Title
San Agustin vs. Barrios
Case
G.R. No. 46497
Decision Date
Sep 18, 1939
Election protest over Iloilo councilor seat; Supreme Court upheld lower court's compliance in ballot review, affirming Melocoton's 15-vote win.
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 46497)

Factual Background

The election protest centered on the validity and classification of 38 stubless ballots found in the red box of precinct No. 32 of the City of Iloilo. The respondent judge, upon reopening the case pursuant to the Court’s prior order, examined these ballots and treated them as comprising two categories for legal purposes: (a) “excess ballots” (sobrantes) and (b) ballots that had been rejected by the board of canvassers as marked or countersigned.

In the later decision complained of in the certiorari petition, the respondent judge recounted the evidentiary setting and the parties’ positions during the reopened proceedings. He noted that both parties concurred that certain ballots—Exhibits 37, 38 and 39—were to be considered “excess ballots.” He further considered the electoral records for precinct No. 32, including an electoral act (three copies) dated December 15, 1937 and signed by the election officials, identified as Exhibit R. According to that act, 802 persons voted, and there were 802 useful ballots in the ballot box, with approximately ten additional ballots removed without opening and marked as “excess ballots.” The respondent judge treated Exhibit R as admitted without dispute, and therefore accorded it more probative weight than the testimony of the president of the board of canvassers regarding the rejection of certain exhibits as marked.

The respondent judge then relied on the absence in Exhibit R of any enumeration of ballots rejected as marked. He described that the packet of ten “excess ballots” was not found inside the white ballot box nor was any ballot described as tachadas as marked. Applying the cited statutory requirements (Arts. 462 and 463, New Election Law), he concluded that certain exhibits were properly rejected by the inspectors as marked or countersigned, while a limited set could be treated as excess ballots.

Procedural History

Sanagustin first filed the election protest in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo on December 31, 1937. The respondent judge initially ruled against him, confirming the election of the other councilors and enumerating vote totals that placed Sanagustin last among the listed candidates.

Sanagustin then pursued G. R. No. 46196, an original action aimed at reversing the decision and securing a declaration of his own election. On September 12, 1938, the Court ordered the reopening of the election protest and specifically required the respondent judge to consider the 38 stubless ballots in the red box of precinct No. 32, separating excess ballots from those rejected as marked or countersigned, and deciding whether the rejection was erroneous.

In compliance, the respondent judge reopened the election proceedings and rendered a new decision. In that second decision, he again declared the respondents named in the reopened case to be legally elected councilors, computed in terms of the adjusted vote comparison between Sanagustin and Melocoton, and dismissed the protest with costs. Thereafter, Sanagustin filed the present petition for certiorari, challenging the sufficiency of the respondent judge’s segregation and classification of the ballots, and asserting that the respondent judge failed to decide whether the board’s rejection of the marked ballots was correct.

The Parties’ Contentions

Sanagustin contended in the certiorari petition that the respondent judge did not properly segregate excess ballots from ballots held by the board of canvassers to be marked and countersigned. He also argued that the respondent judge failed to decide whether the rejection by the board of the marked ballots was right or wrong, thus purportedly falling short of the Court’s September 12, 1938 mandate in G. R. No. 46196.

The respondents, through the respondent judge’s decision and the record, maintained that the respondent judge already complied with the required segregation and adjudication. They pointed to the respondent judge’s discussion of which exhibits could be treated as excess ballots and which were to be treated as marked or countersigned, including a factual basis anchored on the electoral act and the marks and inscriptions on the ballots.

The Court’s Evaluation of Compliance with the September 12, 1938 Mandate

The Court held that Sanagustin’s contentions were groundless. The Court found that the respondent judge’s last decision sufficiently addressed the required determinations. It observed that the respondent judge, after examining the 38 ballots from the red box of precinct No. 32, expressly identified the excess ballots and the marked ballots. The Court pointed out that the respondent judge stated which ballots he treated as excess—Exhibits Y, MM, 40, 41, 42, 46, 37, 38, and 39—and specified that the remaining twenty-nine ballots had to be deemed properly rejected by the inspectors for being marked or countersigned. The Court found that the respondent judge also particularized the inscriptions and marks relevant to this classification, which, in the Court’s view, constituted enough compliance.

In support of this approach, the Court invoked its prior holdings that a judge may be required to decide a question but not to decide it in a particular manner, citing Arteche vs. De la Rosa, 58 Phil., 589. It likewise cited Sanson vs. Barrios, G. R. No. 45086, promulgated August 22, 1936, emphasizing that the Court would not, through mandamus, order or direct what judgment shall be rendered. Although those principles were stated in the context of remedial limits, the Court treated them as relevant to the scope of certiorari review of whether the respondent judge had made the determinations contemplated by the prior directive.

The Theory-of-the-Case Issue

The Court also considered an additional procedural and doctrinal constraint: Sanagustin’s inability to shift theories after trial in the election protest. The record showed that, when the respondent judge reopened the election case, Melocoton had requested segregation of the excess ballots by sorteo as the alleged only way to do justice, while Sanagustin opposed that method and insisted that the clean or unmarked ballots should be deemed excess, whereas the marked ballots were allegedly those missing from the white ballot box and should be evaluated by the court as to whether they were truly countersigned.

The Court held that, under these circumstances, Sanagustin could not later criticize the segregation on the ground that it was not done in the manner he now proposed. The Court characterized the attempt as an effort to shift from the theory adopted during trial to a new and different theory on review. It cited Toribio vs. Decasa, 55 Phil., 461, which in turn cited Williams vs. McMicking, 17 Phil., 408; Agoncillo and Marino vs. Javier, 38 Phil., 424; and American Express Co. vs. Natividad, 46 Phil., 207.

Classification of the Ballots and the Remaining Vote Margin

Sanagustin further argued that the respondent judge erred in finding Exhibits Y and MM and the other specified exhibits as excess ballots, based on the contention that Y and MM bore on their reverse sides the note “mark ballot.” The Court rejected this argument as fruitless. It noted that even assuming the premise for Sanagustin’s argument, meaning even if the nine ballots treated as excess—Exhibits Y, MM, 40, 41, 42, 46, 37, 38 and 39—were treated as clean and good, the numerical consequence did not place Sanagustin in a winning position.

The Court reproduced the respondent judge’s

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