padilla (dissent arguing for grant).
Issue Presented
- Whether the marriage between Leouel and Julia is void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground that one party (Julia) was, at the time of the celebration, psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage.
Applicable Statutory Provision (Article 36)
- Article 36 (as amended by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July 1987) as quoted in the decision:
- "A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."
- The Family Code does not define "psychological incapacity"; the Court examines the legislative and committee deliberations and relevant doctrinal and canonical materials for interpretive guidance.
Deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee (as recorded)
- Committee’s drafting objectives and tensions:
- Article 36 (initially proposed as Article 35/37 in drafts) drew from Canon Law, but the Committee debated phraseology and conceptual scope.
- Debates centered on whether the provision pertains to vices of consent, mental defects, or to a distinct incapacity relating to appreciation and discharge of marital obligations.
- Key positions and concerns:
- Justice Reyes: favored wording changes to avoid implying total lack of reason and to distinguish lack of judgment from other defects.
- Justice Caguioa: argued the provision should address lack of appreciation of marital obligations (not merely vitiation of consent); distinguished psychological incapacity from defects of mental faculties affecting consent; suggested deleting "mentally" to distinguish from vice of consent but also explained why psychological incapacity was not a vice of consent.
- Judge Diy: raised questions distinguishing "insanity" (voidable ground) from "psychological incapacity" (ground for nullity); suggested including mental and physical incapacities.
- Justice Puno: viewed psychological incapacity as a kind of vice of consent that should lead to voidable remedies; expressed concern about possible perpetual right to annul until cure.
- Prof. Bautista and others: feared the provision could be used as a form of divorce or encourage false claims; suggested safeguards.
- Discussions touched on possible cure or lucid intervals, selective impotency, and whether a psychiatrist’s testimony would be helpful.
- Procedural safeguards and prescriptions debated:
- Debate on retroactivity vs. prospectivity produced a divided vote; Committee votes recorded: Reyes, Puno, Romero for prospectivity; Caguioa, Diy, Gupit, Bautista, Director Eufemio for retroactivity; Baviera abstained.
- Justice Caguioa suggested placing a prescriptive period of ten years within which to file the action for declaration of nullity; Committee approved suggestion.
- Committee discussed deleting the clause "even if such incapacity becomes manifest after its solemnization" due to concern it might encourage manufactured manifestations, but retaine