Title
Sama y Hinupas vs. People
Case
G.R. No. 224469
Decision Date
Jan 5, 2021
Accused Iraya-Mangyan IPs acquitted of illegal logging charges; prosecution failed to prove Dita tree as "timber" or location, and IP rights claim under IPRA was unaddressed.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 224469)

Prosecution Version (facts as adduced at trial)

  • Apprehending officer PO3 Villamor Ranee and team conducting surveillance for illegal logging heard chainsaw and observed a tree falling; they traced the sound, crossed a river and found the accused at the site and a bolo attached to the felled tree; accused admitted they had no permit; team transported accused to police station and took photos; Joint Affidavit of apprehending officers, Apprehension Receipt and pictures were offered.

Defense Version and Evidence of Indigenous Status

  • Barangay Captain Rolando Aceveda testified the arrested persons were Iraya‑Mangyan IPs and that the logged dita tree was planted within the Iraya‑Mangyan ancestral domain and had been felled for a communal toilet project organized by an NGO (Team Mission); he identified petitioners by name.
  • NCIP involvement: NCIP Legal Affairs Office represented petitioners throughout the proceedings and filed motions and pleadings on their behalf; CADC No. R04‑CADC‑126 covering municipalities including Baco and San Teodoro was issued to the Iraya‑Mangyan and pending conversion to CADT at time of record.

Trial Court Ruling and Rationale

  • RTC convicted petitioners of violating Section 77, PD 705; held the dita tree to be timber under the statute and that cutting without permit is prohibited; ruled Section 77 malum prohibitum so criminal intent is not required; dismissed IP defense for failure to prove indigenous title/authority and faulted petitioners for not testifying personally.

Court of Appeals Ruling and Focus of Review

  • CA affirmed RTC conviction (May 29, 2015): emphasized petitioners’ failure to present any license, lease or permit authorizing logging; faulted reliance on IPRA because petitioners did not substantiate proof of being Iraya‑Mangyan IPs or that the site fell within an ancestral domain protected by IPRA; denied motion for reconsideration.

Issues Presented to the Supreme Court

  • Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt: (1) petitioners’ ethnicity as Iraya‑Mangyan IPs; and (2) elements of Section 77 PD 705, namely (a) the dita tree is a species of timber, (b) the timber was cut from forest land, alienable/disposable public land or private land as contemplated in Section 77, and (c) the cutting/collection occurred without any authority granted by the State.

Statutory Elements Under Section 77 and Ownership Considerations

  • Section 77 proscribes cutting/gathering/collecting/removing timber or forest products from forest land, timber from alienable/disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority; it also punishes possession without required legal documents. Past precedents reflected in the record treat ownership of the timber/land as non‑essential to the statutory offense; the central elements are the act, the object (timber/forest product from specified lands), and lack of authority.

Court’s Findings on Ethnicity and Ancestral Domain Claim

  • The Supreme Court found petitioners are Iraya‑Mangyan IPs: (a) the Information listed them as residents of Barangay Baras, Baco (an area publicly known to be inhabited by Iraya‑Mangyan); (b) Barangay Captain Aceveda’s clear testimony identifying petitioners and stating the felled tree stood in land owned by the Mangyans; and (c) NCIP’s ongoing formal representation and the issued CADC (R04‑CADC‑126) covering the area. These record points were treated as sufficient to establish IP identity and a claim to ancestral domain for purposes of resolving criminal liability.

Court’s Findings on the Nature of the Dita Tree and Source Land

  • The Court accepted that the dita tree qualified as “timber” (suitable for building; intended for a communal toilet) and therefore within the statutory object of Section 77.
  • As to the source land, the Court concluded the tree was cut from land that could fall within any of the Section 77 categories (private land, forest land, or alienable/disposable public land), applying the statute’s definitions and prior authorities; but crucially it held that ownership alone is not an element that negates the statute’s coverage.

Legal Analysis on “Authority” under Section 77 in Light of IPRA and Amendments

  • Historical evolution: earlier Forestry provisions specified a permit or license from the Director/DENR; Executive Order No. 277 (1987) amended the text to punish cutting “without any authority,” i.e., broader, unspecific language.
  • The Court stressed (1) that the explicit textual evolution—from a specific licensing requirement to an unqualified “any authority”—permits a reasonable reading that the required “authority” may encompass other legitimate sources beyond DENR permits, (2) that IPRA and subsequent administrative instruments (including DENR–NCIP coordinating measures) recognize customary/collective forms of resource stewardship, and (3) that those developments created a plausible ambiguity about whether IP exercise of ancestral‑domain resource rights could constitute lawful authority for limited, customary uses.

Standard of Proof, Reasonable Doubt, and Application to the Case

  • The Court reiterated the standard: criminal guilt must be proved beyond reasonable doubt; reasonable doubt is a doubt grounded in logical connection to the evidence and not fanciful.
  • Applying that standard, the Court found reasonable doubt existed as to whether petitioners acted “without any authority”: petitioners acted pursuant to community elders’ instructions, with an NGO project and NCIP engagement, and within an acknowledged ancestral domain (CADC). Those circumstances, together with the textual shift in the Forestry provision and nascent administrative reconciliation between DENR and NCIP, created doubt whether the act was lawless. The prosecution’s evidence that arresting officers did not personally witness the actual felling (officer saw petitioners holding the chainsaw and arrived after the tree had been cut) also contributed to reasonable doubt about identity/conspiracy and precise culpable acts.

Supreme Court’s Holding and Disposition

  • The Supreme Court (majority opinion by Justice Lazaro‑Javier) GRANTED the petition: reversed CA Decision (May 29, 2015) and Resolution (April 11, 2016), and ACQUITTED petitioners Diosdado Sama, Bandy Masanglay and co‑accused Demetrio Masanglay on reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. CR‑05‑8066. The Court rested the acquittal primarily on reasonable doubt that the acte was committed “without any authority” under Section 77 given the IP assertions, NCIP involvement, the CADC, and the changed statutory and administrative context.

Separate Opinions—Concurring and Dissenting Perspectives (brief)

  • Concurring (per curiam and multiple Justices): Several Justices filed separate concurring opinions elaborating on constitutional and IPRA foundations for recognizing IP rights and the sui generis nature of ancestral domain rights, including Justice Perlas‑Bernabe (concurs; emphasizes statutory and constitutional context), Justice Leonen (concurs; historical and jurisprudential background), Justice Caguioa (separ
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