Title
Sanchez vs. Demetriou
Case
G.R. No. 111771-77
Decision Date
Nov 9, 1993
Antonio Sanchez, ex-mayor, accused of rape-slay; Supreme Court upheld charges, ruled arrest valid, jurisdiction proper, and informations lawful despite procedural challenges.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 111771-77)

Factual Background

The petition arose from the rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta and the killing of Allan Gomez. On July 28, 1993, the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission requested filing of appropriate charges. A Panel of State Prosecutors of the Department of Justice conducted a preliminary investigation on August 9, 1993, at which the petitioner was represented by Atty. Marciano Brion, Jr. On August 12, 1993, PNP Commander Rex Piad served an “invitation” on the petitioner to appear for investigation at Camp Vicente Lim; the petitioner was taken there on August 13, 1993. At a confrontation that day Aurelio Centeno and SPO III Vivencio Malabanan positively identified the petitioner and executed extrajudicial confessions implicating him. The petitioner was placed on “arrest status,” taken to the Department of Justice in Manila, underwent inquest proceedings with Atty. Salvador Panelo as counsel, and was served a warrant of arrest issued August 13, 1993, by Judge Enrico A. Lanzanas for violation of R.A. No. 6713. He was detained at CIS Detention Center, Camp Crame. On August 16, 1993, seven informations were filed in the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, charging the petitioner and six others with the rape and killing of Sarmenta. The Secretary of Justice expressed concern about a miscarriage of justice if trial occurred in Laguna; the cases were transferred to Pasig and raffled to respondent Judge Demetriou. The informations were amended on September 10, 1993, to include the killing of Allan Gomez as an aggravating circumstance. The petitioner filed a motion to quash which the respondent judge denied after oral arguments on September 13, 1993.

Procedural History in This Court

The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraining order/writ of injunction to annul the respondent judge’s denial of his motion to quash. The respondents filed a Comment and this Court ordered the petitioner to file a Reply within a non-extendible period of five days. The Reply was filed five days late. Although the Court noted that the tardy Reply could be treated as an implied admission or loss of interest, the Court nevertheless proceeded to decide the petition on the merits.

The Petitioner’s Grounds for Quashal

The petitioner advanced six principal grounds to quash the seven informations: first, denial of his right to present evidence at the preliminary investigation; second, that only the Ombudsman had jurisdiction to conduct the investigation of a public official; third, that his warrantless arrest on August 13, 1993, was illegal and thus the court lacked jurisdiction over his person; fourth, that the seven informations alleging seven homicides were legally impossible because there were only two victims; fifth, that the informations were discriminatory because they omitted Teofilo Alqueza and Edgardo Lavadia; and sixth, that as a public officer he could only be tried by the Sandiganbayan.

The Preliminary Investigation and Waiver

The Court reviewed the transcripts of the hearings of August 9 and 13, 1993, and found that the petitioner, through counsel, expressly waived the submission of counter-affidavits. At the August 9 hearing Atty. Marciano Brion, Jr. manifested that, after reviewing the statements, the petitioner would not submit counter-affidavits. The head of the prosecutorial panel, Jovencito Zuno, informed counsel that counter-affidavits could still be filed up to August 27, 1993, but none were filed. At the August 13 hearing Atty. Salvador Panelo, who appeared and spoke for the petitioner, again waived submission of counter-affidavits after being furnished the sworn statements of Centeno and Malabanan. The petitioner later disputed his representation by Atty. Panelo in a tardy Reply, but the record showed that he was present and permitted Atty. Panelo to act for him during the inquest. The Court applied Section 3, paragraph (d), Rule 112 and the settled rule that an accused may waive the right to present evidence at a preliminary investigation.

Effect of a Flawed or Absent Preliminary Investigation

The Court reiterated that the absence of a preliminary investigation does not render an information invalid, nor does it divest the trial court of jurisdiction. The appropriate remedy, when a preliminary investigation is absent or flawed, is for the trial court to order an investigation or reinvestigation and hold the criminal proceedings in abeyance on motion of the accused. The respondent judge found no need for such relief and the Supreme Court, finding no arbitrariness in her factual conclusions, deferred to her exercise of discretion.

Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman

Relying on precedent, including Deloso v. Domingo, 191 SCRA 545 and Aguinaldo v. Domagas, G.R. No. 98452, September 26, 1991, the Court held that the Ombudsman’s authority to investigate and prosecute alleged illegal acts by public officers is not exclusive but concurrent with other agencies, such as the Department of Justice. The non-involvement or lack of prior approval by the Ombudsman did not render the Department of Justice proceedings void nor impair the authority of the panel of prosecutors to file and prosecute the informations.

Lawfulness of the Arrest and Acquisition of Jurisdiction Over the Person

The Court examined whether the petitioner’s removal to Camp Vicente Lim and his subsequent detention constituted an arrest within the meaning of Section 1 and Section 2, Rule 113. The Court recognized that an invitation to appear may, under the circumstances here, amount to compulsory submission when it emanates from powerful military officers and the designated site is a military camp, citing Babst v. National Intelligence Board, 132 SCRA 318. The petitioner was placed on “arrest status” after being identified by state witnesses. The Court nonetheless found the original warrantless arrest to be not within the lawful exceptions enumerated in Section 5, Rule 113, because the arresting officers lacked personal knowledge and the offense had not “in fact just been committed.” Notwithstanding that original illegality, the Court held that the Regional Trial Court lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner by reason of (a) the warrant of arrest issued on August 26, 1993, in the rape-slay cases, and (b) the warrant issued August 13, 1993, by Judge Enrico A. Lanzanas in connection with R.A. No. 6713 charges, which at least furnished initial justification for detention. The Court further applied by analogy Rule 102, Sec. 4 and prior decisions holding that subsequent issuance or appearance of jurisdictional process cures the defect of an earlier illegal detention and that the filing of charges and issuance of a valid warrant will prevent relief by habeas corpus that would otherwise be predicated on an earlier invalid arrest. The Court also observed that an accused who objects to the court’s jurisdiction over his person must do so but that, when he raises other grounds in a motion to quash, he is deemed to have waived that objection and submitted to the court’s jurisdiction.

Duplicity and the Seven Informations

The Court rejected the petitioner’s contention that the seven informations alleging seven counts of rape with homicide were legally absurd because only two persons died. The Court explained that where two or more offenders commit successive rapes, the homicide committed on the occasion of each rape is a constituent element of the special complex crime of rape with homicide, so that there may be as many counts as there were rapes. The Court relied on Section 13, Rule 110 on duplicity and the statutory framework of R.A. 2632 and R.A. 4111 which recognize rape with homicide as a special complex crime. The factual allegation was that Mary Eileen Sarmenta was raped successively by seven men and was thereafter killed; each separate rape complexed with the homicide supported a distinct information against each accused.

Allegation of Discriminatory Prosecution

The Court disposed of the complaint that the informations were discriminatory because Teofilo Alqueza and Edgardo Lavadia were not charged. It observed that the prosecutor must charge those who in his opinion appear guilty but cannot be compelled to include persons against whom he believes there is insufficient evidence. The exercise of prosecutorial discretion involves assessment of ev

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