Title
Santa Rosa Coca-Cola Plant Employees Union vs. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc.
Case
G.R. No. 164302-03
Decision Date
Jan 24, 2007
Union's mass action deemed illegal strike; failure to comply with Labor Code requirements led to dismissal of officers and shop stewards.
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 164302-03)

Factual Background

The Sta. Rosa Coca-Cola Plant Employees Union served as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the Company’s regular daily-paid workers and monthly-paid non-commission-earning employees in the Sta. Rosa, Laguna plant. The CBA effective July 1, 1996 covered the period until June 30, 1999. After the CBA’s expiration, the Union demanded renegotiation. CBA negotiations began on July 26, 1999, and the parties reached an impasse on two issues relating to CBA ground rules: first, the Union insisted that representatives from the Alyansa ng mga Unyon sa Coca-Cola be allowed to sit as observers in the negotiation meetings; second, the Union demanded that wages be based on work shift rates. The Company countered that the Alyansa’s members were not part of the bargaining unit and that Alyansa was not a registered labor organization. No agreement was reached, and the impasse prompted further steps.

On August 30, 1999, the Union filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB Regional Office in Southern Tagalog, Imus, Cavite, relying on deadlock in the ground rules and alleged unfair labor practice arising from the Company’s refusal to bargain. The Company moved to dismiss, and on September 17, 1999 the Union filed an amended notice of strike, this time alleging unfair labor practice for refusal to bargain in good faith and interference with the right to self-organization. Separately, the Union decided on September 15, 1999 to participate in a mass action organized by the Alyansa in front of the Company’s premises on September 21, 1999. The Union officers, directors, and shop stewards applied for leave of absence for that date. The Company disapproved all leave applications on the premise that the plant would come to a complete stop due to insufficient trained contractual employees to replace the absent workers.

On September 21, 1999, the Union officers and members staged a picket within the plant perimeter pursuant to a Mayor’s permit allowing a mass protest from 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon. Some union members wore gears and red tag cloth bearing slogans including “YES KAMI SA STRIKE” and other expressions of protest. During the action, the Company’s engineering personnel did not report for work, and a substantial number of production personnel were also absent. As a result, only one of the three bottling lines operated on the day shift, and all three lines operated on the night shift with cumulative downtime due to lack of manning and skills. The Company reported that production for the day fell short of budget by 60,000 physical cases.

Labor Arbiter and NLRC Proceedings

On October 13, 1999, the Company filed a petition to declare the strike illegal. It alleged that the activity on September 21, 1999 constituted a strike because it effectively caused a temporary work stoppage and was carried out without complying with legal requirements such as strike vote, cooling-off period, and notice/reporting obligations. The petition further asserted that the activity violated the CBA’s grievance machinery provisions and that officers knowingly participating in an illegal strike should lose their employment status. The Company prayed for declarations of illegality, dismissal of participating union officers and members, liability for unfair labor practice, and damages, including actual damages of P 4,733,366.29, moral damages of Five (5) Million Pesos, and exemplary damages of Two (2) Million Pesos.

The Union opposed, maintaining that the September 21 mass action was not a strike but a lawful picket and exercise of constitutional rights to free expression and assembly. It also claimed that the activity occurred under a Mayor’s permit, involved workers merely marching to and fro near the plant highway/loading area without blocking ingress or egress, and lasted only a few hours before the workers returned to their shifts. The Union further argued that the Company’s petition was meant to harass and weaken the Union during ongoing CBA negotiations. The NCMB had indicated, based on the Union’s allegations, that the dispute should be pursued through peaceful dialogue and recommended conversion of the notice of strike into preventive mediation, which was unsuccessful; the parties submitted position papers thereafter.

In the course of the Labor Arbiter proceedings, the officers and directors remained absent without approved leaves. After reminders and directives to submit explanations for possible AWOL characterization, the Labor Arbiter, on November 26, 1999, ruled in favor of the Company. It held that the September 21, 1999 mass leave and ensuing concerted activity fell within the statutory definition of a strike under Article 212(o) of the Labor Code. It found that a temporary stoppage/slowdown occurred: out of three day-shift production lines, only one line operated, and there was five hours of cumulative downtime attributed to lack of manning, complement, and skills. It relied on company testimony describing the absence of engineering personnel, production personnel, and additional personnel whose absence resulted in reduced operational capacity. The Labor Arbiter also reasoned that the concerted action was a result of a labor dispute because the Union had earlier filed a strike notice grounded on disagreements over CBA ground rules and had staged protest expressions the day before, including slogans denouncing alleged anti-labor practices and union-busting.

The Labor Arbiter further held the strike illegal because the Union did not prove compliance with mandatory statutory requisites—specifically, that it conducted a strike vote, observed the cooling-off period, and reported the strike vote to the Department of Labor within the time required. For the Union’s officers’ knowing participation in the illegal strike, the Labor Arbiter declared that they lost employment status. The NLRC, on July 31, 2002, affirmed the ruling with a modification: Union Treasurer Charlita M. Abrigo, who was on bereavement leave, was excluded from the list of those who participated in the illegal strike and was ordered reinstated with full backwages and benefits.

Contentions Before the Court of Appeals and Issues Raised

The Union and its officers, directors, and shop stewards filed separate petitions for certiorari with the CA (CA-G.R. SP No. 74174 and CA-G.R. SP No. 74860, later consolidated). They argued, in substance, that the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. They asserted that they were deprived of due process because execution of the Labor Arbiter’s adverse decision occurred even while their NLRC appeal was pending. On the merits, they contended that the September 21 mass protest was a peaceful picket, not a strike, and therefore should not have carried strike illegality consequences. They also challenged the dismissal of union officers and shop stewards, insisting that dismissal for knowing participation in an illegal strike was unwarranted, particularly because certain individuals were allegedly mere shop stewards who were not officers and because no proof showed that they committed illegal acts.

The CA dismissed the petitions on September 10, 2003 for lack of merit and also declared the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 74860 to be guilty of forum shopping. In the Supreme Court, petitioners framed the threshold issues as: (a) whether the September 21, 1999 mass action was a strike; (b) if so, whether it was legal; and (c) whether the individual officers and shop stewards should be dismissed.

Petitioners’ Legal Theory and the Company’s Response

Petitioners maintained that the mass action was not intended to stop work. They asserted that the Company scheduled no bottling operations on September 21 and 22, and they pointed to the existence of logistics planning showing the lack of bottling operations on those dates. They also emphasized that leave applications were filed, that a Mayor’s permit had been obtained, and that the protesting workers marched to and fro near the plant’s highway/loading area and did not block ingress or egress. Petitioners argued that because they allegedly did not intend to strike, they considered compliance with strike procedures unnecessary. They also invoked a separate labor dispute resolution involving other workers’ simultaneous walkout in October 1999, where the Secretary of Labor and Employment allegedly characterized that walkout as a mass action rather than a strike and meted only a suspension to certain union officers.

On the issue of penalty, petitioners argued that even if the activity were characterized as a strike, dismissal was too severe. They invoked the employer’s discretionary power under the Labor Code as to dismissal of union officers participating in an illegal strike and claimed good faith. They also insisted that shop stewards were not officers, so dismissal of shop stewards should not follow automatically. Respondent, in its comment, argued that the questions raised were factual and thus not appropriate in a petition for review on certiorari. It further contended that the Labor Arbiter’s findings were affirmed by both the NLRC and the CA, making them conclusive. Respondent also emphasized that the Labor Code offers no discretion in imposing the proper consequences on knowing participants in an illegal strike and argued that shop stewards, as union representatives, should be treated as union officers for purposes of liability.

Supreme Court’s Ruling: Nature of the September 21, 1999 Mass Action as a Strike

The Supreme Court denied the petition for lack of merit. It held that the CA’s conclusion that petitioners staged a strike on September 21, 1999, rather than merely a picket, was correct. The Court treated the characterization of the action as a factual determination made by the Labor Arbiter and affirmed by the NLRC and CA. The Court reiterated the settled rule that factual findings of quasi-judicial bodies—when supported by substantial e

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