Title
San Juan Structural and Steel Fabricators, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
Case
G.R. No. 129459
Decision Date
Sep 29, 1998
Petitioner paid P100,000 for land sale, but respondent’s treasurer lacked authority to sell. SC voided contract, ordered return of payment, denied damages, upheld corporate veil.
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 223767)

Petitioner

San Juan Structural and Steel Fabricators, Inc. seeks enforcement of the February 14, 1989 Agreement of sale and recovery of damages and attorney’s fees for alleged bad faith refusal to execute the Transfer of Rights/Deed of Assignment after payment of earnest money.

Respondents

Motorich Sales Corporation denies authorizing its treasurer, Nenita Gruenberg, to sell corporate land or to bind the corporation in such transaction; Nenita Gruenberg contends she lacked authority to bind Motorich and offered to return the earnest money when the sale did not materialize. ACL Development and JNM Realty were impleaded as necessary parties because of their roles in prior transfers recorded in title history.

Key Dates and Procedural Posture

Agreement dated February 14, 1989; balance due March 2, 1989. RTC (Branch 63, Makati) dismissed complaint and counterclaim; Court of Appeals modified RTC decision to order refund of the P100,000 to petitioner; Supreme Court review resulted in denial of the petition and affirmation of the CA decision with the refund order upheld. Decision reviewed here is dated September 29, 1998 (governing constitutional context: 1987 Constitution).

Applicable Law

Governing instruments and provisions relied upon in the decision include: Section 23 and Section 96 of BP Blg. 68 (Corporation Code), Civil Code provisions (Arts. 1318, 1874, 1878, 1910, 1409, 2154, 2155), and jurisprudential principles concerning corporate agency, ratification, and piercing the corporate veil. The decision applies settled principles on corporate authority and the circumstances permitting disregard of the corporate entity.

Issues Presented

The Supreme Court framed and addressed: (1) whether a valid and enforceable contract of sale existed between petitioner and Motorich; (2) whether the corporate veil of Motorich could be pierced (i.e., treat acts of the treasurer/major stockholders as binding the corporation); (3) whether alleged alteration of a transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) was material; and (4) whether respondents are liable for damages and attorney’s fees.

Material Facts Found by the Courts Below

San Juan executed an Agreement of February 14, 1989 with a signature of Nenita Gruenberg as “Treasurer” of Motorich and paid P100,000 as earnest money. Petitioner presented a Metrobank cashier’s check to pay the balance by March 2, 1989 but the transacting meeting did not occur; Motorich refused to execute the Transfer of Rights/Deed of Assignment. Motorich later obtained a new title under TCT No. 3571 in the names of Nenita and Reynaldo Gruenberg. Petitioner sued for specific performance and damages; Motorich and Gruenberg denied authority and asserted signature by treasurer alone was inadequate to bind the corporation.

Trial Court and Court of Appeals Disposition

The RTC dismissed the complaint, finding no evidence that Gruenberg was authorized by Motorich’s board to effect disposition of corporate land and noting the statutory requirements governing disposition of corporate assets. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal but modified the judgment to order Gruenberg to refund the P100,000 earnest money to petitioner. The CA found absence of corporate ratification and inadequate proof of authority; it noted the receipt issued was not a corporate receipt and bore only Gruenberg’s signature.

Supreme Court Analysis — Validity and Enforceability of the Agreement

The Supreme Court held there was no valid contract binding Motorich because the seller’s consent (authority of the corporation) was not proven. It reiterated the foundational rule that a corporation acts through its board of directors and authorized officers (Section 23, Corp. Code) and that the authority of corporate officers to bind the corporation must be shown by articles, bylaws, board resolution, or proof of actual or apparent authority. The Court emphasized that a treasurer’s ordinary functions (receipt and disbursement of funds) do not generally include the power to sell corporate real property and that Articles 1874 and 1878 of the Civil Code require written authority for an agent to sell immovable property. Because petitioner failed to prove that Gruenberg had actual, apparent, or ratified authority to sell the land, the February 14, 1989 instrument was void under Article 1874 and inexistent as to Motorich; the consent of the corporation was absent and thus no perfected obligation existed under Article 1318.

Supreme Court Analysis — Corporate Veil and Close Corporation Argument

Petitioner’s contention that Motorich was a close corporation or that the corporate veil should be pierced because the Gruenbergs owned virtually all stock was rejected. The Court declined to consider the close-corporation argument in detail because petitioner raised it belatedly on appeal; courts ordinarily do not entertain new theories not advanced at trial. On the merits, the Court reiterated that mere concentrated ownership does not, by itself, justify disregarding separate corporate personality. Piercing the corporate veil is an equitable remedy reserved when the corporate form is used to perpetrate fraud, illegality, or inequity. Petitioner failed to prove such misuse. The Court also observed that even if the corporate veil were disregarded, the property would be conjugal property of the spouses; under the conjugal partnership or community property regimes, unilateral alienation by one spouse without consent or judicial authority would still be invalid. Hence, the close-corporation theory or veil-piercing would not validate the sale.

Supreme Court Analysis — TSN Alteration Claim

Petitioner pointed to an alleged alteration in the TSN where a “Yes” answer was crossed out and replaced by “No” on whether Gruenberg represented herself as authorized. The Court found the claimed alteration immaterial because Gruenberg’s fuller testimony, read in context, did not establish that she represented herself as having corporate author

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