Case Summary (G.R. No. 133743)
Procedural History
Respondent’s petition for letters of administration was filed December 17, 1993. Petitioners filed motions to dismiss (improper venue, lack of legal personality) on February 4–15, 1994; the trial court denied those motions on February 28, 1994. Multiple motions for reconsideration and motions to inhibit/disqualify judges followed, with re-raffling of the case and submission of position papers. On September 12, 1995 the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration; its denial of reconsideration was entered January 31, 1996. The Court of Appeals reversed on February 4, 1998, reinstating the trial court’s earlier orders that denied the motions to dismiss and remanding the case. The Supreme Court denied the consolidated petitions for review, affirmed the Court of Appeals’ reinstatement of the February 28 and October 24, 1994 orders, and remanded for further proceedings.
Trial Court Findings and Rationale
The trial court found that at the time of death Felicisimo was a resident and duly elected governor of Laguna (Sta. Cruz) and therefore venue lay in Laguna, not Makati. It further held respondent lacked legal capacity to file the petition because her marriage to Felicisimo was allegedly bigamous: the Hawaii divorce obtained by Merry Lee was not binding on the Filipino decedent, and paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code could not be applied retroactively to validate the subsequent marriage because retroactive application would impair vested rights (Article 256 of the Family Code). Accordingly, the petition was dismissed.
Court of Appeals Ruling
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. It construed "place of residence" in Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court to mean actual, personal, physical habitation rather than legal domicile, and concluded Felicisimo’s actual residence was Alabang, Muntinlupa; hence venue in Makati was proper. The CA also accepted the Hawaii divorce as effective vis-à-vis the Filipino spouse under the reasoning of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, and applied paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code to hold that Felicisimo had capacity to remarry; therefore respondent was not in a bigamous marriage and had legal capacity to petition for letters of administration.
Issues Presented to the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court framed the issues as: (1) whether venue for the estate settlement was properly laid in Makati, and (2) whether respondent had legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration (i.e., whether the alleged foreign divorce and the subsequent marriage produced legal effects sufficient to make respondent the decedent’s surviving spouse for administration purposes).
Governing Law on Venue and Its Application
Governing provision: Section 1, Rule 73, Rules of Court (estate settlement in the court of the province "in which he resides at the time of his death"). The Court relied on Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals to distinguish "residence" (actual, physical habitation or place of abode) from "domicile" (legal residence with intent to remain). For venue under the Rules of Court, the relevant standard is actual residence, which requires bodily presence and continuity greater than temporary presence. Applying that standard, the Court found respondent’s evidence (deed of sale for the Alabang property dated January 5, 1983; hospital billing statements listing the Alabang address for August–December 1992; membership in Ayala Alabang Village Association and Ayala Country Club; envelopes and calling cards showing the Alabang address and provincial office address) established that Felicisimo maintained an actual residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 until death. Therefore the petition was properly filed in the RTC having territorial jurisdiction over Alabang (Makati RTC at the time pursuant to SC Administrative Order No. 3), and venue was correctly laid in Makati.
Governing Law on Foreign Divorce, Van Dorn, and Article 26(2)
The Court surveyed precedent: Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. recognized that when an alien spouse obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse is released from the marital bond under the foreign jurisdiction and thereby has capacity to remarry under Philippine law; Pilapil and subsequent cases applied the same principle. Paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code (added by E.O. No. 227) codifies the rule that where a marriage between a Filipino and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him/her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. The Court recognized the Van Dorn line of cases as the jurisprudential basis that the Family Code later codified, reflecting legislative intent to avoid a situation where the alien spouse is freed abroad while the Filipino spouse remains bound.
Proof Requirements for Foreign Judgments and Foreign Law
Despite doctrinal recognition that a foreign divorce obtained by an alien spouse can capacitate the Filipino spouse to remarry, the Court emphasized evidentiary rules for proving foreign judgments and foreign law: per Garcia v. Recio and Sections 24–25, Rule 132, a foreign public record must be proven by official publication or a copy attested by the officer having legal custody, and if not kept in the Philippines must be accompanied by a certificate from the proper diplomatic/consular officer and authenticated by his seal. Judicial notice of foreign law is not permitted; foreign law must be alleged and proved. The Court found respondent’s submissions (photocopy of the Hawaii divorce decree and photocopy of a California marriage certificate and an annotated text of the California Family Law Act) insufficient to prove the authenticity, due execution, and the applicable foreign law. Consequently, remand to the trial court was required for proper reception and proof of the divorce decree and the marriage’s validity under foreign law.
Alternative Basis for Respondent’s Legal Capacity: Cohabitation and Co‑ownership
The Court als
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Procedural Posture
- Consolidated petitions for review from G.R. Nos. 133743 and 134029 assail the Court of Appeals Decision dated February 4, 1998 in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647 and its May 15, 1998 Resolution denying motions for reconsideration.
- The Court of Appeals had reversed and set aside the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Makati City, Branch 134 orders of September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996, and reinstated earlier RTC orders dated February 28 and October 24, 1994; it remanded the records for further proceedings.
- Petitioners Edgar and Rodolfo San Luis brought the consolidated petitions to the Supreme Court, challenging (1) venue of the petition for letters of administration and (2) the legal capacity of respondent Felicidad to file the petition.
- The Supreme Court DENIED the petition, AFFIRMED the Court of Appeals’ reinstatement of the RTC orders dated February 28 and October 24, 1994 (which denied motions to dismiss and motions for reconsideration), and REMANDED the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
Relevant Facts — Personal and Familial
- Decedent: Felicisimo T. San Luis, former governor of Laguna, died December 18, 1992.
- Marriages:
- First marriage: Virginia Sulit, married March 17, 1942; six children born: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita, Manuel. Virginia predeceased Felicisimo on August 11, 1963.
- Second marriage: Merry Lee Corwin (an American citizen), married May 1, 1968. They had one son, Tobias. Merry Lee filed a Complaint for Divorce in the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii on October 15, 1971; Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody issued December 14, 1973.
- Third marriage: Felicidad Sagalongos (later Felicidad San Luis), married June 20, 1974 before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, United Presbyterian minister in Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. No children from this marriage. The couple cohabited for 18 years until Felicisimo’s death.
- Residence claimed by parties:
- Petitioners (children) maintained that Felicisimo’s domicile/residence was Sta. Cruz, Laguna (where he exercised public office).
- Respondent alleged and offered evidence that Felicisimo actually resided in New Alabang Village, Alabang (100 San Juanico Street, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa) from about 1982 until his death.
Origin of the Controversy — Petition for Letters of Administration
- On December 17, 1993, respondent Felicidad filed a petition for letters of administration in the RTC of Makati City (SP. Proc. No. M-3708, raffled to Branch 146) alleging:
- She was the surviving widow of Felicisimo.
- Decedent’s residence at death was 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila.
- Surviving heirs: respondent (legal spouse), six children from first marriage, and one son from second marriage.
- Decedent left real properties (conjugal and exclusive) valued at approximately P30,304,178.00 and had no unpaid debts.
- Prayer: liquidation of conjugal partnership assets and issuance of letters of administration to respondent.
Trial Court Proceedings — Challenges, Orders, and Rulings
- Motions to dismiss:
- Rodolfo filed motion to dismiss on February 4, 1994 for improper venue and failure to state cause of action, asserting the petition should have been filed in Laguna and claiming respondent was only a mistress because the marriage to Merry Lee subsisted.
- Linda joined the motion on February 15, 1994; other children later filed similar motions and motions for reconsideration.
- RTC initial orders:
- February 28, 1994: Trial court denied the motions to dismiss.
- Respondent filed opposition and submitted proof of Alabang residence and the Hawaii divorce decree to support capacity to remarry.
- Trial court required position papers on venue and legal capacity on April 24, 1995; parties submitted on May–June 1995.
- Change of judges and disqualification/inhibition motions:
- Mila filed motion to disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos on April 21, 1994; substitution and subsequent motions for inhibition led to re-raffling.
- Judge Tensuan granted inhibition on November 25, 1994; case re-raffled to Branch 134; motions for inhibition and reconsideration ensued.
- RTC final dispositive orders:
- September 12, 1995: RTC, Branch 134 (Judge Paul T. Arcangel) dismissed the petition for letters of administration, holding:
- Venue improper: Felicisimo was duly elected governor and resident of the Province of Laguna; petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
- Respondent lacked legal capacity: marriage to Felicisimo was bigamous and void ab initio because the Hawaii divorce was not valid in the Philippines and did not bind a Filipino citizen.
- Paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code could not be retroactively applied as it would impair vested rights of Felicisimo’s legitimate children.
- Motions for reconsideration and for disqualification were denied (January 31, 1996).
- September 12, 1995: RTC, Branch 134 (Judge Paul T. Arcangel) dismissed the petition for letters of administration, holding:
Court of Appeals Decision (CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, Feb. 4, 1998)
- The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC orders of September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996, and reinstated the RTC orders of February 28 and October 24, 1994, remanding the case for further proceedings.
- Findings of the Court of Appeals:
- Venue: Under Section 1, Rule 73, “place of residence” means personal, actual or physical habitation (residence) as distinct from legal residence or domicile. Although Felicisimo worked as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa; therefore the petition was correctly filed in Makati City (which had territorial jurisdiction then over Muntinlupa).
- Legal capacity: The Court of Appeals held that the Hawaii divorce validly dissolved the second marriage and, under paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and jurisprudence (Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.; Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera), Felicisimo was capacitated to remarry. The marriage to respondent therefore was not bigamous and respondent had standing under Article 130 of the Family Code to institute settlement proceedings.
Issues Presented to the Supreme Court
- Whether venue for the petition for letters of administration was properly laid in the RTC of Makati City.
- Whether respondent Felicidad had legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration (i.e., whether her marriage to Felicisimo was valid or whether she could otherwise be an “interested person” entitled to seek letters of administration).
Supreme Court Ruling — Summary of Holdings
- Petition denied; Court of Appeals’ reinstatemen