Title
Sandra Jane Gagui Jacinto vs. Maria Eloisa Sarmiento Fouts
Case
G.R. No. 250627
Decision Date
Dec 7, 2022
A lesbian relationship ends in alleged violence; petitioner challenges RA 9262's applicability, arguing it excludes same-sex abuse. Court affirms gender-neutral protection.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 250627)

Factual Background

The Information charged that on January 14, 2018 in Antipolo City the petitioner willfully and unlawfully attacked and employed personal violence upon the person of the respondent, her live-in partner, causing injuries that required medical attendance and incapacitated the complainant for less than thirty days. The Information invoked Section 5(a) in relation to the second paragraph of Section 6(a) of RA 9262, and Section 5(k) of RA 8369. The parties had been in a relationship for 16 years. The complainant alleged threatened arson, forced ingestion of a drug, non-consensual photography while she was incapacitated, and an incident in which the petitioner allegedly crushed and fractured her left wrist. The petitioner presented a competing narrative, alleging provocation and asserting ownership of the house where the parties lived.

Trial Court Proceedings

On June 8, 2018 an Information was filed in the RTC against the petitioner. The petitioner filed a motion to quash the Information on the ground that RA 9262 does not apply to lesbian relationships. The RTC denied the motion to quash in an order dated July 24, 2019, reasoning that Section 3(a) of RA 9262 uses the gender-neutral term "any person" and therefore encompasses same-sex relationships, citing Garcia v. Drilon, 712 Phil. 44 (2013). The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the RTC denied on November 28, 2019.

Procedural Posture and Relief Sought

The petitioner elevated the denial of the motion to quash to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, Rules of Court, and sought injunctive relief by way of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. The petition sought reversal and setting aside of the RTC orders insofar as they held that RA 9262 applies to lesbian relationships.

The Issue Presented

The principal legal question was whether the RTC erred in denying the motion to quash on the ground that RA 9262 applies to lesbian relationships, and whether the petitioner may obtain interlocutory relief from the Supreme Court under the remedy invoked.

Petitioner’s Contentions

The petitioner contended that the RTC misapplied Garcia v. Drilon, arguing that Garcia addressed a husband who challenged the law and that any statement about lesbian relationships was mere obiter dictum. She argued that the phrase "any person" in Section 3(a) should be read as limited by the enumerated terms that follow and that ejusdem generis dictates a male referent. Petitioner also relied on a pending legislative amendment as evidence that same-sex relationships were not initially covered. She asserted that continuation of trial would work injustice because she would be tried under a defective Information.

Respondent’s Contentions

The respondent maintained that the petition under Rule 45 was improper because an order denying a motion to quash is interlocutory and unappealable. She argued that RA 9262 is clear and applies without regard to the gender of the offender so long as the offender had the requisite sexual or dating relationship with the victim. The respondent further contended that the Supreme Court’s discussion in Garcia was not dictum because Garcia raised questions about the law’s classifications and equal protection.

Ruling of the RTC

The RTC held that Section 3(a) of RA 9262 uses the gender-neutral term "any person" and that the statute thus applies to lesbian relationships. The RTC relied on Garcia for the proposition that the term "person" who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman encompasses lesbian relationships. The RTC denied both the motion to quash and the motion for reconsideration.

The Supreme Court’s Disposition

The Supreme Court denied the petition. The Court dismissed the petition on two independent grounds. First, the Court held that the petition was an improper remedy because an order denying a motion to quash is interlocutory and not appealable or subject to certiorari where other remedies are available. The Court applied Section 1, Rule 41, Rules of Court, and upheld the principle articulated in Enrile v. Manalastas that the proper recourse is to enter a plea, proceed to trial, and, if aggrieved by a final judgment, raise the denial of the motion to quash on appeal. Second, and alternatively, the Court denied the petition on the merits and reaffirmed that RA 9262 applies to lesbian relationships.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

On remedy, the Court relied on the interlocutory character of orders denying motions to quash and on Rule 41, Section 1. The Court cited precedent that a motion to quash denial is subject to review on appeal from final judgment rather than by extraordinary writ. The Court also observed that, even if the petition were treated as a Rule 65 petition, it would offend the judicial hierarchy and should be dismissed.

On the substantive question, the Court relied on the text and purpose of RA 9262, particularly Section 3(a) and Section 5(a). The Court reaffirmed its prior exposition in Garcia v. Drilon, concluding that the gender-neutral term "any person" who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with a woman plainly includes female perpetrators in lesbian relationships. The Court rejected the argument that pronouns such as "his" convert the statute into a male-only referent, noting the statutory context in which same-sex marriage is not recognized and the ordinary drafting choices made in the Family Code. The Court further invoked legislative history recorded in the Bicameral Conference Committee minutes to show that Congress intended the statute to cover lesbian relationships. The Court also grounded its conclusion in equal protection principles under the 1987 Constitution, reasoning that limiting protection to heterosexual victims would constitute impermissible discrimination against a class of women. The Court observed that intimate partner violence is equally injurious regardless of the sexual composition of the relationship and that the statute’s protective purpose compels coverage of all women who are victims of such violence.

Reliance on Precedent and Legislative Intent

The Court explicitly relied on Garcia v. Drilon, 712 Phil. 44 (2013), to support its interpretation that RA 9262 covers lesbian relationships. The Court treated the discussion in Garcia

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