Title
Sampayan vs. Court of Appeals
Case
G.R. No. 156360
Decision Date
Jan 14, 2005
Dispute over Lot No. 1959: Respondents claimed forcible entry by petitioner, who denied prior possession. SC ruled petitioner proved prior possession; respondents' evidence insufficient. MCTC jurisdiction upheld.
forcible entry
jurisdiction
prior physical possession

Case Summary (G.R. No. 156360)

Factual Background

On July 8, 1992, Crispulo Vasquez and Florencia Vasquez-Gilsano, siblings and private respondents herein, filed in the MCTC a complaint for forcible entry against Cesar Sampayan. They alleged that they and their mother, Cristita Quita, were the owners and lawful possessors of a parcel identified as Lot No. 1959, PLS-225. After their mother’s death on January 11, 1984, they claimed to have become co-owners pro-indiviso and lawful possessors. They alleged that on June 1, 1992, while they were temporarily absent, Sampayan entered and occupied the lot through strategy and stealth, built a house thereon, excluded them, and refused to vacate despite repeated demands.

In his answer, Sampayan denied material allegations and asserted that neither the plaintiffs nor their mother had been in possession of Lot No. 1959 and that he did not even know their identities or whereabouts. He claimed that he did not enter by stealth or strategy because permission was given by Maria Ybanez, the overseer of the true owners, the Spouses Anastacio Terrado, who were allegedly residing in Cebu City for business purposes. He also raised the alleged long prescription of plaintiffs’ claim based on prior possession and tax declarations by the Oriol spouses. He alleged that in 1960, the Oriols had possessed and declared the property for taxation; that in 1978 the Oriols sold one-half (one-half) of the lot to the Terrados; and that the other half was sold in 1979 to Manolito Occida and Juliana Sambale-Occida, who allegedly possessed their respective portions to the present.

To prove prior possession, the private respondents presented, among others, Tax Declaration No. 3180 in the name of Cristita Quita; a certificate of death showing Cristita Quita died on January 11, 1984; a DENR certification that Lot 1959, PLS-225 was covered by a Miscellaneous Sales Application of Cristita Quita; an affidavit of Emiliano G. Gatillo that he gave the lot to Cristita Quita in 1957 and that she had been occupying it since then; and materials relating to Cadastral Case No. 149, including a decision therein showing that Lot No. 1959 was among the lots subject of that cadastral case.

Sampayan, in turn, presented tax declarations and deeds intended to show transfers from the Oriols to the Occida couple and to the Terrados. He also offered evidence of alleged continuous possession by the vendees. In addition, he submitted sworn affidavits, including Dionisia Noynay, stating that she had been residing on an adjacent lot since 1960 and that neither Cristita Quita nor the private respondents had ever possessed Lot No. 1959, and that it was the Occida couple who possessed it and introduced improvements.

MCTC Proceedings and Ocular Inspection

While the case was pending, the MCTC judge conducted a personal ocular inspection on March 21, 1996 in the presence of the parties and/or their counsels. In the area, the judge observed, among others, the house of defendant Sampayan, the dilapidated house of Peter Siscon, and a portion of the house of Macario Noynay, husband of Sampayan’s witness Dionisia Noynay. The judge also noted fruit-bearing and non-fruit-bearing coconut trees, and star apple (caimito) trees.

Based on the ocular findings, the MCTC judge concluded that the improvements visible on the land could never have been introduced by the private respondents nor by their mother Cristita Quita, but instead by the vendees of the lot. The judge stated that nothing indicated that the plaintiffs had once been in possession. The judge further described the claim that Cristita Quita had been in possession since 1957 as a “naked claim” unsupported by evidence. The MCTC judge reasoned that, from the appearance of the improvements, the predecessors of Sampayan had been in possession for more than one year. On that basis, the judge treated the action as one that could amount to accion publiciana or plenaria de posesion, and dismissed the complaint.

RTC Reversal and Appeal to the Court of Appeals

The private respondents appealed to the RTC. In its Decision dated December 5, 1996, Branch VII reversed the MCTC. The RTC relied on the fact that Cristita Quita was an oppositor in Cadastral Case No. 149 and that she filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application. From those circumstances, the RTC concluded that Cristita Quita, as the predecessor-in-interest of the private respondents, was in actual prior physical possession of Lot No. 1959.

Sampayan then appealed to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43557. The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated May 16, 2002, denied the petition and affirmed. It also denied reconsideration in its Resolution dated November 7, 2002.

Issues Raised by Petitioner

Sampayan raised two principal grounds: first, he contended that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the MCTC’s jurisdiction, arguing that during trial it was found out that accion publiciana or plenaria de posesion and not forcible entry was the proper action; and second, he argued that the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that private respondents had prior actual possession was contradicted by the evidence on record. He maintained that possession for purposes of legal sufficiency would consist of unmistakable acts of dominion and control, and that the private respondents had not shown acts such as fencing or cultivating.

Supreme Court’s Treatment of Jurisdiction

The Supreme Court began by framing the analysis around the essential elements of a forcible entry case. It reiterated that in forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove prior possession and deprivation through force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, and that absence of prior physical possession warrants dismissal. The Court also recognized that issues of prior physical possession are factual, and ordinarily the Supreme Court does not re-examine evidence, while acknowledging recognized exceptions.

Before determining who had prior physical possession, the Court resolved petitioner’s jurisdictional argument. Relying on Sarmiento vs. CA, the Supreme Court held that for the MCTC to acquire jurisdiction in forcible entry, it sufficed that the complaint averred the jurisdictional facts appearing on its face: that the plaintiff had prior physical possession and was deprived thereof through the statutory modes. Thus, the Court ruled that the irrelevant circumstance that evidence adduced during the hearing rendered an action inappropriate could not deprive the MCTC of jurisdiction. The MCTC therefore retained jurisdiction over the case.

Supreme Court’s Determination of Prior Physical Possession

On the more decisive question—who had prior actual physical possession when the complaint was filed—the Supreme Court examined the record and found for petitioner. It stressed that the MCTC judge’s ocular inspection findings were uncontested and showed that improvements on the land—such as the caimito trees and coconut trees—confirmed the allegation that Sampayan’s predecessors introduced improvements. The MCTC judge also categorically stated that the claim of possession by Cristita Quita since 1957 was a naked, unsupported assertion. The Supreme Court further relied on the sworn affidavit of Dionisia Noynay, an immediate neighbor who declared that she had resided on adjacent Lot No. 1957 since 1960 and that neither the private respondents nor their mother had possessed Lot No. 1959. The Supreme Court accorded her statement great weight.

The Supreme Court also noted that the MCTC judge found during ocular inspection that part of Macario Noy

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