G.R. No. 203249 - San Roque Power Corp. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

The case revolves around the interpretation of the 120-day and 30-day periods outlined in Section 112(D) of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).
The Supreme Court previously ruled in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc. that simultaneous filing of administrative and judicial claims for VAT refunds is impermissible.
The Court held that premature filing of a judicial claim before the expiration of the 120-day period results in a lack of jurisdiction for the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).
The petitioner, San Roque Power Corporation, filed its claims before the Aichi ruling was promulgated but was dismissed by the CTA for prematurity, aligning with the Aichi decision.
The petitioner contends that the retroactive application of the Aichi ruling adversely affects taxpayers who relied on prior interpretations allowing premature judicial claims.

The Court acknowledges that there was no established precedent prior to Aichi permitting simultaneous claims under Section 112 of the NIRC.
However, the Court recognizes an exception for taxpayers who relied on BIR Ruling DA-489-03, which allowed judicial claims before the 120-day period expired.
This ruling was in effect from December 10, 2003, until it was reversed by Aichi on October 6, 2010.

San Roque Power Corporation, a VAT-registered taxpayer, was granted zero-rating on its sales to the National Power Corporation (NPC) for 2004.
The petitioner filed two administrative claims for refund of unutilized input tax for specific periods in 2005 and 2006.
Due to the inaction of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR), the petitioner filed petitions for review with the CTA, which were initially partially granted by the CTA Division.

The CTA Division granted a partial refund of the petitioner’s claims, totaling P29,931,505.18.
The CIR's motion for reconsideration was denied, leading to the CIR filing a petition for review with the CTA En Banc.

The CTA En Banc ruled that the judicial claims were prematurely filed, violating the 120-day and 30-day periods mandated by Section 112(D) of the NIRC.
The court emphasized that the petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies, which is a prerequisite for invoking the court's review power.

The petitioner argues that at the time of filing, there was no Supreme Court ruling regarding the 120-day and 30-day periods, and that prior CTA decisions allowed for premature filing.
The petitioner contends that the CTA En Banc erred in retroactively applying the Aichi ruling, which established a new procedural rule.

The Court grants the petition, stating that the CTA En Banc did not cite the Aichi case in its decision.
The Court clarifies that the 120-day and 30-day periods are mandatory and jurisdictional, and that the Aichi ruling was an interpretation of existing law rather than a new procedural rule.
The Court reiterates that prior to Aichi, there was no jurisprudence allowing premature filing of judicial claims.

The Court emphasizes that the 120-day period is mandatory and must be adhered to strictly.
The petitioner filed its claims prematurely, as it did not wait for the expiration of the 120-day periods before filing with the CTA.

The Court recognizes that BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 provides an exception to the mandatory nature of the 120-day and 30-day periods.
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