G.R. No. L-11991 - People vs. Tano

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-11991)

Factual Background

Republic Act No. 6766 provided an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region and required a plebiscite for ratification. The plebiscite covered the City of Baguio and the provinces composing the Cordillera Autonomous Region. To govern the plebiscite, the Commission on Elections promulgated Comelec Resolution No. 2167, which included the following provision: "Section 19. Prohibition on columnist, commentators or announcers. During the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer, or personality shall use his column or radio or television times to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues."

Petition and Temporary Restraining Order

On November 20, 1989 petitioner challenged the constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167, alleging that it violated the constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression and of the press. Petitioner described his role as a columnist whose work reflects personal opinions and contended that the provision amounted to a prior restraint and an impermissible penalty under the resolution's cross-reference to election offenses. On November 28, 1989 the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the Comelec from enforcing Section 19 and required the Comelec to file a Comment.

Respondent's Comment and Legal Authorities Asserted

In its Comment filed January 9, 1990 the Commission on Elections defended Section 19 as a valid exercise of its supervisory and regulatory powers during election periods under Art. IX-C, Section 4, 1987 Constitution, and as consistent with the Omnibus Election Code and R.A. 6646. Respondent relied on Sections 90 and 92 of B.P. Blg. 881 to emphasize that the Comelec may allocate free and equal "Comelec space" and "Comelec time" for campaign purposes and argued that Section 19 did not absolutely bar expression because media practitioners could use those Comelec-provided forums.

Legal Issue Presented

The Court framed the central question as whether Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 unlawfully abridged the freedom of expression and of the press by prohibiting mass media columnists, commentators, announcers, or personalities from using their columns or radio or television time to campaign for or against plebiscite issues during the plebiscite campaign period and on plebiscite day.

The Court's Analysis of Constitutional Authority

The Court examined the scope of Art. IX-C, Section 4, 1987 Constitution and concluded that the provision granted the Comelec power to supervise and regulate the enjoyment or utilization of franchises, permits, and similar grants for the operation of media and other utilities to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space and the right to reply among candidates. The Court held that this constitutional supervision concerned franchise holders and the allocation of media resources to prevent undue advantage to candidates. The Court found no textual basis in Art. IX-C or in Section 11, R.A. 6646 to support a power in the Comelec to regulate the exercise of free expression by media practitioners themselves, especially where no candidates are involved as in a plebiscite.

Distinction Between Elections and Plebiscites and Precedent

The Court distinguished the present plebiscite from elections, noting that elections concern competing candidates while a plebiscite asks the electorate to vote for or against issues. The Court considered and distinguished Badoy, Jr. v. Comelec, L-32546, Oct. 16, 1970, where prohibitions on certain forms of election propaganda were upheld as a valid exercise of police power to prevent perversion of the electoral process. The Court found that the evil addressed in Badoy does not obtain in a plebiscite and that restrictions justified for elections do not automatically apply to plebiscites.

Forum Restriction and Freedom of Expression

The Court addressed the Comelec's contention that Comelec space and Comelec time furnished alternative forums. The Court observed that, while not an absolute bar to expression, Section 19 restricted the columnist's choice of forum. The Court found that no adequate justification was offered for limiting the forum of expression in a plebiscite. The Court reasoned that plebiscite issues are matters of public conce

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-11991)

Parties and Procedural Posture

Pablito V. Sanidad filed a petition for certiorari challenging the constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167.
The Commission on Elections answered the petition and filed a Comment through the Office of the Solicitor General.
The petition was filed on November 20, 1989, and a temporary restraining order was issued on November 28, 1989 enjoining the enforcement of the questioned provision.
The respondent filed its Comment on January 9, 1990, and the case was decided en banc with the petition being granted.

Key Factual Allegations

Republic Act No. 6766 creating the Cordillera Autonomous Region was enacted on October 23, 1989 and a plebiscite for its ratification was set and later rescheduled by Comelec Resolution No. 2226.
The Commission on Elections promulgated Resolution No. 2167 to govern the plebiscite and included Section 19 which restricted media personalities from using their columns or broadcast time to campaign on plebiscite issues during the campaign period, the day before and on plebiscite day.
Petitioner asserted that he was a newspaper columnist of the "OVERVIEW" column for the Baguio Midland Courier and that his columns necessarily expressed opinions on public issues.
Petitioner contended that Section 19 functioned as a prior restraint and carried punitive consequences because the resolution incorporated election offenses and banned acts purportedly made applicable to the plebiscite.

Issue Presented

Whether Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 unconstitutionally abridged the freedom of expression and the freedom of the press guaranteed by the Constitution.

Petitioner Contentions

Petitioner asserted that as a columnist he was entitled to publish opinions and that Section 19 constituted a prior restraint on speech and the press.
Petitioner argued that the provision imposed subsequent punishment by making electoral offenses and banned acts applicable to the plebiscite through the resolution.
Petitioner maintained that unrestricted media discussion would better serve the public interest in a plebiscite by permitting full dissemination and ventilation of all sides of the issue.

Respondent Contentions

The Commission on Elections maintained that Section 19 was a valid exercise of its supervisory and regulatory powers under Article IX-C, Section 4, 1987 Constitution, BP 881, R.A. 6766, and other election laws.
Respondent argued that Section 19 did not absolutely bar expression because media practitioners could still use Comelec space and Comelec time under Section 90 and Section 92 of BP 881.
Respondent relied on Section 11(b) of R.A. 6646 to support restrictions on the use of mass media during electoral periods and claimed that the r