Case Summary (G.R. No. L-44640)
Issues Presented
The Court distilled the controversy to three central questions:
- Is the constitutionality of PDs 991, 1031 and 1033 a political question outside judicial review or a justiciable one?
- During the transition period under the 1973 Constitution, with the interim National Assembly not convened, does the incumbent President have authority to propose constitutional amendments and to set up machinery for their ratification?
- Was the manner and timing of submission of the proposed amendments to the people (notably a three‑week interval between formal proposal and plebiscite) sufficient for a fair and proper submission?
Standing and Justiciability: taxpayers and political‑question doctrine
The Court held that petitioners (Sanidads) had standing as taxpayers to challenge the Decrees because the Decrees included specific appropriations of public funds; expenditure to carry out unconstitutional acts gives taxpayers a direct interest to sue. On justiciability, the Court rejected the Solicitor General’s contention that the questions were purely political. It reasoned that the legality of the process and the constitutional authority claimed by the President are matters of law and therefore justiciable. The Court relied on prior Philippine precedents that treated amending and ratification issues as judicially examinable when the legality of the procedure or authority is in question (citing the Court’s past treatment of plebiscite and ratification disputes).
Constitutional framework for amendment under the 1973 Constitution
The Court analyzed Article XVI (Amendments) and the Transitory Provisions (Section 15) of the 1973 Constitution:
- Article XVI contemplates that amendments are proposed by the National Assembly (three‑quarters vote) or by a constitutional convention, and become valid when ratified by a majority in a plebiscite held not later than three months after approval.
- Section 15 (Transitory Provisions) specifically entrusted the power to propose amendments during the transition to the interim National Assembly, upon special call by the interim Prime Minister, by a majority vote of all its members; such amendments take effect upon ratification per Article XVI.
Interim National Assembly, presidential discretion, and the electoral history
The Court emphasized precedent (Aquino v. COMELEC) recognizing the incumbent President’s discretion to determine when to convene the interim National Assembly consistent with prevailing conditions of peace and order. The President had repeatedly deferred convening that body, and earlier referenda (1973 and 1975) had reflected popular unwillingness to convene the interim Assembly. That context—an interregnum in which the interim National Assembly had not been assembled—was central to the Court’s accommodation of an executive role in the amending process.
Constituent power versus ordinary legislative power
The Court reiterated that proposing constitutional amendments is a peculiar, non‑legislative constituent act distinct from ordinary lawmaking: ordinarily the President does not “approve” constitutional amendments as he would ordinary statutes. Nevertheless, the Court held that where the President legitimately performs legislative functions during the transition (as recognized in the Transitory Provisions and prior decisions), the adjunct constituent function of proposing amendments may be exercised by the President when the interim National Assembly has not been convened, provided that the President acts as agent for the people and the submission to the people conforms with constitutional safeguards.
Crisis government, emergency powers, and concentration of authority
The majority adopted the view—drawing upon political theory and authorities—that in crisis or emergency government some concentration of powers in the executive is both necessary and constitutional in order to preserve the state and restore normalcy. The Court accepted that, under the transition and martial‑law context, broader executive exercise of powers (including legislative functions by decree) had been validated; some members, however (notably Justice Fernando), expressly dissented from any proposition that such concentration equated to an unqualified accumulation of constituent power.
Holding on presidential authority to propose amendments
Applying the transitory context, the Court concluded that the President could validly submit proposed amendments to the people by decree when the interim National Assembly had not been convened. The reasoning emphasized (a) the people’s prior expressions against convening the interim Assembly, (b) the President’s established role in exercising legislative powers during the interregnum, and (c) the characterization of the President’s actions in this instance as implementation of proposals originating from barangays, sanggunian assemblies and the Batasang Bayan—i.e., as acting in furtherance of the people’s sovereign will rather than as a unilateral executive conversion into a constituent assembly.
Popular sovereignty and the people as constitutional legislator
The Court stressed that sovereignty resides in the people and that the constituent power ultimately belongs to them. Given that the barangays and sanggunian assemblies had proposed the amendments through their national bodies, and given the people’s prior choices reflected in referenda, the President’s formalization and submission of those proposals were treated as instruments of the people’s residuary constituent power. Accordingly, the Court held those proposals and the President’s concomitant authority to call a plebiscite and appropriate funds for it to be constitutionally defensible in the circumstances.
Referendum‑Plebiscite mechanics and the youth vote
The Court sustained the separate treatment of the referendum question (continuation of martial law) and the plebiscite question (ratification of amendments): the referendum was consultative and allowed participation by citizens aged fifteen and older; the plebiscite, which effects constitutional change, was limited to those 18 years and above as required by Article VI. Procedural safeguards (separate ballot boxes and separate counts by age grouping) were deemed adequate to prevent confusion and to ensure that only votes of those 18 and older would have effect on ratification.
Freedoms of expression, assembly and campaign environment
The Court rejected the claim that the martial‑law regime wholly suppressed freedom of dissent relevant to the plebiscite. It found no valid basis to conclude that freedoms of expression and assembly were effectively stifled for purposes of the referendum‑plebiscite; indeed public debate and campaigning by dissenters and government employees occurred and the President publicly announced he would not suppress dissenting views.
Sufficiency of the time for public deliberation and prior public debate
The Court concluded that the roughly three‑week formal period between codification of the proposals and the Oct. 16 plebiscite was not constitutionally insufficient. The Court observed the relevant issues were longstanding public topics (martial law, the interim Assembly, constitutional arrangements) that had been discussed in multiple prior referenda and public forums; historical precedents showed comparatively short formal notice periods for past plebiscites; and the gover
...continue readingCase Syllabus (G.R. No. L-44640)
Case Citation and Procedural Posture
- Reported at 165 Phil. 303; 73 OG 1886 (March 14, 1977). En banc decision rendered October 12, 1976 (G.R. No. L-44640 and related petitions).
- Consolidated and related docket numbers: L-44640 (Pablo C. Sanidad & Pablito V. Sanidad v. Commission on Elections), L-44684 (Vicente M. Guzman v. Commission on Elections), and L-44714 (Raul M. Gonzales, Raul T. Gonzales, Jr., and Alfredo Salapantan v. Commission on Elections and National Treasurer).
- Relief sought in each: prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain the Commission on Elections from holding/conducting the national referendum-plebiscite of October 16, 1976, and to declare Presidential Decrees Nos. 991, 1031 and 1033 (or portions thereof) null and void insofar as they proposed amendments to the Constitution or directed Comelec to supervise the referendum-plebiscite.
- Majority opinion authored by Justice Martin; final vote to dismiss the three petitions was 8–2. Decision immediately executory.
Facts and Decrees at Issue
- Presidential Decree No. 991 (September 2, 1976): called for a national referendum on October 16, 1976 to consult the Citizens Assemblies (barangays) on issues including continuation of martial law, the interim National Assembly, its replacement and powers, duration of such replacement, and the period of exercise by the President of his then-powers; appropriated Five Million Pesos for implementation.
- Presidential Decree No. 1031 (September 22, 1976): amended PD 991, declared provisions of PD 229 (manner of voting and canvass in barangays) applicable to the October 16 referendum and repealed inter alia Section 4 of PD 991; appropriated Eight Million Pesos.
- Presidential Decree No. 1033 (September 22, 1976): set forth the questions to be submitted to the people on October 16 and the proposed amendments to the Constitution (text of nine proposed amendments included in decree).
- Commission on Elections was vested with exclusive supervision and control of the October 1976 national referendum-plebiscite.
- The referenda/plebiscite had two-part character: a referendum question on continuation of martial law and a plebiscite question on proposed constitutional amendments.
Text and Substance of Proposed Amendments (as submitted by PD No. 1033)
- Proposed Amendment 1: Create an interim Batasang Pambansa in lieu of the interim National Assembly, membership not more than 120 and to include incumbent President, regional representatives apportioned by population, sectoral representatives (not less than 18 years old), and presidential appointees from the Cabinet; number and manner of election to be prescribed by law.
- Proposed Amendment 2: Interim Batasang Pambansa to have same powers and members same functions/responsibilities as the interim and regular National Assembly, except it shall not exercise power under Article VIII, Section 14(1).
- Proposed Amendment 3: Incumbent President to convene and preside over interim Batasang Pambansa until Speaker elected; incumbent President to be Prime Minister and continue to exercise all presidential and Prime Minister powers.
- Proposed Amendment 4: President (Prime Minister) and Cabinet to exercise powers/functions of regular President (Prime Minister); disqualifications subject to what the President may prescribe; may appoint Deputy Prime Minister(s).
- Proposed Amendment 5: Incumbent President shall continue to exercise legislative powers until martial law is lifted.
- Proposed Amendment 6: President (Prime Minister) may issue decrees, orders, letters of instruction in grave emergency or when interim Batasang Pambansa or regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act — such issuances to form part of law of the land.
- Proposed Amendment 7: Barangays and sanggunians to continue but their functions, powers, composition may be altered by law; referenda conducted through barangays under Comelec supervision may be called to ascertain the will of the people on important matters.
- Proposed Amendment 8: All provisions of Constitution not inconsistent with these amendments shall continue.
- Proposed Amendment 9: Amendments to take effect after incumbent President proclaims they have been ratified by a majority of votes cast in the referendum-plebiscite.
Petitioners’ Principal Contentions
- Sanidad petitioners (L-44640): The incumbent President has no constitutional grant under the 1935 or 1973 Constitutions to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments; therefore the October 16 referendum-plebiscite has no constitutional or legal basis; sought to enjoin Comelec and annul specified PDs insofar as they propose constitutional amendments and appropriate funds.
- Vicente M. Guzman (L-44684): Asserting that the power to propose amendments during the transition period is expressly conferred upon the interim National Assembly under the Transitory Provisions (petition mentions Section 16, Art. XVII in pleadings).
- Raul M. Gonzales, Raul T. Gonzales, Jr., Alfredo Salapantan (L-44714): Argue that even if the President may exercise legislative powers under martial law, he cannot act as a constituent assembly to propose constitutional amendments; a referendum-plebiscite in the manner proposed is untenable under both Constitutions; the short submission period renders the plebiscite a nullity; lifting martial law need not be done via referendum; allowing 15-year-olds to vote constitutes an impermissible amendment of Article VI which confines suffrage to 18+.
Respondent’s (Solicitor General / Comelec) Principal Arguments
- Solicitor General’s contentions: petitioners lack standing; the issue is political and non-justiciable; at this stage of the transition only the incumbent President has authority to exercise constituent power; the referendum-plebiscite is a step toward normalization.
- Respondent Commission on Elections: vested with exclusive supervision and control of the October 1976 referendum-plebiscite; tasked with implementing voting mechanics as directed by decrees.
Threshold: Standing and Justiciability — Court’s Analysis
- Standing (locus standi): the Court held Sanidad petitioners had standing as taxpayers to challenge PDs appropriating public funds (PD 991 appropriation Five Million; PD 1031 appropriation Eight Million). Expenditure of public funds to execute unconstitutional acts may be enjoined; the Court exercised discretion to entertain taxpayer suit.
- Justiciability: the Court rejected the Solicitor General’s political-question argument. It held the amending process — both proposal and ratification — raises judicially cognizable questions where the legality (not the wisdom) of authority assumed is in doubt.
- Jurisdictional basis cited: Section 2(2), Article X of the 1973 Constitution requires the Supreme Court en banc to hear cases involving constitutionality of laws; the Court’s precedents (Plebiscite Cases, Ratification Cases, Gonzales v. Comelec, Javellana v. Executive Secretary) were invoked to sustain justiciability where constitutional grant of amending authority is contested.
- Distinction drawn: Political questions concern wisdom or policy; when the controversy centers on legality or constitutional authority, it is justiciable.
Legal Framework — Amending Process under the 1973 Constitution and Transitory Provisions
- Article XVI, Section 1(1–2): Any amendment or revision may be proposed by the National Assembly by three-fourths vote of all its Members, or by constitutional convention; National Assembly may call a convention with two-thirds vote or submit question of calling such convention to the electorate by majority vote.
- Article XVI, Section 2: An amendment or revision shall be valid when ratified by a majority of votes cast in a plebiscite held not later than three months after approval.
- Transitory Provisions, Section 15: During the transition, the interim National Assembly, upon special call by the interim Prime Minister, may by majority vote propose amendments; such amendments to take effect upon ratification per Article XVI.
- The Constitution contemplates two stages in transition: (1) period from effectivity of Constitution to convening of the interim National Assembly (President has discretion when to convene); (2) period after convening until regular Government constituted.
- Prior